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Abstract 
This thesis presents an empirical study of the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth from the legal protection perspective for a large number of countries, based 
on both micro firm-level data and macro country-level data. Our study comprehensively examines 
the investor legal protection in terms of legal statues, legal enforcement and legal origins. We first 
examine the mechanism through which the legal system affects firm investment behaviour 
controlling for the cost of capital in error terms of the empirical model. We find that firms invest 
more in the following period if legal protection of shareholders or creditors is stronger. The study 
suggests that a well-functioning legal system will benefit financial development; consequently 
access to external finance in the financial sector will be easier, thus firms are less sensitive to 
internal financing. Secondly, we further investigate the reason why a firm’s investment will increase 
when legal protection is strengthened by taking into account of the cost of capital. We examine 
whether stronger legal protection of investors is associated with lower cost of capital. The empirical 
study provides evidence that stronger legal protection will lead to a decrease in the cost of debt and 
cost of equity, since it promotes financial development and thus funds are more available. Finally, 
we construct four new indices to measure financial development on the country level. These indices 
measure financial development from the qualitative aspect rather than the quantitative aspect of 
financial market and financial intermediaries. The indices measure the liquidity and volatility of 
financial market while assessing the efficiency of banking and non-banking sector. Based on these 
financial development indicators, we find that economic growth is accelerated by financial 
development which is exogenously determined by the functioning of legal systems.  
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1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and Hypothesis 
This thesis intends to provide a piece of work on the finance-growth nexus. First and 
foremost, we need to clarify the role that the financial system plays in economic growth, as there 
has been a debate on the causality between financial development and economic growth among 
many influential economists over the last century. Although Joan Robinson (1952, p.86) stated that 
―where enterprise leads finance follows‖, which means that economic growth causes financial 
development, many others such as Miller (1998), Schumpeter (1912), and Goldsmith (1969) argue 
that the finance system contributes to economic growth. For example, Schumpeter (1912, p.74) said 
that ―the banker, therefore, is not so much primarily a middleman. He authorizes people in the name 
of society...to innovate‖, which states the idea that finance favours innovation which will boost 
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economic growth.   
Theoretically, there has been an extensive work to illustrate the hypothesis that finance 
causes growth. It has been emphasized that the economy benefits from more capital formation and 
technological innovation via services that the financial system provides. According to Levine 
(2004), there are five major functions that the financial system has. The financial industry serves the 
economy as it  
“1. produces information ex ante about possible investments and allocates capital;  
 2. monitors investments and exerts corporate governance after providing finance;  
 3. facilitates the trading, diversification and management of risk;  
 4. mobilizes and pools savings;  
 5. eases the exchange of goods and services” 
            Precisely, from the microeconomic perspective, theories state that financial development can 
ease the costs when firms raise funds from external sources. (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) Since external funds are believed to be more costly than internal 
funds as a result of the asymmetric information problem, (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981) financial development can provide more accounting transparency and information 
disclosure and improve corporate governance, which reduces the gap between the cost of internal 
financing and external financing and thus encourages firms to identify more investment 
opportunities from external sources of funds.  
The causality from finance to growth can also be illustrated by economic phenomena from 
the world history: for instance Sen (2000) summarizes that mediaeval Indian economic growth 
owed much to the fast development of finance in terms of capital mobilization and technology 
progress. Furthermore, this causality issue has been largely illustrated by recent empirical analyses 
on a variety of econometric techniques. In terms of time series studies, Granger causality tests and 
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Vector Autoregressive (VAR) technique are usually applied to examine whether finance causes 
growth. The results suggest that financial development causes economic growth instead of vice 
versa. (e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Xu, 2000) Recent panel time series analyses such as unit 
root tests and the panel cointegration technique further confirm this causality issue in the long-run. 
(e.g. Wu and Chen, 1999; Christophoulos and Tsionas, 2004) At the same time, researchers based 
on cross-country studies construct indicators of financial intermediaries development as well as 
financial market development and conclude that the level of financial development positively 
influences the long-run economic growth in terms of real per capita GDP growth, real per capita 
capital stock growth, and productivity growth. (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 
1998) Furthermore, the use of instrumental variables controlling for the legislation, government 
regulation and culture differences in these cross-country studies has proved that the causality 
running from finance to growth is not due to simultaneous bias. (e.g. Levine et al. 2000) Later on, 
the panel data approaches controlling for effects from both time-series and cross-section use the 
same indicators of financial development as above and also illustrate the causality from finance to 
growth. (e.g. Beck, et al. 2000; Levine et al, 2000, Beck and Levine, 2003) In Chapter 4 there will 
be a thorough review of this part of literature. Moreover, the industry-level and firm-level studies 
provide a more detailed mechanism through which finance causes growth. These studies 
demonstrate that better-developed financial systems facilitate firm investments and firm growth by 
reducing the cost of external financing. (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Love, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1998 ) 
As historical and empirical evidence has demonstrated that finance causes growth, finance is 
as important as other forms of physical capital to economic growth. Therefore, an advanced 
investigation into the determinant of financial development can provide a resolution of the financial 
liberalization which is good for the process of economic growth. This is the intention of the thesis. 
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We would like to analyse the factors that influence financial development and trace the impact on 
economic growth through particular channels.   
1.2 The Financial Structure View versus the Legal View 
Over the last century, financial economists have been debating the comparative advantages 
of financial markets and financial intermediaries in order to explain the cross-country difference in 
financial development. Research which stresses the advantages of developed banks mainly focuses 
on the functions of banks in terms of information revelation and risk reduction(for example, 
Gerschenkron, 1962; Goldsmith, 1969; Allen and Gale, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001); 
while financial market proponents emphasize the drawbacks raised by bank-based systems, mainly 
in terms of effectiveness of operation and corporate governance problems (for example, Allen and 
Gale, 1999; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998). However, those studies do 
not provide enough evidence on whether a banking-based system is superior to a market-based 
system or the other way around. Studies in recent decades tend to ignore this argument but 
concentrate on the functions that the financial system provides and factors that influence these 
functions. Typical of this view is the work on the impact of the legal system on financial market 
development and operation, which argues that a well-functioning legal system improves the way the 
financial system allocates resources and hence promotes economic growth and also that certain 
legal rules imply the development of financial market-based systems while others promote bank-
based systems. Since finance is established by a series of contracts/agreements defined and operated 
by laws, regulatory and legal enforcement mechanisms, the financial system cannot function 
properly without an effective legal system as investors’ rights are not secured.  
Over the past half century, scholars began to explore the effects of legal institutions related 
to corporate governance. (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Hart, 1995; Modigliani and Perotti, 
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1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; La Porta et al., 1997; henceforth LLSV). Recent law, finance and 
development studies during the past ten years have been dominated by the LLSV’s view, which 
states that legal institutions determine financial development and thus influence economic growth. 
The level of legal protection on investors can explain the cross-country difference in financial 
development. Furthermore, the distinction between common laws and civil laws can explain the 
difference in shareholder protection and creditor protection and thus indicate the divergence of 
financial development around the world. (see LLSV, 1998; 2000; Balas et al., 2009, etc)  
Recently, this view has been challenged by a new type of study on the law, finance and 
development carried out by the Centre for Business Research (CBR), University of Cambridge.(see 
Sarkar and Singh, 2009) Their empirical results repudiate LLSV’s view on legal origins and reject 
the hypothesis that greater shareholder protection leads to stock market development. The 
divergence between LLSV view and Cambridge view is partly because of the difference in the 
database that measures legal protections on shareholders, where the former is based on the ad hoc 
collection of legal variables for a single cross-section year in the mid 1990’s for both developed and 
developing countries; while the latter covers 36-year period, 1970-2005, but only for four 
developed countries.  
Albeit criticized, LLSV’s method is more applicable in the law, finance and development 
study across countries, because they have built up a more complete database which covers about 
200 countries in terms of not only shareholders protection, but also creditor protection. The use of 
LLSV method can help our work in this thesis generate a broader picture about the law and finance 
in the world. Therefore, our following work will be carried out based on LLSV’s database and their 
hypothesis. A more explicit discussion about this view is as follows. However, we have to be aware 
of the limitations of using such time-invariant LLSV type data rather than time-series and hence are 
more careful about the policy implications as argued by Sarkar and Singh (2009).  
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There are two parts in LLSV’s view that explain the linkage between the legal system and 
financial development: 1) legal protection on investors determines financial development; 2) legal 
origins are highly correlated with the level of legal protection, thus determine financial development. 
1.2.1 Investor Protection 
The most important factor that associates legal institutions with financial development is the 
extent of and type of investor protection provided by the legal system. In many countries, 
expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by majority/controlling shareholders and 
managers is extensive. (we usually refer to managers and controlling shareholders of a firm as 
―insiders‖ and outside investors as ―outsiders‖) When outsiders finance firms, they may face the 
risk of being expropriated by the insiders creating uncertainty about their returns on the investment, 
which, in turn, influences a firm’s ability to access external finance from the financial system, hence 
impacting on the overall quality of financial development. From this point of view, investor 
protection or the proper functioning of the corporate governance mechanism is essential. 
The legal system can provide an effective method to protect investor rights. For example, 
contract law ensures the execution of agreements and contracts, while the company, bankruptcy and 
securities laws systematically and explicitly describe the rights of insiders and outside investors. 
Laws grant minority shareholders the same rights as the majority shareholders in receiving 
dividends, buying new issues of shares, participating and voting in shareholders’ meetings, and 
furthermore calling extraordinary shareholders’ meetings; while the laws protect creditor with 
priority rights in the bankruptcy and reorganization process, as well as in repossessing 
collateral.(see La Porta et al., 2002) Besides that, other laws such as takeover law and competition 
laws also provide legal sources for investor protection. Furthermore there is regulation of stock 
markets and other financial institutions; accounting standards also function quite similarly with laws 
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as they provide information which limits the opportunities of the insiders’ managerial expropriation 
and allows for more transparent protection for investors. 
When laws and regulations clearly define the rights of both insiders and outsiders and 
embody the idea of investor protection, the effectiveness of these laws and regulations in protecting 
investors can be significantly influenced by their enforcement taken out by courts, regulators, 
governments as well as market participants. Therefore, not only a country’s legal rules and 
regulations, but also their enforcement capabilities can determine what rights the investors have and 
how well their rights are protected. This, in turn, will impact on the behaviour of investors, financial 
firms and managers/shareholders. 
When investors are well protected, they should be more willing to participate in the financial 
system and therefore invest more, which will broaden and deepen the financial system through both 
banks and markets. For example, LLSV (1997) and Levine (1997) respectively argue that countries, 
with better legal protection for shareholders, have a broader financial market in terms of market 
capitalization, number of listed firms as well as initial public offers (IPOs); whilst countries with 
better creditor protection have a deeper credit market in terms of the total private credit. 
Following those studies, we would expect that better financial development will offer better 
terms for firms’ external finance in terms of funds availability and liquidity. In other words, 
entrepreneurs find easier and less costly access to external finance. This is important as a firm relies 
not only on its internal funds, but also the external funds, when funding its growth. Prior studies 
from the industry or firm level empirically prove this linkage that lower cost of external finance 
favours firm growth. (See Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2002; etc) Since better legal protection for 
investors eases obstacles to external finance, firms will be able to sell more equity and raise more 
debts in the financial system, at a price which makes it worthwhile, which leads to more investment 
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and expansion of firms. From this hypothesis, this is one channel through which legal protection 
matters for growth via its impact on financial development. As Davis (2003) states, ―Laws are 
particularly important in economic activities as they can encourage exchanges and investments, the 
two main wealth-creating activities in a capitalist system.” Therefore, it will be interesting to 
examine this mechanism, through which legal protection influences economic growth, based on the 
study of firm investment behaviour.  
 
1.2.2 Legal Heritage 
There is another explanation of why legal environment could determine financial 
development from the historical perspective. This approach holds that legal heritage can shape a 
country’s approach to property rights and investor protection and hence determine the extent and 
character of financial development. In other words, a country’s legal heritage can help explain the 
cross-country difference in law and regulations as well as their enforcement, thus identifying the 
reasons for the cross-country difference in financial development. 
Based on the comparative legal scholars’ study of the European legal system (Reynolds & 
Flores, 1989), there are four major legal families in the world: English Common law, French Civil 
Law, German Civil law and Scandinavian Civil law. More generally, the key discussion is based on 
the difference between ―judge-made‖ law (English Common Law) and ―Code Laws‖ (French Civil 
Law) and whether there is an independent judiciary developing procedure to constrain the power of 
the state. The Common law system and Civil law system are quite distinct due to their historical 
origins while the other two civil law families (German and Scandinavian) have something in 
common with French civil law systems. 
It is identified that civil law systems are generated from the Justinian texts, codified from the 
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Roman civil law by the Roman emperor, Justinian, in the sixth century  (Hayek, 1960). The 
formalization of the civil law, either French or German, embodies the consolidation of the 
government role in the system and relegates the bureaucratic role of judges (LLSV, 1999a). Theory 
of the Civil Code requires only that the legislature drafts explain laws but does not allow judges any 
right to make laws by giving interpretation to ambiguous laws. Therefore, the civil law system 
embraces more government intervention, which may interfere in the operation of competitive 
financial markets and hinder financial market development, (LLSV, 1998). In addition it expresses, 
to some extent, a static and rigid legal tradition (Johnson et al., 2000), which will not meet 
commercial or other environmental changes, and hence may not provide the conditions for financial 
development. For instance, judges are not allowed to go beyond the statutes made by legislatures 
and hence they cannot react sufficiently to protect outsiders from expropriation from the insiders in 
such ways not forbidden by laws. 
The British Common Laws are distinguished from the Civil Laws in terms of the 
relationship between the state and the courts (Beck & Levine, 2003). Common law strengthens the 
status of the individual relative to that of the state. Historically, the English common law system 
developed as a result of the compromise between the monarch and Parliament and the property 
owners who dominated it. Common Laws allow the courts to place the law above the monarch, 
which limits the rights of the monarch and embodies property protection as a way of reducing the 
power of the monarch. Over time, these property protection rights are extended to investors.  
Another feature of the common law is that judges play a more particular role in the legal 
system than that in the civil-law countries. The judges in common law countries have power in 
interpreting the law and in ruling on any new situations which are not described in statutes. In the 
real economy, they can identify whether some unprecedented actions from the insiders are harmful 
or unfair to the insiders, which creates a constraint to insiders and limits their ability to expropriate 
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the outsiders. Hence, they can protect investors powerfully and flexibly. 
According to this argument, the common law system can protect investors rights more 
efficiently and bolster financial development more than the civil law system both because it acts as 
the counterpart of the state to protect property rights and investor rights, and because it has an more 
independent and influential judiciary that is capable of interpreting laws to meet variations of 
financial needs in the economy. 
The above descriptions can be summarised into two mechanisms through which legal 
origins affect financial development: the political mechanism and the legal-adaptability mechanism. 
The political mechanism stresses the private rights related to the power of the state as well as the 
independence of the judiciary; while the legal-adaptability mechanism focuses on the adaptability 
and flexibility of the legal system related to changes of the commercial environment across the 
country.  
The political mechanism emphasizes that: 1) the legal tradition differs in terms of private 
rights vis-à-vis the state’s rights; 2) financial development is built on the protection of private rights. 
Through conquest, colonization as well as imitation, legal traditions spread all over the world. 
Therefore, the cross-country difference in financial development can be explained by differences in 
legal tradition in history. (La Porta et al. 1998)  
The second mechanism stresses that legal systems differ in their ability to adjust to changed 
economic circumstances in terms of comm. Furthermore, there will be a gap between the needs of 
the financial system and the economy. If the legal system can adapt quickly so as to meet the needs 
of a modern economy, the financial system can develop more efficiently. (Johnson, et al. 2000; 
Beck, et al. 2001)  
Empirically, the legal origin becomes a commonly accepted factor when scholars investigate 
the finance-growth nexus. Since the legal system is obtained historically through original 
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establishment, occupation or colonization, statistically, it is a plausible exogenous factor that avoids 
simultaneity bias for empirical studies on finance-growth nexus issue. (See, LLSV, 1998; Claessens 
& Laeven, 2003; Djankov, et al. 2005; etc)   In this thesis, we will also trace this exogenous 
influence from legal origins to financial development so that our analysis is comparable to prior 
studies.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis combines three empirical studies related with law, finance and economic growth 
from both micro- and macro-economic views. The empirical studies are based on 40 countries 
across the world between 1985 and 2006, including both developed and developing countries. The 
first two chapters focus on a firm-level data analysis while the last chapter concentrates on the 
country-level analysis. The firm-level analysis in the first two chapters aims to investigate the 
mechanism through which legal protection influences firms’ investment opportunities and their 
expansion. The third piece of research focuses on some new proxies for financial development 
emphasising quality rather than quantity, to understand the relationship between law and finance 
and hence the impact on economic growth. The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter two examines the channel via which legal protection influences firms’ capital 
investment behaviour. The study in this chapter is based on a modified neoclassical investment 
model which investigates the firm’s investment behaviour in the context of financial constraints 
created by obstacles to external financing. It empirically analyzes how legal protection affects firms’ 
external financial constraints and thus influencing firms’ investment strategy. It provides evidence 
that companies are less sensitive to internal finance when legal protection is stronger. For 
comparison with existing literature, the legal origin factor is taken into account. This outlines how a 
firm’s investment behaviour varies according to different legal families across the world. In the later 
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part, the study provides a critical value at which the legal protection becomes influential to the 
firm’s investment.  
Chapter three continues to examine the linkage between legal protection and firms’ external 
financing. It studies the reasons why the effectiveness of the legal system is associated with firms’ 
expansion by focussing on the firm’s cost of capital. It provides a study of the cost of capital in 
terms of both debt and equity. The analysis not only examines effects from investors’ protection 
according to the legal system, but also the legal enforcement mechanism. In this way the legal 
origin factor is taken into consideration.  
Chapter four focuses on a country-level study between financial development and economic 
growth. The study in this chapter provides some new measurements that index financial 
development in a country in terms of the quality perspective (i.e. volatility and liquidity of financial 
markets) rather than the quantity aspect (i.e. size and volume). Based on these new indices, we aim 
to investigate whether the law and finance view is still upheld and whether the impact from law on 
financial development transfers to economic growth. The analysis provides a link between legal 
protection, financial development and economic growth in terms of the law codes, enforcements 
and the legal origin factors. We test whether these measurements are complementary to existing 
indices of financial development. For completeness, we also consider impacts from other social 
factors such as culture and income level. 
The last chapter concludes the results in this thesis and discusses the main policy 
implications. Further studies and some limitation of the study are also discussed.  
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2  
LEGAL PROTECTION AND 
FIRM GROWTH 
 
 
   
 
2.1 Introduction  
An important part in the Law and Finance view stresses that the legal system influences 
corporate governance and thus financial development. Early studies have considered the 
implications of legal institutions for corporate finance (i.e. Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995; LLSV, 1997; 2000a; etc.). These studies emphasize that laws and legal 
enforcement will influence financial development because of the impact on investor protection and 
thus operation of the financial sector.  
On the other hand, financial economists argue that financial development contributes to 
economic growth because of the services that the financial system provides in favour of resource 
allocation and hence to boost economic growth (as stated in Chapter 1). Besides the prior studies 
that examine the finance-growth nexus on a macroeconomic view based on aggregate data analyses 
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(for example, Levine, 1999, 2002; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; 
Beck and Levine, 2003; etc), further research has been done from the microeconomic view to 
examine the mechanism through which financial development affects economic growth based on an 
industry-level or firm-level data analysis (for example Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck et al, 2001; Claessens and Laeven,  2002; Love, 2003, 
etc). In these microeconomic analyses, they try to interpret the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in terms of corporate finance. In other words, financial 
development affects economic growth because enterprises need to seek external finance.  
In this chapter, we try to link the above two issues together, so as to investigate the impact of 
legal protection on firm growth. Although existing literature traces legal impact on economic 
growth via the effect on the financial sector, (for example, Levine, 1999, 2002; Beck and Levine, 
2003; etc) there are not many studies which show how legal factors influence firm growth. 
Therefore, to complete this study, we are going to tackle the mechanisms via which legal factors 
influence firm growth through their impact on the financial sector. This will also offer a better 
understanding of the linkage between financial development and economic growth from the firm 
perspective.  
In this chapter, we modify the traditional investment model1 with financial constraints by 
interacting legal protection with the cash flow as well as the debt term of a firm respectively. 
Results on the multi-country study provides the evidence that legal factors do affect the firm’s 
investment decisions since its effect on cash flow as well as debt are both negatively correlated with 
the investment ratio. This result is in accordance with the law and finance view which states that 
                                                        
1
 Similar investment models have been estimated by previous literature, such as Whited (1992) on U.S. firms; 
Bond and Meghir (1994) on U.K. firms; Bond et al, (1997) for Belgium, France, Germany and U.K. firms; Love, 
(2003) for 36-country firms; etc.  
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better legal protection will provide better financial development, thus allowing for an easier access 
to external finance with good investment opportunities and enhancing firm growth (LLSV, 1997; 
Love, 2003, etc).  The further individual country study in this chapter finds that firms in countries 
with low legal protection benefit more from the financial development in reducing financial 
constraints in their expansions. Furthermore, the chapter finds the critical values of the legal 
protection index at which the legal factor will come into force in affecting the firm’s investment. 
Only when the shareholder protection and creditor right protection arrive at a certain high level do 
they influence the firm’s future investment. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents literature review on the 
law and finance papers and also provides a literature survey on existent neoclassical investment 
models; section 2.3 discusses the empirical model applied in this chapter; section 2.4 further 
discusses the estimation methodology; section 2.5 describes the data and variables. Section 2.6 
provides the main discussions on all empirical results. Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Law and Finance View 
 
 
The Law and Finance view focuses on the role that the legal system plays in explaining 
cross-country difference in financial development. It ignores the distinction between bank-based 
and market-based financial systems, but concentrates on the degree of legal protection that 
influences the proper functions of the financial sector. It is established by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998). In the paper, they hold that in countries where the legal 
system is more in favour of the protection of investor rights and supporting contractual agreements, 
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corporate finance is more facilitated as outside investors are more willing to finance firms and thus 
financial sector is more developed. LLSV (1998) create two indices in assessing legal protection on 
shareholders and on creditors
2
. One index
3
 is to measure protection of shareholders rights for each 
country based on company laws and commercial laws; and the other index
4
 is to assess protection of 
creditors’ rights based on bankruptcy and reorganization laws. These two legal indices positively 
indicate the level of legal protection on investors, i.e. the index is higher; the legal protection is 
stronger. In the later part of this paper, they find that legal origin is also correlated with financial 
development. Their findings show that countries in the English-common law origin show strongest 
legal protection on shareholders; while French-civil law origin countries show weakest legal 
protections on investors. Other literature analyzes the reason why the legal origins explain this 
difference. (for example, Beck & Levine, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Johnson, et al. 2000; see 
Chapter 1 for details.) 
Another paper by Pistor, et al., (2000) also cannot be neglected. This paper makes two 
contributions: first, it supplements the assessment on legal protection from the legal statutes with 
the effectiveness of legal institutions; second, it investigates law and finance linkage in less 
developed countries rather than developed markets. Although their investigation is taken across 
only transition economies, they draw a different picture from the one in LLSV (1998) that the 
                                                        
2
 In fact, they are more concerned about senior secured creditors.  
3
 Index for shareholder rights protection is created by adding up 1 if 1) law allows posted proxy from shareholders 
to the firms in the country; 2) selling shares before a general shareholders meeting is free; 3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minority shareholders on the board of directors is allowed in the firm; 4)  law grants 
minority shareholders with the right to doubt or to object any major managerial decisions of the firm; 5) law 
grants shareholders with the pre-emptive rights that can only be discarded by a shareholders vote. (LLSV, 1998) 
4
 Index for creditor rights protection is created by adding up 1 if 1) the reorganization process is restricted by laws; 
2) secured assets are not withheld by laws so that secured creditors can gain their possessions when reorganization 
is taking place; 3) secured creditors have priority than others to be repaid when a bankrupt firm distributes its 
disposal assets; 4) court or secured creditors appoint management of the firm during reorganization process 
instead of the former management. (LLSV,1998) 
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effectiveness of the legal system is more important than legal statutes in association with external 
finance.  
La Porta, et al. (2006) further investigate effect from securities laws and construct a new 
index for shareholders protection. The new index pays full attention to the public supervisory 
enforcement while controlling shareholder protection involved in the index from LLSV (1998) and 
also the judiciary enforcement.  
Mainly based on indices mentioned previously, following empirical studies between law and 
finance can be divided into two categories: one is to analyze the relationship between legal origins 
and financial development; while the other is to investigate how legal protection facilitates 
corporate governance and thus financial development.  
Legal Origin and Financial Development  
 
Literature similar to LLSV (1998) classifies countries in the world into four main categories: 
English-common law origin; French-civil law origin; German-civil law origin and Scandinavian 
law origin- according to the country’s Commercial and Company code. LLSV (1997) shows that 
lower level of shareholder protection is associated with poor financial market development in terms 
of stock market size (the market capitalization to GDP); number of listed domestic firms and initial 
public offers (IPOs) in the markets; whilst poor performance in creditor protection is associated 
with less developed debt market based on its total bank debt of the private sector as well as the total 
face value of corporate bonds.  After controlling for economic growth, French Civil law countries 
are found to have both the weakest investor protection and least developed capital markets 
compared with common law countries. Levine (1997) has examined the legal impacts on financial 
intermediary development rather than capital markets for 77 countries between 1960 and 1989. He 
measures the financial intermediaries’ development in terms of the size of financial intermediaries, 
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the credit allocation between commercial banks and central banks as well as the degree to which 
intermediaries allocate credit to private sector versus public sector or government. It is found out 
that financial intermediaries are developed better under a better legal creditor protection.  
Moreover, Levine (1997, 1998, and 1999) and Levine, et al. (2000) trace the impact from 
the legal system to financial development to economic growth. The evidence significantly supports 
that financial intermediary development which is exogenously affected by legal components is 
positively associated with economic growth. They argue that the reforms in legal and accounting 
systems and their enforcement can boost financial intermediary development, and as a result, 
bolster economic growth with more efficient resource allocation. At this stage, legal origin variables 
are associated with the overall rate of economic growth via the influence on corporate governance 
and investment decisions in terms of macro-economic view. The use of legal origin as instruments 
also solves the simultaneity bias issue between finance and growth.   
More recent research conducts robustness tests between legal origins and financial 
development. For example, Levine (1998, 1999); Levine, et al (2000), Stulz & Williamson (2003) 
and Beck et al (2003). These studies all confirm that legal origins explain the cross-country 
differences in financial development and economic growth. Levine (1998, 1999) re-examines the 
link between legal environment and decomposition of economic growth through its effect on 
banking development within 42 countries. The paper finds that the legal origin not only matters for 
the growth rate of the economy, but is also related to physical capital accumulation and productivity 
growth. Levine, et al. (2000) construct a set of new indicators to measure financial intermediary 
development rather than former ones (Levine, 1997, 1998) in order to tackle this issue. The study 
controls the effects from religious factors and geographical features at the same time. Beck et al 
(2003) further control the influences from political system, endowments and religions. They 
measure the degree of competiveness and elections, the number of influential veto players in the 
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legislation process in terms of the political system; meanwhile they control the natural resource 
endowments and religions across countries. Their study shows that legal origin continues to explain 
cross-country differences in financial development. French civil law countries tend to have lower 
levels of property right protection and less developed financial market and financial intermediary 
development. Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine the linkage between legal origins and financial 
development controlling the effect from cultural differences. The study shows that legal origins are 
more powerful in explaining equity market development differences across countries, because they 
argue that laws are more protective for equity holders while religions matters for creditors more. 
Djankov, et al. (2005) analyzes the convergence of creditor rights protection within 129 countries. 
They confirm that the legal origin matters for the development of the credit market, but they further 
stress that a simple convergence to English common law is not an ideal way to solve economic 
problems in a country and some relevant social control should be exercised: for instance, public 
credit registries can be required to overcome the weakness in French law countries.  
Legal Protection, Corporate Governance and Financial Development 
 
Recent literature examines the relationship between legal protection for investors and 
corporate governance. It has the consequences related to the evaluation of the firm and the operation 
of the financial sector. (For detailed explanation of this theory, please see Chapter 1) In this 
subsection we will mainly discuss the relevant empirical work which is mostly micro-level based.  
LLSV(2000a) shows that stronger legal protection will lead to a higher dividend policy in 
the firm. In other words, legal protection of shareholders secures their rights by disgorging cashes 
from the firm and forcing it to pay higher dividends. Furthermore, LLSV (2002) and Claessens et al. 
(2002) point out that stronger legal protection of shareholders will enhance firm valuation. 
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Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that firms with stronger protection of private property rights 
tend to have more investment from the profits. In contrast, entrepreneurs are more inclined to retain 
the profits (for other purposes but not for investment) if property rights protection is weak.  
Some other empirical work shows that legal protection is associated with the capital 
structure of the firm and thus the firm size. LLSV (2000b) explore the influence of investor 
protection on a firm’s capital structure employing data from the 10 largest companies in their 49 
sample countries. They find that poorer investor protection is linked with more concentrated firm 
ownership. Since investor protection is poorer, shareholders might need to own relatively more 
shares in order to avoid mangers’ expropriation; meanwhile, under weak protection, small investors 
are less interested in corporate shares which also leads to more concentrated ownership. Similarly, 
LLSV (1998), Claessens, et al. (2000) argue that the strengthening of legal protection on investors 
will lead to lower concentration of capital ownership as the mechanism to avoid the incentive 
problems. Further studies investigate the relationship between firm size and legal protection. Kumar, 
et al. (2001) and Beck, et al. (2002) find that countries with stronger legal protection of investors 
will have more large firms. It is accordance with the belief that firms are less retained by the profits 
because they are more correlated to the external finance. However, these papers do not prove so.  
Later on, studies draw attention to the relationship between the legal system and efficiency 
of the financial sector and link this with corporate finance. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) illustrate that firms in countries with stronger legal protection on investors tend 
to have higher reliance on external finance in the long-run.  Wurgler (2000) and Beck & Levine 
(2002) show that strong legal protection on investors, especially on small investors, will boost the 
efficiency of the financial system in capital allocation.   Beck & Levine (2002) argue that whether 
the financial system is market-based or bank-based does not matter for the proper functioning of the 
financial sector, but a well-functioning legal system can lead to better financial development in 
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terms of resource allocation, and thus increase firm growth. Claessens & Laeven (2003) find that in 
countries where investors are better protected, firms are likely to get external finance more easily 
with less collateral than those in countries with poorer protection. Love (2003) also mentions the 
legal influence on financial development, and examines whether this is related to an easing in 
financing constraints. Some researchers even draw their attention to the relationship between legal 
institutions and equity market efficiency. It is argued that the extent to which investor rights are 
protected can help explain stock synchronicity, even the causes of financial crisis. (Morck, et al., 
2000; Johnson, et al., 2000; respectively) 
Besides the above multinational empirical studies, country-case studies suggest some 
divergence from the law and finance literature. For instance, Hyytinen et al. (2003)’s study in 
Finland, Franks et al. (2003)’s research in UK and Aganin and Volpin (2003)’s analysis in Italy. A 
case study in Finland (Hyytinen et al., 2003) describes the changes in Finnish corporate governance 
and the financial system over the period of 1980-2000. The legal reforms are only found to be 
related to the strengthening of shareholder rights but are not associated with creditor rights changes, 
which were weakened in the sample period, nor have any relationship with ownership structure 
changes. Furthermore, they argue that politics may be a missing observation that can make both 
legal and financial reforms endogenous, because as civil law originated, legal rules can only be 
amended by politicians. Franks et al. (2003) question whether the law and finance literature is the 
key determinant of a firm’s ownership structure or the capital market development after a case study 
in UK’s stock market over a 100-year period. Aganin et al. (2003), in a dynamic analysis of the 
ownership structure and Milan stock market development in Italy over the 20
th
 century, find a non-
monotonic pattern in the ownership structure, stock market development and controlling power of 
family. The results cannot be explained only by legal institution reforms but more by its joint effect 
with political factors or government intervention.      
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2.2.2 The Investment Model 
  
In the following, we are going to provide a literature review of investment models since our 
study in this chapter is built on a modified neoclassical investment model. According to the 
neoclassic economic theory, a firm’s object is to maximize its present value. The value of the firm is 
equal to accumulated discounted value of dividends in the future. There are two commonly 
implemented investment models to rearrange the first-order conditions for the above optimization 
problem.  
Tobin’s Q-Model 
The Q-theory is first created by Tobin (1969) and further developed by Hayashi (1982) to 
investigate the investment in a perfect financial market. It is derived from the first-order condition 
of the optimization for the enterprise’s profit. Firstly, if we consider a firm that aims to maximize its 
net present value Wt in the absence of taxes, the equation is given as 
    1 1 1
t t
t t t t t t t t t
L ,I
W ( K ) max V K ,I ,L E W K                                      (2.1) 
In (2.1),  V . is the net revenue function; tI is the gross investment at time t and is assumed 
to be productive immediately and the firm faces strictly convex adjustment costs in changing its 
capital stock; 1t is the discount factor while  .Et  is the expectation operator at time t conditional 
on information set  , and here symmetric information is allowed. Here for simplicity, we 
generalize all inputs as Lt at time t. tK represents the capital stock at time t, and is given by the 
equation    
                      11t t tK K I                                                      (2.2) 
where  is the depreciation rate;  
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The net revenue function can be specified as  
                   K Lt t t t t t t t t t t t tV K ,L ,I p F K ,L C K ,I p I p L                        (2.3)                         
where F(.) is a constant returns to scale production function, C(.) is the user adjustment cost 
function, tp is the price of the firm’s output; 
K
tp is the price for capital goods; and 
L
tp is the price for 
other types of inputs. 
Then the solution to equation (2.1) gives as followings by first-order conditions: 
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We denote 
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as the shadow value of capital at time t. Here we substitute (2.4.3) into 
(2.4.1) which gives 
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In a price-taking firm, the price of capital goods is 
K t
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                    (2.4.5) 
Therefore, combine (2.4.1) and (2.4.5) we have the marginal q, the ratio of shadow value to 
the capital cost: tt K
t
q
p

 ; equation (2.4.4) turns to be  1
K
t
t
t t
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q
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
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More fundamentally, in the basic Q-model the adjustment cost function C(.) is required to be 
homogeneous of degree one in (It, Kt), such as Summers (1981) function 
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where a and b are parameters and b parameterizes the importance of adjustment costs. Then 
this function gives equation (2.4.3) a linear model as  
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Tobin (1969) argues that this marginal q is equal to the ratio of the market- to book-value of 
the firm, known as average q or Tobin’s q. This q can be measured more easily, which provides the 
basic empirical Q-model based on a panel firm dataset as 
1
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it
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                                                                                           (2.5.1)  
Where 
itK
I






is the ratio between investment and capital stock of firm i at time t, which 
indicates the firm’s investment at time t; Qit is Tobin’s q; it captures the stochastic feature and a 
controls the non-stochastic feature while b denotes the parameter in the adjustment cost function.  
However, this Q-model requires that stock market valuation can correctly reflect the 
fundamental value of the firm. In other words, the financial market should be perfect so that stock 
prices are not affected by bubbles or fads. However, this assumption cannot be satisfied empirically 
due to the imperfection in the market. The measurement error is also believed to be systematically 
correlated with the level of financial development which makes Q-model implausible in the cross 
country study. (see Erikson and Whited, 2000; Cooper and Ejarque, 2001)  
According to Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), the firm’s investment strategies should be 
independent from its financing decisions. There is no ―hierarchy of finance‖ so that internal finance 
and external finance are perfectly substitutes for each other. However, this hypothesis fails because 
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of reasons such as incentive problems, costs in monitoring, information asymmetries and contract 
enforcement. Myers and Majluf (1984), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and others argue that because of the existence of those problems, 
internal finance cannot perfectly substitute external finance and vice-versa, therefore, financial 
constraints should be taken into account when firm makes investment decisions, where internal 
finance is normally assumed to be less expensive than external finance. Empirically, additional 
finance variables are added in the basic Q-model so as to control for the effect of finance constraints, 
which makes equation (2.5.1) as follows 
ititit
it
fQ
b
a
K
I





 1
                                                                                  (2.5.2) 
There fit is the finance variables such as cash flow of the firm,  
itK
C . Nevertheless, 
empirical studies (see Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Blundell et al. 1992; Bond et al., 2003; etc) show 
that average q in the model performs badly in modelling the shadow value of one additional unit of 
new capital whilst it shows ―excess sensitivity‖ to finance variables such as cash flows which may 
overstress the importance of finance constraints in firm investment decisions.  
Euler Equation Model 
The Euler equation model is the other investment model which solves the optimization 
problem in equation (2.1) by the first-order conditions.  The advantage of this model is to avoid the 
reliance on measures of profitability based on the firm’s market value as in the Q-model.  
The basic Euler investment model also assumes a perfect market with firm facing strictly 
convex adjustment costs. The revenue function is again the same as in equation (2.3), and to solve 
the optimization problem subject to the constraint for capital Kt in equation (2.2), we also denote 
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as the shadow value of capital, using the envelope theorem, the Euler equation gives  
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And the first-order condition on investment provides 
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Combine equation 2.6 and 2.7 to eliminate t ,and we obtain 
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The above equation provides a standard model of investment. Again, this model presents no 
substantive role for financial policy. In other words, the choice between internal finance and 
external finance remains irrelevant to maximization of equation (2.1). The debt policy remains 
irrelevant to the investment decision according to (2.8) as argued by Modigliani-Miller (1958).   
However, investment decision may be sensitive to the availability of internal funds if the 
hierarchy of finance is taken into account. Representative papers such as Bond and Meghir (1994) 
has taken into account of probability of bankruptcy by employing debt financing in the basic Euler 
investment model. They point out that the firm’s financial policy plays the substantive role in the 
investment decision when the hierarchy of finance approach is considered. Besides, they also apply 
a debt term in the model implying that firm has probability of bankruptcy. In the model, the 
probability of bankruptcy is assumed to depend on 
t
t
K
D
, the amount of borrowing, Dt related to 
the firm size, Kt, but  the bankruptcy cost is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one to the 
borrowing amount Dt, not on the total capital, Kt. Therefore, the total value of a firm given by 
equation 2.1 should be adjusted by the presence of debt which gives a new Euler equation 
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characterized optimal path for investment as 
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where t is the parameter containing one impact from the tax advantage in the trade-off 
between capital gains and the dividend income and the other impact from  the non-negativity 
constraint on dividend payments. t indicates the optimal amount of debt.  
The net revenue function in equation (2.3) and the adjustment cost function in equation 
(2.4.6) give 
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Again, b and a are parameters in the adjustment cost function, C(.) in equation (2.4.6). tp is 
the price of the firm’s output, which is assumed to depend on the output because of the imperfect 
competition hypothesis, and the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be constant and greater 
than 1,( 1 ), thus 0),/1(1  ll  . tY is the net output of the firm, denoted by t t tY F C  , the 
difference between the firm’s productivity Ft (see equation (2.3)) and the adjustment cost, Ct,. It 
controls for the imperfect competition effect.  
Using equation (2.10.1) and (2.10.2) in the Euler equation (2.9), Bond and Meghir (1994) 
assumes that the coefficients from the above derivations are constant across firms and across time, 
thus can be treated as parameters, so they provide the implied empirical investment model from (2.9) 
as: (Detailed deviations are available from the original paper.) 
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According to the original work,
 t
K
I



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
is the new investment related to the capital stock. 
Both coefficients for the lagged investment term and lagged squared investment term are expected 
to be greater than 1, namely 1,1 21   . 
tC  
is the real cash flow, which is associated with t
L
tt LpYp  , the difference between the 
output, Ypt , and the inputs, t
L
t Lp . The coefficient of lagged cash flow to capital ratio 
1






tK
C
depends on the magnitude of adjustment costs, 03  and thus the whole term 3  is expected to 
be negative. This theoretically implies that a firm can invest as much as it requires at a certain cost 
without any financial constraints. However, if this fails, i.e. 03  , it may suggest that the firm 
confronts a financial constraint and therefore the firm’s investment is excessively sensitive to the 
internal finance, the cash flow.  
The coefficient of the lagged output to capital ratio is expected to be positive, 04  which 
controls for the assumption of imperfect competition. If perfect competition exists, this term should 
be dismissed, 04  .  
The debt term 
2
tK
D

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
controls for borrowing. The impact of the borrowing is quadratic as it 
illustrates how the probability of bankruptcy increases as the debt increases. The coefficient of the 
lagged debt term, 5 , is associated with the optimal amount of debt and the real interest rate. It is 
expected to be positive, so the whole term is going to be negative, i.e. 05  . From the 
theoretical model, 05  implies that there is a bankruptcy cost when the firm raises debt, so the 
firm attempts to control for the bankruptcy risk when taking debt financing for investment; while 
the failure of such hypothesis may suggest that the firm is taking excessive risks through borrowing 
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for reasons such as the tax advantage from issuing debt against the bankruptcy cost.  
Zt is the user cost of capital affected by the price of investment capital goods, 
I
tp , interest 
rate, tr  and the depreciation rate,  . 
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. The coefficient of Zt is affected by 
the magnitude of adjustment costs, thus is expected to be negative, 06   ,so as to illustrate the 
impact of the cost of capital when the firm is considering investment from different sources. t is 
the unobserved bias.
 
a  is a constant.  
Bond and Meghir (1994) apply the model (2.11) to a panel dataset of 626 UK firms without 
a constant, which gives an explicit form of empirical model as:  
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where i refers to different firms and t refers to the time. The assumed signs of coefficients are
0,0,0,1,1 54321   . Notably, this model does not precisely measure the 
cost of capital but allow it controlled by the firm-specific term, i , and time-specific error term, t  . 
it  controls for other unobserved errors. Their findings are not significantly consistent with the 
assumptions in the theoretical model. The results mostly suggest that 01,1 21   , which can 
be seen as a deviation of the value maximization principles. Their empirical findings suggest that 
the UK firms are sensitive to the availability of internal financing when they maximize the total 
revenues subject to adjustment costs under a financial constraint, as indicated by the positive 
coefficient of the cash flow to capital ratio, 03   .  The only consistency is from the negative 
coefficient of the debt term, which approves that UK firms are aware of the risk when raising debts.   
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2.3 The Empirical Model 
Within an imperfect market, a firm’s investment behaviour is not independent of the 
financial decision because of the limited sources of investment finance; therefore, the firm’s 
investment decision is subject to the availability of funds. Any factors that influence financing 
would affect the firm’s investment. According to the law and finance view, a well-functioning legal 
system determines financial development. Consequently, a firm’s investment decision will be 
affected by the legal system when seeking external finance from the financial sector. We would 
expect this as a channel through which legal institutions influence firm investment and its growth, 
and hence worthy of examining. Since the Q-model is not applicable in the cross-country firm 
studies for reasons discussed before, in this chapter, we modify the Euler investment model such as 
Bond and Meghir’s (1994) with financial constraints with additional variables controlling for the 
legal impact, where we interact legal protection variables with cash flows and debts respectively. 
We would expect to see the firm’s investment decision when legal protection is examined.  
Therefore, the empirical model turns to be  
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is the ratio between new investment and the capital stock for firm i at time t;
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is the real cash flow to the capital stock;
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 is the ratio between output Y and the capital stock K at time t;
 
2
,tiK
D






 accounts for the debt to capital stock ratio;
 
tiK
C
LP
,







 
is the interaction term between legal protection and cash flow, which reflects the 
internal finance after controlling for the impact from legal system; 
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 multiplies legal protection and the debt term representing debt financing 
controlling for the impact of legal protection.  
td accounts for time-specific effect and i is the firm-specific term; t,i is the unobserved 
bias. Furthermore, both td and i control for variations in the cost of capital.
 
Parameters 1  to 5  are theoretically expected to be 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 0 0, , , ,         
according to the original model of Bond and Meghir (1994). But we still have expectations that 
there may be some inconsistencies for reasons which we have discussed in previous section. We 
want to discuss more about the expected signs of coefficients of the new variables that we add in the 
model to investigate the impact from the legal system. In terms of coefficient 6 , we assume it to 
be negative. Given the hypothesis that better legal protection will lead to financial development, 
which will ease the obstacle when a firm seeks external finance, the firm will thus be less sensitive 
to its internal finance because it has easier access to external finance to meet its financial needs for 
expansion, therefore the coefficient of the interaction of legal protection and the cash flow to capital 
ratio is assumed to be negative. The coefficient of the interaction between debt and legal protection 
implies the bankruptcy cost related with the legal protection when the firm borrows. Better legal 
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protection will protect investors against the default of the borrowers by methods such as requiring 
more collateral, which usually means higher bankruptcy costs to the borrower, the firm; this will be 
illustrated by a negative coefficient since the firm realizes that bankruptcy costs increase as creditor 
protection is better. However, better legal protection will facilitate financial development as we 
assume, and as a result firms could find an easier access to external funds at a given cost and may 
take excess risks in the process of expansion in terms of borrowing, which will show a positive 7  
in this case. Furthermore, our model follows the original work by Bond and Meghir (1994), thus it 
does not precisely measure the cost of capital but allows the firm-specific term and the time-specific 
term to control for the variation of the cost of capital. Therefore, we would explicitly examine how 
legal protection influences the cost of capital for complement in the following chapter.  
2.4 Estimation Methodology  
To estimate this dynamic panel model, the paper uses the Generalized Method of Moments
5
 
(GMM) estimator, which is firstly developed by Arellano and Bover (1991) and Holtz-Eakin, et al. 
(1988). More precisely, the GMM estimator is prior to other techniques in dealing with dynamic 
panel model with following features
6
: 
1) The model indicates the dynamic process. i.e. current dependent variable is influenced 
by past values; 
2) There are fixed individual effect in the dynamic model; 
3) There are certain endogeneity problems in the model; 
                                                        
5
 For a further fundamental explanation for GMM estimation, please refer to Chapter 4.   
6
 For detailed discussion about GMM estimator in dealing with dynamic panel model, see D. Roodman (2006), 
Bond (2002).  
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4) The panel dataset has a pattern of small T and large N. i.e. relative small time period but 
relative large number of sections.  
According to our model, equation (2.11) illustrates the impact of the past value of 
investment on contemporary investment. To some extent, other independent variables, such as cash 
flow, output and debt terms may correlate with the firm-specific effect i .  In other words, these 
regressors may be weakly exogenous or predetermined rather than strictly exogenous, thus 
estimators under mean-differencing will be inefficient and perform poorly7.  
Typically, we could apply the first-difference GMM estimator to eliminate the fixed effect.  
However, this method has one drawback that it will magnify gaps in the dataset (Roodman, 2006). 
For example, if Yit is missing, the first-differenced form, both ∆Yit and ∆Yit+1 , will be missing in the 
transformed dataset. Therefore, in order to minimize the data loss, we alternatively employ the 
―orthogonal deviations‖ transformation discussed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This 
transformation eliminates the fixed effect by removing the mean of all future observations, which is 
given below, 
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For 2 3t , , ,T , T is the number of the time-series observations for firm i. Based on this 
method, we could generate the transformed data for all observations except the one in the last 
period regardless of any gaps in the original observations. No matter whether itw  is independent or 
not, as long as itw  is identical distributed then the transformed form 
*
itw will uncorrelated with 
lagged values i ,t sw  for 2s . Therefore, in our model, the lagged untransformed dependent 
                                                        
7
 It is illustrated by previous literature. For instance, Love, (2003); Bond, (2002). 
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variables, (I/K)i,t-s and other lagged independent variables
8
 , dated t-s, will be uncorrelated with the 
transformed error term *
it for  2s . They can be valid instruments in the transformed model and 
the GMM estimators can be formed. Furthermore, the orthogonal deviation transformation is proved 
to be more efficient in Monte Carlo experiments when not all moments’ restrictions are exploited9.  
GMM provides the one-step estimation and the two-step estimation
10
. Considering 
consistency and efficiency, the two-step GMM estimator is asymptotically efficient and robust in 
terms of different patterns of heteroskedasticity and correlations. But its standard error illustrates 
downward bias compared with the one-step GMM estimator. However, this problem has been 
reduced dramatically by Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction for the two-step standard 
errors of the estimators. Windmeijer proves that the two-step estimation with corrected errors is 
superior to the one-step robust GMM estimation. This type of correction can be realized by 
Roodman’s (2006) programme in Stata® software.  
Furthermore, researchers such as Blundell and Bond (1998) have argued that the difference 
GMM estimator performs poorly if dependent variable Yit is close to a random walk, as the lagged 
dependent variables Yi,t-s, (s=2,3,...,T) are weak instruments for the transformed variables. Therefore, 
they constructed the so-called ―system‖ GMM estimator by adding in the lagged forms of the 
differenced variables as instrumental variables in order to solve this problem.  
The other issue which needs to be considered is about the instrumental variables. The 
exogeneity of instrumental variables is crucial to ensure that the GMM estimation is valid. The 
                                                        
8
 If independent variable itx  is strictly exogenous, then 1 2itx ( t , , ,T ) is valid instrument; if itx  is predetermined, 
then 1 2 3i ,tx ( t , , ,T )  is valid instrument; if itx  is endogenous, then it is treated asymmetrically as the dependent 
variable, thus 2 3 3 4i ,t i ,tx ,x ( t , , ,T )   or longer lags will be valid instruments. (Bond, 2002) 
9
 Bond, (2002); Bond and Meghir, (1994). 
10
 For detailed explanations of the one-step GMM and the two-step GMM estimation please refer to Chapter 4. 
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Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) provides a Wald-test to examine whether instrumental variables are 
exogenous and hence the GMM estimation is identified. With the null hypothesis that all moment 
conditions are jointly valid, Sargan test constructs the statistic which is the GMM objective function 
evaluated at the estimated parameter matrix, and follows a    distribution with degrees of freedom 
equalling the number of instruments deducted by the number of regressors. However, this test can 
be weakened if there are too many instrumental variables. Moreover, too many instruments will also 
weaken the consistency and asymptotic efficiency of the estimators especially in finite samples, as 
argued by (Roodman, 2006; Windmeijer, 2005). We are concerned with all aspects mentioned as 
above in our empirical work and will have some more discussions later in the results section.  
The overall significance of all reported coefficients of the equation is examined by the Wald-
test which has the statistics following the    distribution.  
2.5 Data and Variables  
 
2.5.1 Explanation of Data and Variables  
The firm-level data comes from the DataStream database and is available for 40 countries 
across the world for the period 1980-2007, but sample period is 1985-2006 as fewer observations 
are available before 1985 or after 2006. I choose firms in each country from the top 100 largest 
according to the firm’s capitalization in the stock market and exclude firms in the financial sector. 
Because of the data unavailability, I do not account for China, one of the largest economies in the 
world today; however, I analyse two of its districts, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which have tight 
relationships with mainland China in finance and economy. The number of observations by country 
is given in the table below. This gives an unbalanced panel data sample set with 3377 companies 
across 40 countries in the world. Table 2.1 describes the allocation of samples firms in each country. 
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We dropped firms which have less than 4-year data since the third lags are employed as 
instrumental variables. The following Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 precisely define variables used in the 
chapter. Most firm-level data, Iit, Cit, Yit and Dit are obtained from DataStream. There are two types 
of variables to measure legal protections on investors, LPc and LGEFc. LPc, the indicator of legal 
protection according to the law statutes is the sum of single legal indices obtained from LLSV(1998) 
across countries for the mid-1990’s legal system. LGEFc, a sum of indicators for legal enforcement 
and government performance following LLSV(1998) obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide(ICRC),  which is also a single index across countries for the period between 1980’s and mid-
1990’s. The index to show the transparency level of the accounting system, ACCOUNTc, is 
constructed according to firms’ annual reports in 1990. Therefore, these indices in terms of legal 
system and accounting environment are time invariant and only changed across countries.  Although 
the time period during which each index is constructed is different, naturally the legal system and 
the accounting environment in a country is nearly stable, even if they change, the change will not be 
severe if there is not any dramatic evolutions in the country. Moreover, our dataset also includes 
other country-level variables, FDct, GOVNct, OPENct and LNGDPct which are time-series across 
countries. Therefore the dataset contains variables that vary from different dimensions. Some 
variables change across firms among different countries along the time; some vary only in different 
countries and times, but some only changes across countries. Moreover, surely firms in different 
countries are heterogeneous especially between developing countries, like Kenya and Philippines 
and developed countries like the UK and the US. We need to apply the whole panel with caution in 
case of any heteroskedasticity and inconsistency. Hence, a careful examination of the whole panel is 
necessary before carrying out the empirical study.  Particular econometric techniques need to be 
applied in order to control for effects from variations along time, firms and country as well as to 
correct the parameters’ standard errors if heteroskedasticity occurred. We will discuss such methods 
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in more details in what follows. But firstly, the whole panel need to be cleaned by removing certain 
outliers where we mainly drop ratios in each firm (I/Kit, C/Kit, Y/Kit and D/Kit) that are greater than 
10% or negative in some cases
11
. Please see Table 2.4 for the descriptive statistics.  
  
                                                        
11
 It may because of the accounting errors or bad performance of the firm which has negative cash flows and sales.  
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Table2. 1 Sample Firms across Countries 
 
Country % in Total Obs. No. of Firms Legal Origin 
1 Argentina 1.22% 38(50) French 
2 Australia 3.22% 100 English 
3 Austria 1.03% 32(52) German 
4 Belgium 1.16% 36(56) French 
5 Brazil 3.22% 100 French 
6 Canada 3.22% 100 English 
7 Denmark 2.67% 83 Scandinavian 
8 Finland 3.22% 100 Scandinavian 
9 France 3.22% 100 French 
10 Germany 3.22% 100 German 
11 Hong Kong, China 3.22% 100 English 
12 Hungary 0.32% 10(61) German 
13 India 3.22% 100 English 
14 Indonesia 1.64% 51(63) French 
15 Ireland 1.16% 36(66) English 
16 Israel 1.42% 44(54) English 
17 Italy 3.16% 98 French 
18 Japan 3.22% 100 German 
19 Jordan 1.58% 49(55) French 
20 Kenya 0.58% 18(66) English 
21 Korea, South 3.22% 100 German 
22 Malaysia 3.22% 100 English 
23 Mexico 3.09% 96 French 
24 Morocco 0.55% 17(50) French 
25 Netherlands 1.90% 59 French 
26 New Zealand 3.09% 96 English 
27 Norway 3.16% 98 Scandinavian 
28 Philippines 0.97% 30(60) French 
29 Poland 3.22% 100 German 
30 Portugal 1.80% 56 French 
31 Russia 3.22% 100 Socialist 
32 Singapore 3.22% 100 English 
33 South Africa 3.22% 100 English 
34 Spain 3.22% 100 French 
35 Sweden 3.22% 100 Scandinavian 
36 Switzerland 3.22% 100 German 
37 Taiwan, China 1.87% 58 German 
38 Thailand 3.22% 100 English 
39 United Kingdom 3.22% 100 English 
40 United States 3.22% 100 English 
 
Total 100% 3105(3377) 
 Numbers in parentheses are the number of firms before they are dropped.  
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Table2. 2 Variable Description 
Variable Description  
I Investment, capital expenditure (additions to fixed assets) (WC04601)
12
 
K 
0K is the Total capital at the beginning. (WC03998), 1 1 1t t tK K ( ) I ,t    , 
 is the depreciation rate, which equals 0.0813.  
I/K Investment to capital ratio.  
C Cash flow. Provision for depreciation of fixed assets plus operating profit 
before tax, interest and preference dividends. (WC18198) 
C/K Cash flow to capital ratio. 
Y Output. Net sales or revenues. (WC01001) 
Y/K Output to capital ratio.  
D Debt. Total debt including both short term and long term debt. (WC03255) 
D/K Debt to capital ratio 
SHRT Index assessing shareholders’ right protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
CRRT Index assessing creditors’ right protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
LGEF Index assessing legal enforcement and government performance. Source: La Porta 
et al. (1998) 
LP Legal protection index. LP=(SHRT+CRRT)/2 
FDFI Financial intermediaries’ development. It is equal to the sum of ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP; ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP. 
14
 
FDST Stock market development. It is equal to the sum of market capitalization to GDP; 
total value traded to GDP; turnover (total value traded to market capitalization) 
15
 
FD Financial development. FD=FDFI+FDST 
OPEN A country’s openness to trade. Total exportation and importation of goods and 
service, % of GDP. Source :World Development Indicators (2008) 
GOVN Log of general government consumption expenditure, % of GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators (April 2008) 
LNGDP Log of real GDP per capita in US dollar at constant price, base year 2000. Source: 
World Development Report, 2008.  
ACCOUNT Index to show the level of transparency of the accounting system. Source: 
International accounting and auditing trends, Centre for International Financial 
Analysis and Research  and LLSV(1998) 
Table2. 3 Legal Indices 
Variable  Definition Source 
One share-one vote 1: each ordinary share Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
                                                        
12
 Code in DataStream.  
13
 King and Fullerton (1984) estimate a depreciation rate for 8.19% for plant and machinery for U.K. industries; hence I 
take an approximate rate 8% for industries.  
14
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage. A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, 2000,  http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0, accessed on 28/05/2007. 
15
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, 2000,  http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 , accessed on 28/05/2007. 
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guarantees one vote in the 
shareholder meeting; 0: 
otherwise 
Posted proxy is allowed  1: shareholder to mail proxy 
allowed; 0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Shares not blocked before 
meeting 
1: shareholders can sell their 
shares before a general 
shareholder meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation 
1: allow accumulated shares to 
represent a number of 
shareholders in election of the 
board of directors;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Oppressed minorities 
mechanism 
1: if minority shareholders can 
challenge manager’s decisions 
with granted judicial venue or 
to abandon the company by 
selling their shares when they 
disagree with the management’s 
decision;  
0: otherwise (minority 
shareholders are those whose 
capital share is 10% or less) 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Pre-emptive rights 1: if shareholders have priority 
to subscribe new shares and this 
right can only be discarded by 
shareholders’ vote;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Percentage of share capital to 
call an extraordinary 
shareholders' meeting 
1: shareholders have to hold 
less or equal to 10% of share 
capital in order to call for an 
extraordinary shareholder’s 
meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
SHRT Shareholder right protection; 
sum of points 1-7, range from 
0-7 
 
   
Restriction on reorganization 
process 
1: reorganization process 
requires consent of creditors; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
No automatic stay on secured 
assets  
1: an automatic stay on the 
assets of the firm is not required 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
41 
 
in the reorganization procedure; 
(collateral can be repossessed 
after the reorganization petition 
is approved.) 
0: otherwise 
Secured creditors rank top 1: secured creditors have 
priority in the distribution of the 
disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Management has to leave 1: court or the creditors appoint 
the managerial body during the 
reorganization process; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
CRRT Creditor right protection; sum 
of points 9-11, range from 0-4 
 
LP Legal protection, average of 
SHRT and CRRT, range from 
0-5.5 
 
   
Efficiency of judicial system Assessment of the legal 
system’s efficiency and integrity 
in terms of its effects on 
business, particular on foreign 
firms, constructed by the 
country risk rating agency 
Business International Corp. 
ranges from 0-10; average 
between 1980-1983 
Business International Corp. 
and LLSV(1998)  
Rule of law Assessment of law and order: 
i.e. the strength of laws and the 
population observance in the 
country, produced by the 
country risk rating agency, 
International Country Risk 
(ICR); scores from 0-10; 
average monthly data between 
1982-1995 
Low score indicates weaker 
observance of the population. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
Corruption Assessment of corruption 
within political system. Ranges 
from 0-10; average monthly 
index between 1982-1995 
Low score indicates high 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
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corruption in government  
According to Wei
16
 (2000), 
there is interactive between 
―Corruption‖ and ―Openness‖.  
Risk of expropriation Measurement  of risk of 
―outright confiscation‖ or 
―forced nationalization‖, 
ranging from 0-10; 
Average monthly index 
between1982-1995 
Lower score shows higher risk  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Repudiation of contracts by 
government 
Assessment of risk of ―a 
modification in a contract 
taking in the form of a 
repudiation, postponement and 
scaling down‖ due to the 
governmental changes. 
ranging from 0-10; 
Average monthly index 
between1982-1995 
Lower score shows higher risk 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
LGEF Law enforcement: the sum of 
12-16; range from 0-50.  
 
 
  
                                                        
16
 Wei, S-J., (2000) ―Natural openness and good government‖, NBER Working Paper, No. 7765 
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Table2. 4 Descriptive Statistics 
A: Mean and Median of the Key Ratios in the Investment Model. (Outliers are removed) 
  IK C/K D/K Y/K 
  mean median mean median mean median mean median 
1 Argentina 0.184 0.112 0.309 0.293 0.855 0.756 4.266 2.348 
2 Australia 0.153 0.128 0.384 0.275 0.784 0.445 2.570 1.335 
3 Austria 0.192 0.157 0.217 0.272 0.793 0.580 3.355 2.197 
4 Belgium 0.153 0.136 0.531 0.479 0.689 0.712 5.015 4.851 
5 Brazil 0.215 0.173 0.485 0.308 1.069 0.683 4.713 2.767 
6 Canada 0.204 0.167 0.373 0.264 0.858 0.463 2.442 0.930 
7 Denmark 0.177 0.151 0.316 0.323 0.422 0.289 3.163 2.020 
8 Finland 0.206 0.161 0.478 0.293 0.874 0.612 4.270 2.389 
9 France 0.165 0.147 0.514 0.345 0.941 0.608 3.784 2.807 
10 Germany 0.163 0.145 0.348 0.289 0.436 0.282 2.837 2.408 
11 Hong Kong 0.264 0.375 0.578 0.615 0.345 0.375 3.678 4.526 
12 Hungary 0.132 0.109 0.178 0.180 0.201 0.151 1.308 1.157 
13 India 0.169 0.154 0.615 0.568 0.765 0.648 2.861 2.798 
14 Indonesia 0.136 0.129 0.689 0.691 0.814 0.718 4.239 4.518 
15 Ireland 0.124 0.115 0.435 0.537 0.675 0.547 2.986 3.065 
16 Israel 0.198 0.342 0.375 0.615 0.678 0.648 5.361 6.894 
17 Italy 0.201 0.167 0.603 0.428 1.299 0.835 3.312 2.512 
18 Japan 0.130 0.118 0.297 0.234 0.724 0.523 2.607 1.817 
19 Jordan 0.174 0.289 0.237 0.301 0.564 0.689 2.894 5.102 
20 Kenya 0.391 0.348 0.080 0.078 0.654 0.519 2.361 2.651 
21 Korea 0.222 0.189 0.265 0.098 0.578 0.471 3.849 3.579 
22 Malaysia 0.285 0.231 0.214 0.174 0.614 0.569 2.618 2.369 
23 Mexico 0.879 0.615 0.314 0.458 0.879 0.901 4.123 5.781 
24 Morocco 0.122 0.086 0.246 0.237 0.148 0.046 1.452 1.331 
25 New Zealand 0.196 0.163 0.591 0.391 1.185 0.653 6.539 3.817 
26 Netherlands 0.152 0.120 0.308 0.328 0.879 0.531 4.567 2.387 
27 Norway 0.254 0.184 0.430 0.259 1.237 0.670 5.383 1.835 
28 Philippines 0.165 0.144 0.599 0.360 1.139 0.691 4.779 2.062 
29 Poland 0.347 0.412 0.312 0.214 0.615 0.748 3.658 5.045 
30 Portugal 0.214 0.345 0.385 0.468 0.315 0.216 3.047 5.187 
31 Russia 0.282 0.102 0.425 0.163 1.393 0.249 2.604 1.143 
32 Singapore 0.177 0.149 0.504 0.435 0.901 0.616 3.897 2.804 
33 South Africa 0.174 0.130 0.429 0.354 1.013 0.632 4.083 2.538 
34 Spain 0.389 0.351 0.209 0.145 0.255 0.248 2.579 2.475 
35 Sweden 0.345 0.386 0.182 0.152 0.471 0.512 3.781 3.612 
36 Switzerland 0.235 0.214 0.084 0.081 0.513 0.514 4.820 4.687 
37 Taiwan 0.615 0.874 0.568 0.847 0.648 0.874 8.547 9.124 
38 Thailand 0.547 0.465 0.075 0.068 0.375 0.289 4.698 3.980 
39 United 0.169 0.148 0.778 0.340 1.284 0.500 4.747 2.415 
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Kingdom 
40 United States 0.197 0.166 0.595 0.419 0.673 0.439 3.503 2.450 
          
 Mean 0.242 0.227 0.389 0.334 0.739 0.536 3.782 3.193 
 Median 0.197 0.162 0.380 0.305 0.706 0.558 3.730 2.595 
 St. Deviation 0.149 0.158 0.173 0.175 0.311 0.199 1.341 1.688 
 
 
B: Correlations for Firm-Level Variables (Outliers are removed)   
Mean Median 
 
IK C/K D/K 
 
IK C/K D/K 
IK 1 
  
IK 1 
  C/K -0.631 
  
C/K -0.607 
  D/K -0.445 0.620 
 
D/K -0.450 0.468 
 Y/K 0.351 0.269 0.467 Y/K 0.263 0.106 0.156 
 
 
C: Correlations for Country-Level Variables  
 
FD FDFI FDST GOVN OPEN LP LGEF LNGDP ACCOUNT 
FD 1 
      
  
FDFI 0.6656 
      
  
FDST 0.8914 0.2551 
     
  
GOVN -0.5178 -0.4502 -0.3975 
    
  
OPEN -0.0711 -0.0509 -0.0612 0.2389 
   
  
LP 0.2106 0.3235 0.2764 -0.2572 -0.3619 
  
  
LGEF 0.1705 0.2209 0.2867 0.0479 0.4424 -0.1041 
 
  
LNGDP 0.5072 0.4973 0.3552 -0.3121 0.2259 0.1310 0.5156   
ACCOUNT 0.0797 -0.1631 0.2023 0.0251 -0.0277 0.2996 0.2758 0.0630 1 
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2.5.2 Poolability Test 
After removing outliers from the whole dataset, we need to check whether the whole series 
can be pooled together. We carry out the Chow test (Chow, 1960) to test whether our data can be 
pooled along the time series as well as among cross-firms and cross-countries. We firstly run a 
pooled OLS regression with I/Kit as the dependent variable and with independent variables 
including C/Kit,  
2
it
D K , Y/Kit, LPc, LGEFc, ACCOUNTc, OPENct, GOVNct, LNGDPct, FDct and a 
constant. Alternatively, we then use the same variables to run separate OLS regressions across time 
and across firms as well across countries.  
The Chow-test assumes that coefficients in all separate equations (either along time-series or 
among cross-sections) are equal so that the data can be pooled into a panel.  It constructs the 
observed statistic as 
   
      1
1r u
stat N K ,N T K
u
RSS RSS / N K
F ~ F
RSS / N T K  
 


                                                           (2.13) 
where RSSr is the residual sum of squares of the pooled regression when the null hypothesis holds  
while RSSu is the total number of the residual sum of squares for all individual equations either 
across times or across sections. N is the number of firms or countries and T is the number of years if 
we test the poolability across sections while N is the number of years and T is the number of firms if 
we test the poolability across times. K is the number of regressors in the regression. The observed 
statistic follows the F-distribution with degrees of freedom ((N-1)K, N(T-K)). The results of the 
poolability tests are shown in Table 2.5 below. Because LPc, LGEFc and ACCOUNTc are time-
invariant and also unchangeable within each firm, the individual regressions on firms are thus 
impracticable because of collinearity and we test poolability across firms without those three 
variables (K=9, as shown in row1 of Table 2.5). However, these variables can be examined in the 
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cross-time and cross-country regressions as shown in the rest rows of Table 2.5. The financial 
development indicator FDct is not available until 1991 for most countries, hence we test poolability 
with FDct (K=12) for shorter period (1991-2006, N=16) as in row 3 and without FDct (K=11) for the 
whole sample period (1985-2006, N=22) as in row 4. The Chow-test suggests that our data can be 
pooled across firms and across countries as the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significant level. But the result rejects the poolability across time. It is also noticeable that the 
pooling combines data that are time-invariant variables, such as LPc, LGEFc and ACCOUNTc, in 
which case it is not applicable to run separate time series regressions across firms or employ these 
data into the single country study.   
Table2. 5 Poolability Test 
  RSSr RSSu N K T Fstat F((N-1)K, N(T-K)) 
(1) Firm  2397.20 1680.60 3105 9 22 0.75 1.02 
(2) Country 2390.04 2216.12 40 11 22 0.08 1.17 
(3) Time 2390.04 2251.32 16 10 3105   25.44 1.22 
(4) Time  3035.21 2724.70 22 11 3105 52.84 1.20 
The Chow test holds the null hypothesis that all series can be pooled along time or among cross-sections. It uses the F-
test. Fstat provides the observed statistics and F((N-1)K, N(T-K)) provides the critical values at the 5% significant level.  
 
2.6 Results  
2.6.1 Pre-estimation Analyses 
Before we apply the dataset to run the regression, we need to carry out a set of pre-
estimation analyses. Having checked that all data series are poolable along firms and among 
countries, we need to check whether any effects in terms of the time, the firm or the country are 
significant. Therefore we apply the Breusch and Pagan(BP, 1980) Lagrangian Multiplier(LM) Test. 
Stata
®
 software provides the BP-LM test based on a random-effect model, where the individual 
error component is assumed to be insignificant. In other words, if the null hypothesis cannot be 
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rejected, the application of individual effects is inappropriate and the pooled OLS estimator is 
consistent. The BP-LM test suggests that firm effects and time effects are significant at 1% 
significant level. (see Table 2.6) We test the joint significance of the 39-country dummies in order to 
detect whether the country effects are significant. The statistic is Chi2(38)=227.21(p-value=0.00, 
one country dummy is dropped by the software because the collinearity occurs when a constant 
term is presented in the regression), which suggests that country effects are significant as well. 
Furthermore, the BP-LM test based on a regression with country-effects provides statistics as 
Chi2(1)=10387.06(p-value=0) for firm effects and Chi2(1)=229.93(p-value=0.00) for time effects 
(not shown in Table2.6), which confirms that the firm-effect and the time-effect are both significant 
controlling for the country-effect.  
Next, we need to find out whether the fixed-effect model is preferred to the random-effect 
model, therefore we carry out the Hausman Test.(Hausman, 1978) There is a crucial assumption that 
the errors which may contain individual invariant effects are not correlated with the exogenous 
variables, in other words, the Generalized Least Squares(GLS) estimator is an unbiased estimator 
and the random effect model is appropriate; otherwise the Within transformation is preferred and 
the fixed-effect model is superior to the random-effect model. The Hausman specification test can 
examine whether the difference between coefficients of the fixed-effect model and coefficients of 
the random-effect model is systematic. The null hypothesis holds that this difference is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the Hausman specification test can also be applied to examine 
the systematic difference in the common coefficients between two models; therefore we can rely on 
this test to check whether country-fixed effect is significant as well as whether time-fixed effect is 
significant. The observed statistics all have small probability values less than 1% which suggests 
that the fixed effects in terms of firm, country and time are significant.(see Table 2.6) Therefore, the 
choice of GMM estimation is appropriate since there exists firm fixed effect and the orthogonal 
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deviation transformation can eliminate this effect. Moreover, the involvement of country-specific 
variables and time dummy is also necessary in the following estimation to control for fixed effects 
from the time and the country.  
We then want to detect whether there is any heteroskedasticity. We use one programme in 
Stata
®
 that detects the groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed-effect model. This programme 
generates a modified Wald test following Greene (2000, p.598) based on the null hypothesis that the 
model is homoskedastic. The results are shown in Table 2.6 which illustrates that there is groupwise 
heteroskedasticity existing in our fixed-effect model which will influence the consistency of the 
estimators so that we need to find ways to correct the standard errors of the estimators in the model.  
Table2. 6 Pre-estimation Analyses 
 BP-LM Test
a
 Hausman Test
b
 Heteroskedasticity Test
c
 
Firm Effect 10415.04(1) 
[0.00***] 
418.41(10) 
[0.00***] 
6.5E+32(3105) 
[0.00***] 
Country Effect 227.21(38) 
[0.00***] 
40.79(9) 
[0.00***] 
- 
Time Effect 8212.50(1) 
[0.00***] 
538.21(9) 
[0.00***] 
213.56(22) 
[0.00***] 
*** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significant level. All statistics are following the Chi
2
-distribution. 
Numbers in the parentheses are degrees of freedom and numbers in the square brackets are p-values.  
a: BP-LM test holds a null hypothesis that  individual effects are insignificant.  
b: Hausman test holds a null hypothesis that the individual fixed effects are not significant. The degrees of freedom for 
three tests are slightly different because the rank of differenced variance matrix when constructing the observed statistic 
is slightly different from the number of coefficients being tested.  
c: Heteroskedasticity test holds that the errors in the fixed-effect model are homoskedastic based on Greene’s(2000) 
method.  
2.6.2 Basic Model Results 
For some reasons that we discussed in the methodology section, we use the ―difference‖ 
GMM estimation with the orthogonal deviation transformation (Arellano and Bover,1995) to 
eliminate the fixed firm effect while minimizing the data loss since there are several gaps in the 
dataset. In order to avoid the influence from the heteroskedasticity that we detect before, we use the 
two-step robust GMM estimation package provided by Roodman(2006) for Stata
®
 which requests 
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the Windmeijier’s(2005) correction for the two-step covariance matrix in a finite sample. We use 
Sargan test to check the validity of instrumental variables and choose a set of suitable instrumental 
variables as described below the results table. We also tried the ―system‖ GMM estimation 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998), but the Sargan test has an implausibly good 
p-value close to 1 which indicates that too many instrumental variables are employed (see Roodman, 
2006). Although we tried to reduce the number of instruments, no good set of instrumental variables 
have been found. Therefore, we did not apply the system GMM in this chapter, but we apply it in 
subsequent chapters. The time-effect that we detect before can be controlled by the time dummy in 
the regression. The basic results for equation (2.11) based on the whole sample are presented in 
Table2.7.  
Table2. 7 Basic Multi-Country Study 
Dependent variable:I/Kit, Sample period 1985-2006 
Independent 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
  1,/ tiKI  
0.679007 
(0.0001)*** 
0.664851 
(0.0000)*** 
0.867129 
(0.0000)*** 
0.861734 
(0.0000)*** 
 2 1,/ tiKI  
-0.299746 
(0.0724)* 
-0.289319 
(0.0939)* 
-0.503788 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.500227 
(0.0000)*** 
  1,/ tiKC  
0.076877 
(0.0084)*** 
0.062506 
(0.0421)** 
0.014703 
(0.0000)*** 
0.022775 
(0.0000)*** 
  1,/ tiKY  
0.003841 
(0.0901)* 
0.003316 
(0.1425) 
0.000398 
(0.1692) 
0.001193 
(0.0056)*** 
 2 1,/ tiKD   
0.0000811 
(0.0557)* 
0.000243 
(0.0218)** 
0.000287 
(0.0145)** 
  1,/ tic KCLP  
-0.009967 
(0.0455)** 
-0.007824 
(0.0333)** 
 
-0.001893 
(0.0024)*** 
 2 1,/ tic KDLP    
-0.000713 
(0.0312)** 
-0.000835 
(0.0223)** 
p-value of Sargan Test 
(d.f.) 
0.27 
(863) 
0.36 
(929) 
0.26 
(953) 
0.48 
(951) 
p-value of AR Test 0.76 0.87 0.63 0.43 
Wald-Test(d.f.) 
(p-value) 
9422.25(5) 
(0.0%) 
11076.83(6) 
(0.0%) 
23228.08(6) 
(0.0%) 
10019.32(7) 
(0.0%) 
The dependent variable is I/Kit. The estimation is by GMM by Arellano and Bond(1991) and implemented by 
Roodman’s(2006) package in Stata® with the finite-sample correction for two-step covariance matrix by 
Windmeijier(2005);  
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The firm specific effect has been eliminated by the orthogonal deviation transformation; time-dummies have been 
applied to control for the time specific effect; GMM instruments are the third lag of I/Kit, other instruments are the first-
lagged C/Kit, Y/Kit, D/Kit; LPc; and the level term of time dummy.  
p-value is presented in parentheses; p-values of the Sargan-test are presented for testing instruments validity with 
degrees of freedom in the parentheses;  AR test ensures no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; 
the Wald-test reports the joint significance of the reported coefficients excluding the time dummy, with the degrees of 
freedom besides and the p-values underneath.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
Table 2.7 represents results of the basic multicountry study.  Firstly coefficients of the 
lagged I/Kit is significantly positive and coefficients of lagged (I/K) it
2
 are significantly negative as 
we expect, but their absolute values are not greater than 1. This conflicts with our assumption and 
this is a sign of deviation from the value maximization principle as argued by Dickinson(2000). The 
output to capital ratio is positively associated with the investment ratio in the following period 
which suggests imperfect competition existing in the market as we discussed in the theoretical 
model before. The parameter of cash flows is positive. We expect coefficient of the cash flow to be 
negative if firms are assumed to raise as much funds as possible without any constraints, however, a 
positive number implies that a financial constraint exists therefore firms’ investments are sensitive 
to its internal finance reflected by the cash flow term. The debt term implies that firms consider debt 
finance for investment. A negative coefficient of this term implies the bankruptcy cost specification 
thus firms are tempt to control the risk associated with the debt. However, a positive coefficient may 
suggest that firms are taking excess risks via debt finance. We are more concerned with the impact 
from the legal protection implied by the two interactions, LPc*C/Kit and LPc*  
2
it
D K . According to 
the Law and Finance View by LLSV (1998), better legal protection will provide an easier access to 
external financing; subsequently firms will have less financial constraints and be less sensitive to 
internal finance. The negative coefficient of the interaction between LPc and C/Kit implies this 
specification.  The interaction of LPc and  
2
it
D K  illustrates the interactive effect between legal 
protection and debt on firms’ investment behaviours. Legal protection on creditors will prevent 
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creditors from the debt default by means of collateral and some other restrictions on the bankruptcy 
process. This will affect firm in raising debts for investment. The coefficient of this interaction is 
negative at 5% which implies that when legal protection is better, firms will be more aware of the 
bankruptcy costs when they raise debt for investment.  
2.6.3 Alternative Tests  
The following section will provide several robustness tests by adding in additional variables. 
Firstly, we look into account of some country level variables. It is believed that not only do law 
statutes influence the financial sector, but also the enforcement of laws has an effect on the financial 
sector according to the law and finance view. (LLSV, 1998) We construct LGEFc
17
 identifying 
several aspects of the legal system such as the rule of law, the efficiency of judicial system, 
corruption, the risk of expropriation and the risk of contract repudiation.  The first two indicators 
assess the quality of law enforcement and the remaining three measures the attitude from the 
government towards business.  Therefore, this index shows the country differences in law efficiency 
and bureaucracy performance. Second, ACCOUNTc
18
 measures the quality of the accounting system 
which indicates the disclosure rules in the country. This is a very important variable affecting firms’ 
investment behaviour as it measures the accounting standards which to a large extent influences the 
information availability and therefore the external financial costs. We try to add it additional to the 
basic model, however as it is time-invariant it is dropped out by the software because of the 
collinearity since we use the ―difference‖ GMM estimation. Nevertheless, it is a valid instrumental 
variable in the estimation. Thirdly, FDct
19
 is the variable indicating financial development for 
                                                        
17
 For details of the index, see variable description in Table 2.2 and 2.3.  
18
 Detailed description referred to Table 2.2. 
19
 For details of the index, see variable description in Table 2.2.  
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different countries c across time t. It is the sum of indices measuring financial development in terms 
of both financial institutions and financial markets created by Beck et al.(2000) in the World Bank 
statistics center, which is widely used in empirical studies monitoring the impacts from financial 
sectors.( i.e. LLSV, 1997; 1998; Levine, 1997,1998, 2000; etc.)  Financial development is important 
in reducing the financial constraint as argued by Rajan & Zingales, (1998) and Love (2003). 
Besides, FDct is correlated with LPc and LGEFc according to the Law and Finance view; therefore, 
we cannot avoid the impact from financial development when investigating firms’ investments in 
terms of financial constraints. Furthermore, there are some other factors assumed to influence the 
financial sectors and thus have an impact on a firm’s behaviour. OPENct (i.e. Levine, 2000; Stulz& 
Williamson, 2001) is an indicator showing a country’s openness to trade. It measures the country’s 
openness to trade and the involvement in the global economy. Therefore, it reflects the activity of an 
economy which is associated with the manufacture of the country, thus has an impact on firm’s 
expansion. GOVNct (i.e. Levine, 2000) is the government expenditure as share of its GDP. It 
measures the influence from the government’s consumption, which has a large impact on the whole 
economy and hence is correlated with a firm’s business and its investment. These variables are all 
exogenous but related with the financial system and hence associated with the firm’s investment 
strategy; therefore, they can also be used as valid instruments. Controlling country wealth, I also 
employ log of GDP per capita, LNGDPct. Besides, this variable is an indicator of business cycle of 
the firm which is correlated with a firm’s financial constraints when it seeks finance for its 
investment.   
Above country level variables can control for the country specific effects which we detect in 
the pre-estimation analyses. Table 2.8 presents the results of models with additional country-level 
variables discussed above. Again in the regressions the firm specific effect has been eliminated by 
the orthogonal deviation transformation and the time effect has been controlled by the time dummy.  
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We add in OPENct, GOVNct and LNGDPct to the basic multi-country model (column 1) 
controlling for the country effects which generates similar results as in Table 2.7. The two 
interactive terms indicate that the protection of legal rights has a significant impact on a firm’s 
investment policy via its cash flow and debt term. Better legal protection is associated with lower 
financial constraints and higher bankruptcy costs. Equation 2 of Table 2.8 shows results when we 
investigate the effectiveness of the legal system, LGEFc. We again multiply it with the cash flow 
term and the debt term separately which reflect the firm’s investment response to internal and 
external finance when considering the effect from legal enforcement. Coefficient of the interactive 
term between LGEFc and  
2
1i ,t
D K

 is significantly positive at 10%. This implies that the 
regulatory efficiency has a positive relationship with the firm’s investment policy. In other words, if 
the legal system is more efficient or there are fewer distortions from the bureaucracy into the 
economy, firms will take more debt financing regardless the correlated bankruptcy costs. However, 
this impact is economically smaller compared with impacts from the law codes, LPc. In the contrary, 
I cannot find any evidence showing the firm’s financial constraint is linked with regulatory level 
since coefficient of the interactive term LGEFc and C/Ki,t-1  is insignificant.  
Secondly, we add in the financial development indicator, FDc,t-1, since it is argued that 
financial development can ease the difficulty of obtaining external finance thus reducing the firm’s 
dependence on internal finance (Love, 2003). The estimated coefficients strongly support the view 
that better legal protection would reduce the firm’s financial constraint in terms of its cash flow 
after we control for other influences from financial development (interactions between FDc,t-1 and 
C/Ki,t-1,  
2
1i ,t
D K

  respectively) as results reported in equations 3-4 of Table 2.8. Consist with 
results in equation 2; results suggest that when the legal system is more effective (LGEFc is higher), 
firms are taking higher debts regardless of the relevant risks since the coefficient is positive. 
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Meanwhile, the coefficient of the interaction of FDc,t-1*C/Ki,t-1 is significantly negative which 
suggests that financial development reduces firms’ dependent on internal finance for investment. 
However, the interactive effect of FDc,t-1 and debt on firms’ investments is ambiguous since 
coefficients of  FDc,t-1*  
2
1i ,t
D K

 
 
are not consistent.  
Since the level of legal protection is significantly associated with financial development as 
argued by LLSV (1998), it will be interesting to check whether the impact of financial development 
on firms’ financial constraints varies across different levels of legal systems. Thus, we include a 
three-way interaction among laws, financial development and the cash flow or debt terms to control 
for this impact. Table 2.8 equations 5-6 present the results. Equation 5 involves LPc*FDc,t-1*C/Ki,t-1 
and LPc*FDc,t-1*  
2
1i ,t
D K

while equation 6 is augmented with LGEFc*FDc,t-1*C/Ki,t-1 and 
LGEFc*FDc,t-1*  
2
1i ,t
D K

 . From the results we can see that significance of the two-way 
interactions’ coefficients has reduced dramatically since some variables such as LPc and FDc,t-1 are 
correlated and the sign of the coefficients change unexpectedly. However, the coefficients of three-
way interactions are significantly negative. If we consider the effect from the interaction 
1i ,t
C K

*FDc,t-1 as a constant, given its coefficient turns to be positive but insignificant in equation 5 and 6, 
their interactive effect is thus negatively associated with LPc and LGEFc in determining firms’ 
investments. In other words, we could see that financial development is more correlated with firms’ 
financial constraints in a country where investors are not well protected. If financial development 
can ease financial constraints, firms in countries with poor legal protection will be more sensitive in 
the financial development in making their investment policies, although this relationship cannot be 
illustrated in equations 5 or 6.   
In terms of the debt term, since the coefficient of interaction term  
2
1i ,t
D K

*FDc,t-1 negative 
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but still insignificant, it appears that interactive effect between financial development and the debt 
is positively correlated with the legal protection and legal enforcement. It means that any effects 
from financial development on the debt finance will be larger in a country with better legal 
protection.  
This three-way interaction effect is far more complicated to be explained just in terms of 
coefficients of the two-way and three-way interactions as above. Whether the impact of legal 
protection on the firm’s investment through its influence on financial development with cash flow 
and debt is significant could be illustrated by some graphs. We would carry out a single country 
study to show that whether the impact from financial development on a firm’s financial constraint 
or on a firm’s debt financing will differ across different levels of legal systems in the following 
section.  
Moreover, in Table 2.8, we could see that whether considering other effects or not, firms are 
always sensitive to internal finance since the coefficient of cash flows is positive, which means that 
firms are facing a financial constraint, although there are coefficients insignificant in equations 2 
and 4. In models of Table 2.8, we find that the main effect from the debt term  
2
1i ,t
D K

 on 
investments is positive in equation 1 and 3; while when we control for interactive effects of 
financial development (FDc,t-1) or effectiveness of legal protection (LGEFc) and debt  
2
1i ,t
D K

, the 
coefficient turns to be negative which suggests a bankruptcy cost to the firm’s investments 
(equation 2, 4, 5 and 6).   
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Table2. 8 Alternative Results 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6   
  1,/ tiKI  0.825541 
(0.0000)*** 
0.931761 
(0.0000)*** 
0.825995 
(0.0000)*** 
0.789140 
(0.0000)*** 
0.698551 
(0.0000)*** 
0.804154 
(0.0000)*** 
  
 2 1,/ tiKI  -0.431167 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.746077 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.622437 
(0.0025)*** 
-0.568763 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.414061 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.576436 
(0.0001)*** 
  
  1,/ tiKC  0.045532 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.015184 
(0.8613) 
0.099564 
(0.0001)*** 
0.029615 
(0.7780) 
0.065167 
(0.0002)*** 
0.061040 
(0.0000)*** 
  
  1,/ tiKY  0.001276 
(0.0002)*** 
0.000499 
(0.4670) 
0.001666 
(0.0205)** 
0.001446 
(0.0579)* 
0.002729 
(0.0010)*** 
0.000402 
(0.5577) 
  
 2 1,/ tiKD  0.000238 
(0.0323)** 
-0.003852 
(0.0900)* 
0.000530 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.005370 
(0.0214)** 
-0.000073 
(0.0618)* 
-0.000318 
(0.0001)*** 
  
  1,/ tic KCLP  -0.010926 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.015985 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.014608 
(0.0134)*** 
-0.019451 
(0.0000)*** 
0.011685 
(0.2690) 
0.0180948 
(0.0710)* 
  
 2 1,/ tic KDLP  -0.000072 
(0.0449)** 
-0.000123 
(0.0224)** 
-0.000207 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.000148 
(0.0159)** 
-0.000882 
(0.0800)* 
-0.000757 
(0.0450)** 
  
  1_t,ic K/CLGEF   0.001670 
(0.3577) 
 0.001804 
(0.4125) 
 0.000989 
(0.6120) 
  
  12 _t,ic K/DLGEF   0.000090 
(0.0593)* 
 0.000120 
(0.0136)** 
 0.000176 
(0.0033)*** 
  
  11  t,ct,i FDK/C    -0.006146 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.006410 
(0.0000)*** 
0.013743 
(0.1431) 
0.0719945 
(0.2111) 
  
  1
2
1  t,ct,i FDK/D  
  -0.000006 
(0.0166)** 
0.000004 
(0.1190) 
-0.000019 
(0.9949) 
-0.000191 
(0.8641) 
  
  ctcti LPFDKC 1,1,/       -0.003185 
(0.0012)*** 
-0.001542 
(0.0210)** 
  
  ctcti LPFDKD 1,
2
1,/   
    -0.000001 
(0.7815) 
-0.000115 
(0.0002)*** 
  
  ct,ct,i LGEFFDK/C 11        -0.001542 
(0.0210)** 
  
  ct,ct,i LGEFFDK/D 11
2
  
     -0.000115 
(0.0002)*** 
  
OPENct-1 0.002025 0.002012 0.003706 0.000567 0.001620 -0.000571   
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(0.0075)*** (0.0790)* (0.0001)*** (0.0400)** (0.0276)** (0.3954) 
GOVNct-1 0.017336 
(0.8436) 
0.034362 
(0.7315) 
0.016751 
(0.0231)** 
0.017866 
(0.0205)** 
0.019570 
(0.9347) 
0.021345 
(0.4593) 
  
LNGDPct-1 -0.055437 
(0.6785) 
0.100954 
(0.000)*** 
0.267510  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.16522 
(0.0979)* 
0.230875 
(0.0000)*** 
0.203901 
(0.0000)*** 
  
p-value of Sargan Test 
(d.f.) 
0.35 
(934) 
0.43 
(932) 
0.62 
(815) 
0.77 
(811) 
0.35 
(821) 
0.41 
(807) 
  
p-value of AR Test 0.84 0.64 0.58 0.75 0.52 0.74   
Wald-Test(d.f.) 
(p-value) 
2676.93(10) 
(0.0%) 
2799.11(12) 
(0.0%) 
3573.55(12) 
(0.0%) 
 3474.08(14) 
(0.0%) 
3724.23(14) 
(0.0%) 
4234.30(18) 
(0.0%) 
  
The dependent variable is I/Kit. The estimation is by GMM following Arellano and Bond(1991) and implemented by Roodman(2006) in Stata
® 
of the finite-sample correction 
for two-step covariance matrix by Windmeijier(2005); the firm specific effect has been eliminated by the orthogonal deviation transformation; time-dummies have been 
applied to control for the time specific effect; the country effect can be controlled by the country characteristic variables GOVNct, OPENct and LNGDPct. GMM instruments 
are the third lag of I/Kit, other instruments are the first-lagged C/Kit, Y/Kit, D/Kit, GOVNct, OPENct, LNGDPct, and the level term of LPc,ACCOUNTc and year dummies; p-
values of parameters are presented in parentheses; p-values of the Sargan-test are presented for testing instruments validity with degrees of freedom in the parentheses;  AR 
test ensures no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; the Wald-test reports the joint significance of the reported coefficients excluding the time dummy, 
with the degrees of freedom besides and the p-values underneath.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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2.6.4 Single Country Tests 
 
Previous analysis provides the general evidence of the relationship between legal 
protection and firms’ investments behaviour from a global perspective. Following study will 
focus on a research on the firm’s investment sensitivity to financial constraints controlling for 
the impact of financial development in single countries.  
We estimate equation (2.14) for each single country in the sample as below: 
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where td denotes the time-specific effect, i denotes the firm-specific effect and it
denotes other unobserved effects. FDct represents the level of financial development in 
country c at time t. Financial development affects firm's investment decisions through the 
influence on the external finance. As financial development is related with legal protection, 
we may be able to draw some pictures showing that interacted effects between cash flows or 
debt and financial development are related to the legal protection, which could also further 
illustrate the three-way interaction effect among legal protection, financial development and 
cash flows or debts in affecting firms’ investments as mentioned in the above section. Thus, 
we need to focus on investigating coefficients of the interactions of FDc,t-1 and C/Ki,t-1 and of 
FDc,t-1 and  
2
1i ,t
D K

 respectively. The appendix table presents the coefficients.  
Firstly, we find out that all parameters of the interaction of FDc,t-1 and C/Ki,t-1 is 
negative, which implies that financial development could reduce firms’ financial constraints 
for their future investments. The absolute values of the coefficients (|β6|) illustrate the level of 
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the influence from this interaction. Therefore, we mainly discuss the absolute values of  6  to 
examine whether there is any pattern across different legal systems.  
This pattern is more obvious in analyzing the downward slope in Fig.2.1 and Fig.2.2, 
where Fig.2.1 illustrates the absolute value of  6  against LPc; while Fig.2.2 is a scatter 
graphic of the absolute value of  6 against LGEFc for all samples countries. In countries 
where investor protection is stronger, the financial sector is more developed and obstacles of 
external finance are relatively weaker. In other words, firms are less constrained in finance 
and thus are less sensitive to the changes of the financial system when considering their 
investment strategies. This is in accordance with the conclusion in previous section on the 
negative coefficient of a three-way interaction LPc*C/Ki,t-1*FDc,t-1. In the contrary, in 
countries where the legal protection is weaker, financial development is more influential in 
reducing firms’ financial constraints. This implies that firms in those countries could benefit 
more from the financial development. There are some outliers in Fig2.1 and Fig.2.2. For 
instance, Malaysia and South Africa are English Common law countries with high legal 
protection scores; however the coefficients of FDc,t-1 and C/Ki,t-1 are relatively high among 
the sample, which means that the corporate governance in those countries is highly related 
with performance of financial development. This is actually not a conflict with our previous 
conclusion. Because although from the law in the statutes, those countries have a high score 
in legal protection, they are among the lowest class in law enforcement since their legal 
systems are still under developed which makes the real quality of legal protection lower than 
other countries, thus the changes of the investment policy in a firm relate more closely to the 
financial development changes in those countries; Switzerland in Fig.2.1, although it has a 
very small |β6| but with a small LPc, however, it has a very high value in legal enforcement, 
LGEFc, as seen from Fig.2.2. Alternatively, in Fig.2.2 Hong Kong, Ireland and Israel firms 
60 
 
have small |β6| but with small LGEFc, however, they all have higher values of LPc as shown 
in Fig.2.1.  This is also evidence that the impacts from legal statutes and legal enforcement 
are relatively independent.  In sum, firms in a country which either has weaker legal 
protection in terms of law codes or has less effectiveness of legal protection on investors will 
benefit more from the financial development for their expansions.   
We find that English Common law countries such as the U.K., the U.S. and Canada 
that have the strongest investor protection have a relatively smaller negative coefficient of 
interaction of FDc,t-1 and C/Ki,t-1; a few other countries, though not English heritage, have 
small 6  as well because their investor protection scores are high among the sample, for 
instance Japan, from the German heritage and Spain, from the French heritage. Therefore, 
from this point of view, we do not find very strong evidence supporting the Law Origin view.  
In terms of coefficients of interacted FDc,t-1 and  
2
1i ,t
D K

, most countries have 
positive coefficients although with some exceptions (see table in Appendix). This positive 
coefficient implies that financial development may encourage firms’ expansion in debt 
finance. Fig. 2.3 plots 7 , the coefficient of interaction between FDc,t-1 and  
2
1i ,t
D K

 against 
investor protection LPc for each country and Fig.2.4 plots 7 against LGEFc. In general, we 
find out that the fitted lines in both graphs are flat and slightly upwards since coefficients 7  
in almost all the sample countries are at fairly the same level. Referring to previous 
conclusion in the three-way interaction of LPc (LGEFc), FDc,t-1 and  
2
1i ,t
D K

, we find out 
that the impact from FDc,t-1*  
2
1i ,t
D K

 positively varies across different legal systems. 
However, two graphs imply that this phenomenon is not significant. In other words, legal 
protection is not significantly or largely correlated with financial development in affecting 
firms’ debt finance for investments. Besides, in those two graphs, we see that firms in the 
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Scandinavian law countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have larger coefficients 
for the interaction of FDc,t-1 and  
2
1i ,t
D K

. Financial development in those countries seems 
more influential in firms’ debt finance. This reflects two historical events in their financial 
development, the financial liberalisation in the 1980s and the banking crisis in the 1990s, 
which result in a giant financial system reorganization and corporate governance reforms 
(Hyytinen et al., 2003).  
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 Figure 2. 1 
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2.6.5 Threshold Effect 
 
Previous studies suggest that legal protection has an impact on firm’s investment 
behaviour when the firm faces financial constraints. Better legal protection and stronger legal 
enforcement will make firms less sensitive to its internal finance-its earnings since they have 
an easier access to external finance. Therefore, we are very curious about the level at which 
legal protection is effectively associated with financial development and consequently 
influence firm’s investment strategy.  
The following analysis aims to find such threshold effect. The econometric technique 
is very basic by including dummies to show different levels of legal protection, so that we 
can compare when legal protection is significantly influential for firm’s investment strategy. 
We add dummies into the basic investment model, equation (2.11), which becomes equation 
(2.15), 
2 2
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 1i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
t i it
I I I C Y D
K K K K K K
dummy d
    
 
    
           
               
           
    
              (2.15) 
In the above equation, capital letter A represents either the cash flow to capital ratio, 
C/Ki,t-1, or the debt term  
2
1i ,t
D K

. I create two types of dummies according to values of the 
legal protection indices. The first dummy, Ds (s=1,2,…,6), is constructed related with values 
of overall law levels, LPc. Since the value range of LPc from the sample is from 1, the poorest 
legal protection, to 4.5, the strongest, then D1=1 if LP >1.5; D1=0 otherwise. The next 
dummy in the series is created by increasing the critical value of LPc by 0.5 and so forth.  
Similarly, the other dummy Us(s=1,2,…,8) is constructed corresponding to the values of legal 
protection in shareholders’ rights SHRTc and the values in creditor rights CRRTc respectively, 
thus dummies U1-U5 are related with SHRT and U6-U8 related with CRRTc. These dummies 
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are made corresponding to every critical values of SHRTc or CRRTc increased by 1 each time. 
The detailed description of the dummies is shown in the second table in the Appendix. 
We estimate equation (2.15) using the stacked firm data across the world. Table 2.9 
presents the summarized results. We find only when the average legal protection level is 
greater than 4 would legal protection come into force and the investment ratio is negatively 
related with the cash flow, because only the coefficient of the interaction of C/Ki,t-1 and D6 is 
significant at 1%. It is found out that when shareholder protection level is above 3, the legal 
system will be effective in firms’ investment decision by reducing their reliance on internal 
finance as coefficients for the 4
th
 and 5
th
 dummies are significant at 1%; meanwhile, this 
effect will take place when creditor right protection is rather low (scores no more than 1). 
More interestingly, it is found out that there are two value ranges within which the legal 
protection will be efficient in affecting a firm’s investment via the debt term, according to 
result in Table 2.9. When LPc is between 2 and 3 or between 3.5 and 4(inclusive), coefficients 
of dummies D2, D3 and D5 are significant at 10%. Further analyses on dummies of 
shareholders right protection (SHRTc) and creditor protection (CRRTc) further confirm that 
laws protecting creditor rights influence the debt term. More precisely, since there are three 
dummies representing three different levels of creditor right protection, parameters of each 
dummies show that only when the country reaches the highest level of creditor protection, 
greater than 3(dummy D8), will a firm’s investment policy have a positive relation with the 
debt ratio. When the creditor protection level is only above 1(dummy D6), indicating a poorer 
creditor protection, coefficient illustrates that investment policy have a negative relationship 
with the debt term alternatively. This is can be interpreted as that creditor right protection is 
so poor that creditors are less secured and thus cost of debt is higher. As a result, firms prefer 
other sources of finance than borrowing, especially when the financial system is developing. 
When the legal protection of creditors increases to the next level, greater than 2, the dummy 
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is insignificant, which illustrates that creditor protection has neither positive nor negative 
effect on firms’ investment behaviour at this point. When the creditor protection achieves a 
score greater than 3, it is associated with a better developed financial system where firms are 
seeking more debts for investments.  
Table2. 9 The Summary Table for Threshold Effect Analyses 
  
, 1
/ si tC K D    , 1/ si tC K U    sti DKD
2
1,/    
2
, 1
/ si tD K U  
S=1 0.179687 
(0.2627) 
-0.068513 
(0.2679) 
0.00037 
(0.9031) 
0.00054 
(0.9031) 
S=2 0.007013 
(0.8159) 
0.001652 
(0.9434) 
0.000979 
(0.0229)** 
0.000130 
(0.6350) 
S=3 -0.017093 
(0.4601) 
0.010969 
(0.4369) 
0.000820 
(0.0743)* 
0.000067 
(0.7547) 
S=4 -0.028043 
(0.1134) 
-0.045773 
(0.0000)*** 
0.000751 
(0.1585) 
0.000170 
(0.4404) 
S=5 -0.023393 
(0.1380) 
-0.060535 
(0.0001)*** 
0.000950 
(0.0875)* 
0.000110 
(0.5929) 
S=6 -0.049697 
(0.0049)*** 
-0.033835 
(0.0001)*** 
0.000757 
(0.2216) 
-0.000935 
(0.1003)* 
S=7  
 
-0.008777 
(0.1669) 
 0.000231 
(0.5124) 
S=8  
 
-0.009213 
(0.4923) 
 0.001009 
(0.0483)** 
The dependent variable is I/Kit. The estimation is by GMM following Arellano and Bond(1991) and 
implemented by Roodman(2006) in Stata
® 
of the finite-sample correction for two-step covariance matrix by 
Windmeijier(2005); the firm specific effect has been eliminated by the orthogonal deviation transformation; 
time-dummies have been applied to control for the time specific effect. GMM instruments are the third lag of 
I/Kit, other instruments are the first-lagged C/Kit, Y/Kit, D/Kit, GOVNct, OPENct, LNGDPct, and the level term of 
LPc,ACCOUNTc and year dummies; p-values of parameters are presented in parentheses;  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter investigates how legal institutions affect firms’ investments by 
improving financial development. This mechanism is illustrated by the improved neoclassical 
investment model assuming that legal factors will have an impact on the internal cash flow 
and the debt. The chapter finds that a firm’s investment is negatively related with the cash 
flows. When legal system is improved, the firm’s investment will be less dependent on 
internal finance but taking more debt finance since the financial system is ameliorated with 
the cost reduction in accessing external finance. The results are confirmed after controlling 
for other factors such as GDP per capita, law enforcement, accounting standard, government 
expenditure and the openness to trade. It is found out that law enforcement has a little impact 
on the borrowing amount invested in the next period by the firm while it has no such impact 
on cash flows.  
The following single country test finds out that firms in countries with lower legal 
protections will benefit more from financial development which reduces their financial 
constraints in investments; while the impact of financial development on firms’ debt finance  
does not show any large variation across different legal systems, and the results show that 
financial development encourage firms to raise debt.  
The threshold effect analysis has found out that when legal protection in a country 
reaches a certain high level (LPc scores greater than 4 or SHRTc is greater than 3); it has a 
significant effect on firms in reducing their reliance on internal finance for their investments 
in the next period. Moreover, this chapter finds that when creditor rights protection 
approaches to a high level (scores 3 and upper); firms turn to raise funds from borrowing in 
the investment of the next period.  
This chapter contributes to providing a mechanism in the micro-level via which legal 
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factors affect a firm’s investment behaviour, thus enhance its growth. It complements the 
findings in previous literature (i.e. Bond and Meghir, 1994; Love, 2003) which holds that 
investment is not sensitive to internal finance when the financial system develops, with a 
possible explanation. The main weakness may relate to the nature of the legal indices in the 
empirical study. The three categories of indices are combined with the creatures of LLSV 
(1998), which are time-invariant and cannot indicate the dynamic influence from the legal 
sector to the financial sector and the economy.  
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Appendix 
Summary Table (Legal Indices against 6 and 7 across Countries) 
 Country Code Legal origin SHRT CRRT LGEF LP 6  7  
1 Argentina AR French 4 1 28.19 2.5 -0.0469 0.0084 
2 Australia AU English 4 1 46.50 2.5 -0.0076 0.0024 
3 Austria AS German 2 3 47.36 2.5 0.0312 -0.0145 
4 Belgium BE French 0 2 47.43 1 -0.0456 0.0035 
5 Brazil BR French 4 1 32.31 2.5 -0.0194 0.0027 
6 Canada CA English 5 1 47.88 3 -0.0098 0.0048 
7 Denmark DE Scandinavian 2 3 48.98 2.5 -0.0461 0.0149 
8 Finland FI Scandinavian 3 1 48.82 2 -0.0644 0.0119 
9 France FR French 3 0 44.87 1.5 -0.0182 0.0010 
10 Germany GE German 1 3 46.83 2 -0.0246 0.0078 
11 Hong Kong HK English 4.5 5 20.32 4.75 -0.0054 0.0087 
12 Hungary HG German 3 3.75 - 3.38 -0.0037 0.0009 
13 India IN English 5 4 30.61 4.5 -0.0168 0.0054 
14 Indonesia ID French 2 4 21.88 3 -0.0642 0.0031 
15 Ireland IR English 2.5 4 17.60 3.25 -0.0067 0.0035 
16 Israel IS English 3.5 3 17.35 3.25 -0.0091 0.0062 
17 Italy IT French 1 2 39.73 1.5 0.0218 0.0025 
18 Japan JP German 5 2 46.86 3.5 -0.0025 0.0031 
19 Jordan JD French 2 2 10.97 2 -0.0547 0.0062 
20 Kenya KY English 3 4 27.63 3.5 -0.0761 0.0063 
21 Korea, South KO German 3 3 33.55 3 -0.0290 0.0012 
22 Malaysia MY English 5 4 38.54 4.5 -0.0159 0.0084 
23 Mexico MX French 1 1 10.83 1 -0.0894 0.0045 
24 Morocco MO French 0 0 - 0 -0.0912 0.0051 
25 New Zealand NL English 4 3 48.98 3.5 -0.0773 0.0014 
26 Netherlands NZ French 2 2 49.33 2 0.0041 -0.0022 
27 Norway NW Scandinavian 4 2 49.59 3 -0.0755 -0.0134 
28 Philippines PH French 3 0 20.42 1.5 -0.0569 0.0075 
29 Poland PO German 3 2.25 - 2.63 -0.0342 0.0036 
30 Portugal PG French 2.5 3 15.43 2.75 -0.0615 0.0074 
31 Russia RF Socialist 5.5 2.5 - 4 -0.0255 0.0084 
32 Singapore SG English 5 4 44.95 4.5 -0.0099 0.0019 
33 South Africa SA English 5 3 33.49 4 -0.0185 0.0035 
34 Spain SP French 4 2 39.35 3 -0.0099 0.0042 
35 Sweden SW Scandinavian 3 2 48.98 2.5 -0.0438 0.0203 
36 Switzerland SZ German 2 1 49.96 1.5 -0.0008 -0.0026 
37 Taiwan TW German 3 3 16.81 3 -0.0498 0.0036 
38 Thailand TH English 2 3 29.67 2.5 -0.0530 0.0046 
39 United 
Kingdom 
UK English 5 4 47.01 4.5 -0.0076 0.0008 
40 United States US English 5 1 47.61 3 -0.0012 0.0025 
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Description of Dummy Variables  
Dummy Description  Category  
D1 =1, if LP> 1.5; 
=0 , if 0 <= LP <= 1.5(where 0 is the lower 
limit of LP) 
Overall law effects 
D2 =1, if LP > 2; 
=0, if LP <= 2 
Overall law effects 
D3 =1, if LP >2.5; 
=0, if LP <=2.5; 
Overall law effects 
D4 =1, if LP > 3; 
=0, if LP <= 3; 
Overall law effects 
D5 =1, if LP>3.5; 
=0, if LP <=3.5; 
Overall law effects 
D6 =1, if 4<LP <= 4.5(upper limit of LP); 
=0, if LP <=4; 
Overall law effects 
U1 =1, if SHRT > 0; 
=0, if SHRT = 0; (lowest value of SHRT) 
Shareholder protection effects 
U2 =1, if SHRT > 1; 
=0, if SHRT <= 1; 
Shareholder protection effects 
U3 =1, if SHRT >2; 
=0, if SHRT <= 2; 
Shareholder protection effects 
U4 =1, if SHRT >3; 
=0, if SHRT <= 3; 
Shareholder protection effects 
U5 =1, if 4 < SHRT <= 4.5;(upper limit of SHRT) 
=0, if SHRT <= 4; 
Shareholder protection effects 
U6 =1, if CRRT >1; 
=0, if CRRT=1;  
Creditor protection effects 
U7 =1, if CRRT >2; 
=0, if CRRT <= 2; 
Creditor protection effects 
U8 =1, if CRRT >3; 
=0, if CRRT <=3 
Creditor protection effects 
 
 
  
71 
 
 
3  
LEGAL PROTECTION AND  
THE COST OF CAPITAL 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Companies raise two types of capital: debt and equity. They differ in terms of their 
natures in granting different rights to the investors, hence the cost of these two types of 
capital should be considered separately since they will reflect different risks.  
The equity capital is usually provided under the equity contract or documents, which 
is defined by the constitution of the company according to the Memorandum or Articles of 
Association. The equity documents grant the shareholders the right to claim a dividend and to 
vote in the general meeting of the company. It is often seem as the basic instrument for 
companies to finance their investment.  
On the other hand, an extensive literature has explained the use of debt and the 
implications for the value of a firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The debt contract is 
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between the creditors (investors) who agree to lend to the borrower (in this case, company). It 
is usually defined by a certain contract, which grants the lender the right to demand 
repayment plus an interest. It is normally in the form of a loan or a bond. Typically, if 
repayment is not forthcoming, then the creditors have the right to take possession of the 
company in order to obtain repayment; otherwise, if the company does not default, the 
creditors have no right to control or to vote in the shareholder meeting of the company. 
The cost of capital represents the cost of the company in accessing both equity and 
debt financing. From the investors’ point of view, it is the expected return from the 
company’s securities. The cost of capital is the benchmark that they will judge whether they 
will provide capital to the company or not. Therefore, the level of cost of capital will 
influence the company’s reinvestment and its growth opportunities. From the macro-economy 
perspective, it will affect the growth of the whole country.   
There are mainly two streams in prior literature that investigate the issue of explaining 
the variation in the cost of capital. One stream concentrates on the governance of the firm 
(shareholder rights and creditor rights) associated with the cost of capital (e.g. Gompers et al, 
2003; Bhojarj & Sengupta, 2003; Bebchunk et al. 2005; Ashbaugh et al. 2004; Collins et al, 
2006 ); while the other stream of literature focuses on the level of information disclosure that 
influences firms’ cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Hubbard 1998; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Francis, et al. 2005 ). Literature in the first stream argues that 
stronger corporate governance increasing stakeholders’ right can reduce the agency problem 
and therefore reduce the cost of capital; while the later stream stresses the importance of 
information disclosure and argues that higher level of information disclosure will reduce the 
cost of capital. Some illustrate that these two mechanisms are effective at the same time (e.g. 
Ashbaugh et al, 2004); some suggest that they are independent (e.g. Fracis, et al., 2005) while 
some argue that there are tradeoffs between the two (e.g. Cheng et al., 2006).  
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When regarding the mechanism though which corporate governance influences the 
cost of capital, the recent law and finance view provides explanations. The law and finance 
view considers the impact of a well-functioning legal system on the corporate governance. 
The main idea is that, efficient legal institutions will protect outsiders (minority shareholders 
and creditors outside of the company) from being expropriated by insiders (majority 
shareholders and managers of the company). As a result, the risk premium required by the 
outside stakeholders will be reduced and the cost of capital will consequently decrease. 
However, there is rare literature to illustrate this phenomenon empirically. Some literature 
proves that there is a significantly positive relationship between legal protection and the 
volume of equity market (e.g. LLSV, 1997) and the size of banking sector (e.g. Levine, 1999), 
which can be taken as evidence of such link.  
In this chapter, we focus on the effect from the variations in corporate governance on 
the cost of capital by systematically analyzing the influence from the legal institutions while 
controlling the influence from the level of information disclosure, and the accounting 
standard as well as other firm specific variables and country specific variables. We examine 
this linkage cross 40 countries in the world including both developed and developing 
countries based on the firm-level data. In our research, we analyse the cost of capital by 
examining both the cost of debt and the cost of equity. Unlike prior researches which only 
control for the effect of shareholders and creditors protection (e.g. Fracis, et al. 2005), in this 
chapter, we explicitly examine the influence from different aspects of legal protection as well 
as the efficiency. The findings suggest that the legal protection of creditors does not have a 
significant direct linkage with the cost of debt. However, we find that the mechanism through 
which the legal protection affects the cost of debt is on the depth of the credit market. In other 
words, the stronger the legal protection is for creditors, the larger the banking sector will be 
and hence more credit is available for firms, and the less the cost of debt will be. Besides, 
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strengthening efficiency of the legal system is more important than type of the legal 
protection for the cost of debt.  In terms of the cost of equity, results suggest a significantly 
negative impact from shareholder protection and its enforcement for the cost of equity. The 
analysis suggests that better shareholder protection will lead to a reduction in the cost of 
equity. The results imply that the legal protection is important to the cost of equity, because it 
affects the liquidity of the stock market rather than through an impact on the total 
capitalization of the market. In other words, the legal protection is better, the funds in the 
market are more active and the cost of equity from the stock market will be lower.   
The study examines the cost of capital associated with different legal origins. The 
results strongly support the idea that the French-civil law countries have the highest cost of 
equity. But the difference of the cost of equity between English-common law countries and 
German-civil law countries is not systematic. Our empirical study does not provide any 
significant results in terms of differences in the cost of debt across countries.  
The chapter is organized as follows: part 3.2 is the literature review which 
summarizes the previous literature about this issue; part 3.3 describe the empirical model; 
part 3.4 describes the variables in the model as well as the data employed; part 3.5  presents 
the main results and discussion; part 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Recent studies on law and finance argue the legal institutions and their ability to 
efficiently determine financial development. The law and finance view holds that finance is 
the constitution of a set of contracts defined and regulated by a series of laws and regulations; 
therefore the quantity and quality level of the financial sector will be determined by the 
country’s laws and enforcement mechanism (LLSV, 1998, 2000). A well-functioning legal 
system can reduce agency cost through the protection on investors. i.e. the legal protection of 
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investors can ease the agency problem by the limiting on expropriation from the insiders 
(managers and controlling shareholders) of outsiders (both minority shareholders and 
creditors). There are a lot of papers demonstrating this law-finance nexus at the macro level, 
for example, LLSV(1998) Levine (1999, 2000) and Levine et al. (2000) conclude that 
countries with stronger shareholder protection will have better developed financial market 
while countries with stronger creditor protection will have better developed financial 
intermediaries sector, or banking sector.  
From the micro-economic perspective, the literature demonstrates the influence of 
legal protection on corporate performance. LLSV (1998), La Porta et al. (1999) illustrate the 
tradeoffs between legal protection and ownership concentration. Their research provides 
evidence that countries with better legal protection will have less concentrated ownership, 
since stronger legal protection will ease the power of insiders, and hence protect outsiders. La 
Porta et al. (1999) study 371 large companies in 27 wealthy countries and provide evidence 
that firms with stronger legal protection for minority shareholders will have higher valuation.  
In this sense, in countries with stronger legal protection, the effectiveness of legal systems 
will lower the risk premium required by investors, thus reducing the cost of capital. Later on, 
LLSV (2000) argue that the dividend payout level is associated with the shareholder 
protection which underpins two agency problem models. One model argues that ―dividend‖ is 
the outcome of legal protection which grants minority shareholders the right pressuring 
insiders to payout cash so as to prevent insiders expropriating. The other model presents the 
alternative idea that ―dividend‖ substitutes for legal protection. In other words, companies 
need to pay higher dividends to establish higher reputation so that to attract more capital from 
the outsider investors when legal protection is weak. However, in countries where legal 
protection is stronger, this mechanism to establish reputation is unnecessary because 
investors are protected well by the legal system instead. The study examines 4,000 companies 
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across 33 countries. Their findings support the first model which suggests that in countries 
with stronger legal protections, minority shareholders will extract more dividends from the 
companies since the law grants them powerful rights to protect themselves against the 
insiders.  
Later literature also considers whether better legal institutions reduce the cost of 
external capital. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) analyze the influence of legal 
protection on firm external financing. Their models apply to 30 developed and developing 
sample countries. The empirical work illustrates that companies in countries with stronger 
legal protection are more likely to rely on external finance, especially long-term financing, 
rather than internal funding. They stress the importance of the effectiveness of the legal 
system which controls the ―opportunistic behaviour by corporate insiders‖ so as to ―deter the 
volatility and enforce the compensation to infractions‖, especially in long-term financing.   
Qian and Strahan (2007) examine the relationship between legal institutions and 
different terms of bank loans across the world. Their study uses the sample loans in 43 
countries excluding the United States, where they model different terms of loans with legal 
institutional variables as exogenous variables. Their findings are consistent with the law and 
finance view that, in countries with stronger creditor protection, bank loans will have longer 
maturity and lower interest rate. i.e. bank loans are secured by collateral and the availability 
of bank loans is improved as creditors are willing to offer credit on more favourable terms.  
Qi et al. (2008) undertake an empirical study on 35 sample countries to examine 
whether political rights or legal protection or both can reduce the cost of debt capital. The 
proxies for the cost of debt are the debt ratings as well as the yield spreads from a firm-level 
dataset, while they control for other country-level effects. Their findings suggest that political 
rights and creditor protection partially substitutes each other while an improvement in each 
can lead to a higher bond rating and lower yield spread. Moreover, it is concerned with the 
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relationship between corruption and the cost of debt, as indicated by prior researches such as 
Johnson et al. (2000). The impact from corruption is proved to be independent from political 
rights and also important for the cost of debt capital.  
Gompers et al. (2003) investigate the level of shareholder right and the firm 
performance for 1,500 companies in 1990s. They build a Governance-index, ―G-Index‖, to 
illustrate the variation of shareholder rights. Their analysis suggests that this index is highly 
correlated with the firm value. They find out that weaker shareholder right is associated with 
lower profits and higher capital expenditures.  
The literature reviewed so far focuses only on the corporate governance or outside 
investor rights’ perspective. Other studies try to investigate the effect of information 
disclosure at the same time. Because information asymmetry is the main reason for the 
agency problem, the level of information disclosure needs to be considered as well. The 
effectiveness mechanisms of information disclosure as well as legal protection have been 
subject to much investigation. Cheng et al. (2006) investigate the influence of legal protection 
and financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital as well as considering the tradeoffs 
between those two factors. They use the Gompers’ G-score (2003) as the proxy for the 
shareholder right level and financial transparency and information disclosure rankings (FTC 
rank) as proxy for financial disclosure. Their study uses firm-level data for 348 S&P 500 
firms and the empirical results from the cross-sectional models demonstrate that firms in 
countries with either stronger shareholder right or higher level of information disclosure will 
have lower cost of equity capital; moreover, their results suggest that shareholder rights and 
the financial disclosure level could partially substitute each other.   
Hail and Leuz (2006) studies the cross-country differences in terms of firms’ cost of 
equity based on a sample of 40 countries across the world. They aim to identify whether legal 
institutions and security regulations have a systematic impact on the cost of equity cross the 
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countries. They use the data that captures the cross-country differences in securities 
regulations, which is constructed by La Porta et al. (2006).  The results support the 
conclusion that countries with stronger security regulations or more extensive information 
disclosure will have lower cost of equity.   
Chen, et al. (2003, 2009) examine the impact of corporate governance on the cost of 
equity capital and how this interaction will be affected by the country-level legal protection in 
17 emerging markets, including Brazil, India, and Singapore. Their conclusion is that the 
firm-level corporate governance and the country-level legal protection of shareholders will 
substitute each other. In other words, corporate governance is negatively correlated with the 
cost of equity. However, in countries where legal protection is weak, firms with better 
corporate governance will have higher evaluation, in turn, lower cost of equity capital.  
Francis, et al. (2005) test whether the level of disclosure is negatively related to cost 
of both debt and equity capital. Their study focuses on the effectiveness of disclosure in 34 
sample countries outside the United States, but for two accounting years. They control for the 
effect from legal institutions. They apply the legal protection indices developed by LLSV 
(1998) for shareholders and creditors. However, their results do not support that legal 
protection of investors has any statistically significant influences on the cost of debt or the 
cost of equity.    
3.3 Empirical Model  
 
The empirical study in this chapter focuses on the impact of investors’ legal protection 
on the cost of capital, both debt and equity. There are two basic empirical models in this 
chapter: one estimating the cost of debt capital (DT) whilst the other to model the cost of 
equity capital (EQT). The key explanatory variables we wish to investigate are the legal 
protection factors: the creditor protection (Credit), shareholder protection (Share), the legal 
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efficiency index (Efficiency), law and order index (Rule) as well as the corruption index 
(Corruption). Besides, we also monitor the effect from the level of information disclosure by 
adding the variable, (Account).  All these variables will be defined later in Table 3.1. 
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where i indicates different firms; t indicates the time; j indicates the number of different 
coefficients in the model and c indicates variety of countries. it  is the error term. In model 
(3.1), we aim to identify the influence of creditor legal protection on the cost of debt capital 
while we will investigate the impact of shareholders legal protection on the cost of equity 
capital in model (3.2). The legal protection indices are taken from indices constructed by 
LLSV (1998) which will be discussed below.  We expect the series of parameters of the legal 
protection to be negative, since we expect better legal protection of outside investor rights to 
reduce the agency costs. Secondly, the improvement of the accounting standard will also 
reduce the problem of information asymmetry; hence reduce the cost of default risk. We also 
include other variables in terms of firm characteristic as well as country characteristics.  
3.4 Data and Variables 
 
This session will explain the variables and data we choose in the study. The first target 
is the choice of the cost of debt and equity capital.  
  3.4.1 The Cost of Equity 
 
The commonest method to estimate the cost of equity is the dividend discount model 
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(dividend growth model or Gordon growth model) of share valuation, which states that the 
price of the share is equivalent to the summation of all the future cash payments to which it is 
entitled. The model can be presented as below 
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where we assume that the company will exist perpetually; 0P  is the current share 
price, tD  is the dividend at time t: it starts from next period (t=1) and lasts for the future 
( t ); and r is the company’s cost of equity which is assumed to be constant. Furthermore, 
if the dividend grows at a constant rate, g, and the dividend in the first period, 1D   is certain, 
therefore, equation (3.1) becomes 
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For values to be finite, we must have g < r, then, subtract   
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When time goes to be infinite t , the last term of equation (3.5) approaches zero,
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Equation (3.8) states that the cost of equity in the company is given by ratio between 
the prospective dividends per share on the share price plus the long-term dividend growth rate 
per share. However there are still some limitations of this method which needs to be aware of.  
The dividend discount model states that the current price is estimated using the ex ante 
estimated discount rate (the cost of equity, r) and long-run growth rate g. But equation (3.8) is 
derived from the dividend discount model given the current stock price is known to solve for 
the cost of equity, r.  The price estimated from the dividend discount model reflects the 
intrinsic value of the stock and lack of measures of risks (see Armitage, 2005, p265), however, 
the current price used in equation (3.8) is the real market price which contains the risk 
premium under the uncertainty in the market, therefore, the use of the real market stock price 
in this model will lead to the deviation from the reasonable discount rate. For instance, if 
current stock price is very small, the cost of capital implied by equation (3.8) would be 
dramatically large. According to the dividend discount model, the current stock price is 
dependent on the expected cash flow captured by D1. Although equation (3.8) is derived from 
the dividend discount model, it does not mean that the cost of equity is dependent on the 
expected cash flows (mostly are dividends). Practically, the dividend values are difficult to 
estimate and we have to use the book value of one-year forward dividend, but there are 
abnormal high dividends paid-out or zero dividend according to the firm’s dividend policy, 
which may misestimate the cost of equity.  Another problem is to decide the long-run growth 
rate g, which the market believes to have. It is popular to use the consensus forecast annual 
growth rates from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), however, the data is 
not sufficient in our calculation of the cost of equity since we need more than five-year data. 
(We can only access up to five-year data from the I/B/E/S.) Besides, there may be some 
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errors from the accounting aspect. For example, we use the one-year forward value of 
dividend, but actually it may reflect the value in the contemporary year because of the delay 
in collecting the firm’s accounting information.  
  3.4.2 The Cost of Debt 
 
The cost of debt, from the company perspective, is the rate of return promised under 
the debt contract, for example, the interest on a bank loan or the yield on a bond. This rate is 
usually affected by the country’s risk-free return. If there is no default, then the expected 
return of rate of the debt equals to the expected return of the creditors. However, the cost of 
debt demanded by creditors is usually higher. This divergence between creditors’ expected 
rate of return and borrowers’ interest rate of loans allows for the risk of default. The 
probability of default of the company, therefore, affects the cost of debt.  
To calculate the cost of debt capital empirically, we use the interest expenses the 
company pays during a year divided by its total debt assets held within the year.  
DebtTotal
ExpensesInterest
DT                                                                                                      (3.9) 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the cost of capital annual data in 1985-2006 from the 
top 100 companies as measured by the capitalization in national stock market in each of the 
40 sample countries across the world. We exclude financial firms from the data set. There are 
some outliers appearing because of some reasons we discussed above or because of the 
inaccuracy of the raw data. We clean the dataset by dropping off those outliers.  
3.4.3 Legal Variables  
 
The legal protection indices for shareholders and creditor rights are following the 
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indices constructed by LLSV (1998) which measure the strength of legal protection of the 
investors in a country according to a series of laws and regulations in economy. We employ 
two types of measure: one is the protection on shareholders, Share; the other is the protection 
on creditors, Credit. Detailed explanations will be presented below in Table 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
LLSV (2005) construct a new series of legal protection of shareholders. This new database 
differs from the dataset we employed in the chapter, since it is concerned more with 
disclosure requirements as a way of protecting shareholders. However, the reason why we 
still use a relative ―older‖ dataset is because the shareholder rights protection variable, Share, 
in this chapter, is more independent from the accounting information, and hence will reflect 
the impact of only the legal factor perspective rather than including accounting features.  
We employ other series of indices on the legal enforcement, rule; legal system 
efficiency, efficiency; as well as the corruption level, corruption, from the database of 
Business International Corporation and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These 
variables also will be explained in Table 3.1.2 below. The former two variables both assess 
the strength of the legal system or observance of the law from different data sources; while 
efficiency focuses on impacts of laws on businesses and rule measures the overall legal 
system. The third variable, corruption, measures the level of corruption within the political 
system which is harmful to businesses. This risk would lead to reconstruction of political 
institutions or even a breakdown in legal institutions if corruption is great. Therefore, these 
three variables are highly correlated which is shown in the correlation matrix below, and thus 
it would be better examine those three effects separately. The index to reflect the accounting 
level, Account, is from the database of International accounting and auditing trends, Centre 
for International Financial Analysis and Research, and LLSV (1998).  The data for legal 
protection and accounting level mainly measure the legal environment and accounting system 
in the country during the 1990s. Since these indices are associated with the law system and 
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accounting system which are all supposed to be resistant over time, in nature, therefore, they 
are almost static and only vary cross different countries.    
The sample countries are presented in table 3.2 below and basic descriptive statistics 
is presented in table 3.3.1 while the correlations between each pair of variables are shown in 
table 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 below.  
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Table3. 1 Variable Description 
Table 3.1.1  All Variables 
Variable  Definition Source  
DT Cost of debt. It is the ratio of 
total interest expense to total 
debt in a firm. 
Thompson Worldscope 
EQT Cost of equity. It equals to the 
ratio of dividend per share and 
current market price plus the 
dividend growth rate in a firm. 
Thompson Worldscope & 
DataStream 
Legal Protection variables Share: legal protection for 
shareholders; 
Credit: legal protection for 
creditors; 
Other legal variables: Rule; 
Efficiency; Corruption; 
Detailed explanations for legal 
protection variables are 
presented in the table below. 
Law books of each countries; 
Business International Corp.; 
International Country Risk 
Guide(ICRG) and LLSV(1998) 
   
ACCOUNT Index for the accounting system 
in a country. The higher the 
index is, the more transparency 
the system is in a country.  
International accounting and 
auditing trends, Centre for 
International Financial 
Analysis and Research  and 
LLSV(1998) 
Legal origin dummy 
(English, French, and German) 
Dummies indicating the legal 
origins of a country: English 
common law, French Civil law 
and German common law; 
LLSV(1998) 
Lev  Leverage level of the firm. It is 
the ratio of total debt to total 
assets in a firm. 
Thompson Worldscope 
LAS Natural logarithm of the total 
assets in a firm. 
Thompson Worldscope 
DTE Debt to equity ratio in a firm. Thompson Worldscope 
Inflation  Annual percentage change of 
the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). 
Would Bank, World 
Development Indicator, 2008 
Govbd Government bond yield in a 
country. 
International Financial 
Statistics(IFS), IMF, 2009 
FDST Stock market development. 
Index-1 from Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, (1996). It is the 
aggregate of market 
capitalization to GDP; total 
value traded to GDP; turnover 
(total value traded to market 
capitalization) 
World Bank
20
 
FDFI Financial intermediaries’ World Bank23 
                                                        
20
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, 2000,  http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 , accessed on 28/05/2007 
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development. Similar to 
FIndex-1 from Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, (1996). It is the 
aggregate of ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP; ratio of 
domestic credit to private sector 
to GDP. 
21
 
Fopen Financial openness index of a 
country. The higher the index 
is, the opener the financial 
system is in a country. 
Chinn and Ito, (2007) 
Bank  The size of the banking system 
in a country. The higher the 
index is, the bigger the banking 
sector is in a country. It is the 
ratio of private credit by deposit 
money bank to GDP. 
World Bank
20
 
Stock  The size of the stock market in 
a country. The higher the index 
is, the larger the stock market is 
in a country. It is the ratio of 
stock market capitalization to 
GDP. 
World Bank
21
 
 
3.1.2 Legal Protection Variables  
Variable  Definition Source 
One share-one vote 1: each ordinary share 
guarantees one vote in the 
shareholder meeting; 0: 
otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Posted proxy is allowed  1: shareholder to mail proxy 
allowed; 0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Shares not frozen before 
shareholder meeting 
1: shareholders can sell their 
shares before a general 
shareholder meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation 
1: allow accumulated shares to 
represent a number of 
shareholders in election of the 
board of directors or allow a 
mechanism of proportional  
representation in the board;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Oppressed minorities 
mechanism 
1: if minority shareholders can 
challenge manager’s decisions 
with granted judicial venue or 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
                                                        
21
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage. A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, 2000,  http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0, accessed on 28/05/2007 
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to abandon the company by 
selling their shares when they 
disagree with the management’s 
decision;  
0: otherwise (minority 
shareholders are those whose 
capital share is 10% or less) 
Pre-emptive rights 1: if shareholders have priority 
to subscribe new shares and this 
right can only be discarded by 
shareholders’ vote;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Percentage of share capital to 
call an extraordinary 
shareholders' meeting 
1: shareholders have to hold 
greater or equal to 10% of share 
capital in order to call for an 
extraordinary shareholder’s 
meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Share Shareholder right protection; 
sum of points 1-7, range from 
0-7 
 
   
Restriction on reorganization 
process 
1: reorganization process 
requires consent of creditors; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
No automatic stay on secured 
assets  
1: an automatic stay on the 
assets of the firm is not required 
in the reorganization procedure; 
(collateral can be repossessed 
after the reorganization petition 
is approved.) 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Secured creditors rank top 1: secured creditors have 
priority in the distribution of the 
disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Management has to leave 1: court or the creditors appoint 
the managerial body during the 
reorganization process; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Credit Creditor right protection; sum 
of points 9-11, range from 0-4 
 
 
 
  
Efficiency Assessment of the legal 
system’s efficiency and integrity 
Business International Corp. 
and LLSV(1998)  
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in terms of its effects on 
business, particular on foreign 
firms, constructed by the 
country risk rating agency 
Business International Corp. 
ranges from 0-10; average 
between 1980-1983 
Rule Assessment of law and order: 
i.e. the strength of laws and the 
population observance in the 
country, produced by the 
country risk rating agency, 
International Country Risk 
(ICR); scores from 0-10; 
average monthly data between 
1982-1995 
Low score indicates weaker 
observance of the population. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
Corruption Assessment of corruption 
within political system. Ranges 
from 0-10; average monthly 
index between 1982-1995 
Low score indicates high 
corruption in government  
According to Wei
22
 (2000), 
there is interactive between 
―Corruption‖ and ―Openness‖.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
 
  
                                                        
22
 Wei, S-J., (2000) ―Natural openness and good government‖, NBER Working Paper, No. 7765 
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Table3. 2 Sample Country 
 
Country name 
No. of 
Observations 
Percentage in total 
observations 
No. 
Companies 
Legal origin 
1 Argentina  857 2.32% 58 French  
2 Australia 861 2.34% 57 English  
3 Austria 680 1.84% 53 German  
4 Belgium 795 2.16% 56 French  
5 Brazil 765 2.08% 49 French  
6 Canada 682 1.85% 72 English  
7 Denmark 768 2.08% 47 Scandinavian  
8 Finland 1093 2.96% 70 Scandinavian  
9 France 1180 3.20% 73 French  
10 Germany 1129 3.06% 68 German  
11 Hong Kong 1038 2.82% 74 English  
12 Hungary 639 1.73% 31 German  
13 India 380 1.03% 40 English  
14 Indonesia 882 2.39% 63 French   
15 Ireland 954 2.59% 59 English  
16 Israel 903 2.45% 61 English  
17 Italy 795 2.16% 54 French  
18 Japan 1566 4.25% 80 German  
19 Jordan 876 2.38% 55 French  
20 Kenya 368 1.00% 36 English  
21 Korea 1020 2.77% 68 German  
22 Malaysia 1198 3.25% 67 English   
23 Mexico 97 0.26% 68 French  
24 Morocco 935 2.54% 59 French  
25 Netherlands 1265 3.43% 70 French  
26 New Zealand 574 1.56% 52 English  
27 Norway 729 1.98% 59 Scandinavian  
28 Philippines 876 2.38% 54 French  
29 Poland 1185 3.21% 60 German  
30 Portugal 1230 3.34% 65 French  
31 Russia 1340 3.63% 80 French  
32 Singapore 962 2.61% 59 English  
33 South Africa 978 2.65% 61 English  
34 Spain 996 2.70% 63 French  
35 Sweden 334 0.91% 47 Scandinavian  
36 Switzerland 990 2.69% 59 German  
37 Taiwan 1108 3.01% 70 German  
38 Thailand 1108 3.01% 64 English  
39 United 
Kingdom 1304 3.54% 75 
English  
40 United States 1424 3.86% 76 English  
      
 Total  36864 100% 2432  
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Table3. 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3.1 Cost of Capital and Other Explanation Variables (outliers are removed)  
 Mean  S.D  Min Max 
DT 0.101 0.566 0.000 17.923 
EQT 0.154 0.586 0.000 8.875 
Share  3.323 1.638 0.000 5.000 
Credit  1.660 1.057 1.000 4.000 
Account  68.466 6.917 54.000 77.000 
Rule 9.521 1.051 6.320 10.000 
Corruption  9.123 1.037 6.320 10.000 
Efficiency  9.123 1.246 5.750 10.000 
Lev 1.836 4.441 0.000 48.962 
Las 9.332 1.730 4.265 13.528 
Dte 1.439 2.724 0 12.290 
Inflation  2.499 1.709 0.185 15.744 
Govbd 6.266 2.130 3.352 13.296 
Bank 0.943 0.456 0.259 1.937 
Stock 0.758 0.468 0.067 2.688 
FDFI 1.544 0.660 0.000 3.148 
FDST 1.780 1.446 0.000 6.893 
Fopen 2.012 1.083 -1.812 2.532 
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Table 3.3.2. Matrix of Correlations of Cost of Debt and Other Explanatory Variables  
 
QT Credit  Account  Rule  Corruption  Efficiency  Lev  Lass  Dte  Inflation  Govbd Bank  Stock  FDFI FDST Fopen  
QT 1 
               Credit   -0.057 1 
              Account  -0.031
*
 -0.713
***
 1 
             Rule  -0.032
*
 -0.002 0.621
***
 1 
            Corruption  -0.031
**
 -0.037
**
 0.695
***
 0.828
***
 1 
           Efficiency  -0.032
**
 0.064
***
 0.568
***
 0.957
***
 0.741
***
 1 
          Lev  0.008 -0.096
***
 0.096
***
 0.049
***
 0.082
***
 0.006 1 
         Las -0.063 0.049
***
 -0.197
***
 -0.173
***
 -0.296
***
 -0.096
***
 -0.236
***
 1 
        Dte  -0.111
**
 -0.017 0.003 -0.043
**
 0.013 -0.063
***
 0.287
***
 -0.298
***
 1 
       Inflation  -0.031 0.042
***
 -0.260
***
 -0.369
***
 -0.330
***
 -0.328
***
 -0.017 -0.143
***
 -0.035
*
 1 
      Govbd -0.005 -0.054
***
 0.100
***
 0.043
***
 0.115
***
 0.018 0.063
***
 -0.157
***
 0.237
***
 0.588
***
 1 
     Bank  -0.033* -0.302
***
 0.362
***
 0.421
***
 0.177
***
 0.394
***
 0.047
**
 0.143
***
 -0.182
***
 -0.121
***
 -0.295
***
 1 
    Stock  -0.038 -0.311
***
 0.440
***
 0.385
***
 0.238
***
 0.406
***
 0.005 0.040
**
 -0.202
***
 -0.175
***
 -0.555
***
 0.381
***
 1 
   FDFI -0.022* -0.255
***
 0.388
***
 0.475
***
 0.289
***
 0.425
***
 0.068
***
 0.065
***
 -0.121
***
 -0.225
***
 -0.188
***
 0.954
***
 0.357
***
 1 
  FDST -0.021 -0.279
***
 0.304
***
 0.228
***
 0.060
***
 0.283
***
 -0.008 0.187
***
 -0.232
***
 -0.088
***
 -0.464
***
 0.405
***
 0.846
***
 0.309
***
 1 
 Fopen  0.017 -0.117
***
 0.569
***
 0.784
***
 0.675
***
 0.723
***
 0.064
***
 -0.017 -0.121
***
 -0.441
***
 -0.446
***
 0.433
***
 0.431
***
 0.472
***
 0.332
***
 1 
*** p<1%; ** p<5%; *p<10%  
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Table 3.3.3 Matrix of the Cost of Equity and Other Explanation Variables   
 
EQT Share  Account  Rule  Corruption  efficiency Lev  Las  Dte  Inflation  Govbd Bank  Stock  FDFI FDST Fopen  
EQT 1.000 
               Share  -0.003
**
 1.000 
              Account  -0.046
***
 0.456
***
 1.000 
             Rule  -0.077
***
 -0.094
***
 0.621
***
 1.000 
            Corrupt ion -0.052
***
 -0.059
***
 0.695
***
 0.828
***
 1.000 
           Efficiency  -0.071
***
 -0.075
***
 0.568
***
 0.957
***
 0.741
***
 1.000 
          Lev  -0.007 0.140
***
 0.095
***
 0.0490
***
 0.081
***
 0.006 1.000 
         Las 0.012 0.069
***
 -0.197
***
 -0.173
***
 -0.296
***
 -0.096
***
 -0.236
***
 1.000 
        Dte  -0.019 -0.038
**
 0.003 -0.042
**
 0.013 -0.062
***
 0.287
***
 -0.298
***
 1.000 
       Inflation  0.138
***
 0.052
***
 -0.260
***
 -0.369
***
 -0.330
***
 -0.328
***
 -0.017 -0.143
***
 -0.035
*
 1.000 
      Govbd 0.014 0.097
***
 0.100
***
 0.0431
***
 0.115
***
 0.018 0.063
***
 -0.157
***
 0.237
***
 0.588
***
 1.000 
     Bank  -0.049
***
 0.497
***
 0.362
***
 0.421
***
 0.177
***
 0.394
***
 0.047
**
 0.143
***
 -0.182
***
 -0.121
***
 -0.295
***
 1.000 
    Stock  -0.041
**
 0.211
***
 0.440
***
 0.385
***
 0.238
***
 0.406
***
 0.005 0.040
**
 -0.202
***
 -0.175
***
 -0.555
***
 0.381
***
 1.000 
   FDFI -0.043
***
 0.408
***
 0.388
***
 0.475
***
 0.289
***
 0.425
***
 0.068
***
 0.065
***
 -0.121
***
 -0.225
***
 -0.188
***
 0.954
***
 0.357
***
 1.000 
  FDST -0.025
*
 0.302
***
 0.304
***
 0.228
***
 0.0597
***
 0.283
***
 -0.008 0.187
***
 -0.232
***
 -0.088
***
 -0.464
***
 0.405
***
 0.846
***
 0.309
***
 1.000 
 Fopen     -0.074
***
 0.048
***
 0.569
***
 0.784
***
 0.675
***
 0.723
***
 0.064
***
 -0.017 -0.121
***
 -0.441
***
 -0.446
***
 0.433
***
 0.431
***
 0.472
***
 0.332
***
 1.000 
*** p<1%; ** p<5%; *p<10%  
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3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Pre-estimation Analyses 
Similar to Chapter 2, we need to do some pre-estimation analyses so that we can choose 
proper estimation methods. Results are shown in Table 3.4 below. Firstly, we would like to carry out 
the BP-LM test to check whether there is any individual or time effects in a random-effect model. 
The null hypothesis has been rejected at 1% significant level which suggests that there are 
significant firm-specific effects and country-specific effects in two models. Therefore, the pooled 
OLS estimators are not consistent. However, the BP-LM test does not imply any time effects. Next, 
according to the Hausman specification test, we find out that there are fixed firm-effect among two 
regressions on firm-level variables, and the country-effect significantly exists in the regression of 
the cost of equity. The Hausman test shows that a fixed time-effect model is preferred to the model 
without time effects.  In the model of the cost of debt, the existence of fixed time-effects (significant 
at 10%) and fixed country-effects (insignificant but p-value is close to 10%) has been proved 
although with weak significance. In this case, it is proper to use econometric methods that control 
for the fixed firm-effect and the fixed time-effect in both models. However, it is not plausible to 
build a model with the fixed firm-effect since we want to examine the effect from legal protection 
which is based on the country-level and would be eliminated by the Within transformation if we use 
the fixed firm-effect model. Therefore, we have to involve some firm-specific variables to control 
for particular firm-effects. Besides, the fixed country-effect should also be taken into account by 
employing country dummies. Thirdly, the heteroskedasticity test rejects the homoskedastic 
assumption therefore we need to use method to correct the heteroskedasticity for standard errors of 
the estimations.    
Table3. 4 Pre-estimation Analyses 
 BP-LM Test
a
 Hausman Test
b
 Heteroskedasticity Test
c
 
 DT EQT DT EQT DT EQT 
Firm 23114.56(1) 23233.4(1) 24.42(6) 124.55(6) 1.4E+37(2432) 8.8E+35(2432) 
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Effect [0.00***] [0.00***] [0.004***] [0.00***] [0.00***] [0.00***] 
Country 
Effect 
309.66(39) 
[0.00***] 
269.80(39) 
[0.00***] 
9.66(9) 
[0.108] 
67.55(9) 
[0.00***] 
- - 
Time 
Effect 
0.00(1) 
[1.00] 
0.00(1) 
[1.00] 
10.75(9) 
[0.096*] 
74.49(9) 
[0.00***] 
56324.19(22) 
[0.00***] 
34.64(22) 
[0.011**] 
*** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significant level. All statistics are following the Chi2-
distribution. Numbers in the parentheses are the degrees of freedom and numbers in the square brackets are p-values.  
DT: the cost of debt, EQT: the cost of equity 
a: BP-LM test holds a null hypothesis that  individual effects are insignificant.  
b: Hausman test holds a null hypothesis that the individual fixed effects are not significant. The degrees of freedom for 
three tests are slightly different because the rank of differenced variance matrix when constructing the observed statistic 
is slightly different from the number of coefficients being tested.  
c: Heteroskedasticity test holds that the errors in the fixed-effect model are homoskedastic based on Greene’s(2000) 
method.  
 
3.5.2 Basic Estimation Strategy  
Based on above pre-estimation analyses, according to equation (3.1) and (3.2), we use the 
panel model with random-effect controlling for the country fixed-effect and the time fixed-effect. In 
the models, I involve firm level variables controlling for firm-specific effects. Both country 
dummies and country level variables are controlling for country-specific effects; while year 
dummies are included in estimations controlling for time-specific effects.  
Moreover, the firm’s ability to obtain external finance is affected by the level of financial 
development; on the other hand, the finance activities in financial markets and intermediaries will 
be influenced by the participation of firms-their offers of obtaining external finance. In other words, 
the cost of capital and financial development are likely to be jointly determined. Therefore, I will 
apply the Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995) Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimators to check this possible simultaneous problem. The financial development 
variables will be instrumented by other exogenous variables, such as the legal protection. It is also a 
sensitivity check for the previous econometric estimations.  
3.5. 3 Basic Results 
 
The basic models only investigate the influence of legal protection on the cost of capital 
while controlling for the accounting standard. The variables used in the model are Credit and Share, 
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two variables measuring legal protection of creditors and shareholders respectively. Rule is the 
index measuring the law and tradition in a country, an index for the legal enforcement in a country; 
Efficiency measures the efficiency in the legal system while Corrupt measures the country’s 
corruption level, a special variable controlling for the country’s risk. As discussed before, these 
legal variables may be highly correlated therefore they are employed separately. These indicators 
are constructed to positively indicate the level of legal protection. In other words, the higher the 
indices are, the stronger the legal protection in the country will be; the more efficient the legal 
system will be; and the less corruption in the country
23
.  According to the Law and Finance view 
(e.g. LLSV, 1998, 1999 and Levine, 1999, 2000), the legal factor is a key determinant of financial 
development. A well-functioning legal system will help ease costs in accessing external finance for 
firms, both in terms of financial markets and financial intermediaries. Therefore, we expect that 
there will be a negative relationship between legal protection and the cost of capital, including the 
cost of debt as well as the cost of equity. In other words, the better the legal protection in a country 
is, the less the cost of capital will be for the firms in the country. In addition, the accounting 
standard (Account
24
) is also an important factor when considering external financing, because the 
availability of accurate information is highly associated with the cost of external finance. In this 
Chapter, we use the index for accounting standard commonly applied in previous literature (e.g. 
LLSV, 1997, 1998). The higher the index is, the more easily that information could be obtained in 
the country. So we expect that there will be another negative relationship between the level of 
accounting standard and the cost of capital. In other words, the more available accurate accounting 
information is, the lower the cost of capital.  
Table 3.5 represents the empirical results of the basic models which regress the cost of debt 
and the cost of equity separately on legal factors as well as the accounting standard. The t-statistics 
in the results are corrected for heteroskedasticity following the White-Methodology (White, 1980). 
                                                        
23
 For detailed explanations of the legal variables and accounting variable, please refer to Table 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, variable 
description.  
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The left 3 columns show results of the cost of debt model and the right 3 columns provide the 
results of the cost of equity model.  
In terms of the cost of debt, the estimators of the accounting level are significant at 5% level 
but the parameters of the legal protection indicators are not significant. On the other hand, the OLS 
estimations suggest a very significantly negative relationship between the cost of equity and the 
legal factors as well as the accounting standard. The parameters are all negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results are quite similar to the empirical results generated by Francis, 
et al. (2005) where they find that the legal protection on shareholders as well as the accounting level 
is negatively correlated with the Ex Ante cost of equity capital at 5% significance level. The results 
suggest a direct linkage between the shareholder legal protection and the cost of equity, in contrast 
to the lack of explanatory power of legal factors when considering the cost of debt. Because 
stronger minority shareholders’ protection will protect the damage caused by insiders (large 
shareholders and managers), firms will have a higher valuation and need to pay lower dividends, 
and hence the cost of equity is lower. Here, the results suggest that the dividend now is the 
substitution for the legal protection: higher legal protection will lead to lower dividend to pay, 
which is opposite to the conclusion implied by previous literature such as LLSV (2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Table3. 5 Cost of Capital (Basic Results) 
Independent Cost of Debt Cost of Equity    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit  -0.0465 -0.0578 0.1435 -0.2457     
 (-0.287) (-1.487) (1.220) (-0.978)     
Share      -0.0051 -0.0191*** -0.0097* 0.0094 
     (-0.930) (-3.020) (-1.736) (1.127) 
Rule   -0.0138    -0.0509***   
  (-0.689)    (-3.851)   
Efficiency    -0.0016    -0.0344***  
   (-0.568)    (-3.510)  
Corruption     0.0161    -0.0202 
    (0.787)    (-1.394) 
Account   -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0014*** -0.0016** -0.0011*** -0.0094*** -0.0065*** -0.0040* 
 (-2.160) (-2.160) (-3.821) (-2.160) (-3.607) (-4.633) (-4.494) (-1.796) 
Observations 36709 36709 36709 36709 36715 36715 36715 36715 
Adjusted R
2
 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.338 0.339 0.336 0.338 
F-statistic 383.7 383.7 383.7 383.7 35.60 35.60 35.60 35.60 
This table presents results of random-effect regressions with country effect of the cost of debt (DT) and the cost of equity (EQT) on independent variables: legal 
protection on creditors (Credit), shareholder protection (Share), rule of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system (Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and 
accounting standard (Account). The constant terms are not presented. Year dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted to correct the 
heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-tailed t-test. F- test statistics are at 
the bottom for overall significance of all coefficients. .   
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3.5.4 Results with Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Variables 
 
We add in additional variables to control for influences from other aspects that we omit in 
previous basic models. These variables can be mainly combined into two groups: one group of 
variables controls for firm characteristics and the other group controls for the influence from the 
country’s macro-economy. In terms of the firm characteristics, we add in variables such as LAS, 
which is the log of total assets in a firm to measure the firm size which previous analyses has shown 
to be important in measuring the equity risk as well as debt risk of the firm. (e.g. Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002) The higher the total assets are, the less likely that the firm fails to pay dividends and 
debt. In turn, the firm will have higher reputation and attract funding more easily, so the firm size 
will be expected to be negatively correlated with the cost of capital.  The other firm specific control 
variable is LEV, the leverage level of a firm. This level will indicate the likelihood of a firm 
defaulting: the higher the leverage is, the more likely that the firm will default; therefore, the firm 
needs to pay higher dividends or higher interest in order to compensate investors in bearing higher 
risk. As a result, it is another important variable influencing the cost of capital and is expected to be 
positively correlated with the cost of equity. The third firm specific variable is the debt to equity 
ratio, DTE, which controls the firms in distinguishing between debt- based and equity- based 
financing patterns. However, statistically LEV and DTE are correlated since the leverage rate is the 
non-linear transformation of the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, we would expect that LEV and DTE 
may not be significant at the same time.  
Apart from the firm specific control variables, we add in other variables controlling for the 
country specification. Govbd, the government bond rate, is the risk-free assets rate and is involved 
as a bench mark of the interest rate that the borrowers need to pay at least plus a default risk 
premium. The higher the rate is, the more the borrowers expect to pay; therefore the estimator is 
expected to be positively correlated with the cost of capital. The inflation rate, Inflation, is the 
annual growth rate of the CPI in a country from the World Bank database. We expect a positive 
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parameter (a nominal term) for this variable as an increase in the inflation would require higher cost 
of capital to compensate investors.  
When we control for country dummies, the estimated parameters suggest a significantly 
negative influence from the legal protections, at 1% significance level when controlling the firm 
characteristics and at 10% level when controlling both firm specific and country specific 
characteristics in Table 3.6. Moreover, the result implies that the legal protection of creditors (Credit) 
does not show any significant impact on the cost of debt while it is the efficiency of the legal 
system or the rule of law that have a significant impact, since only the parameters of Efficiency, 
Rule are statistically significant.  
The results with the cost of equity controlling for firm-specific and country-specific 
variables are presented in Table 3.7.  Coefficients on legal factors in all three cases are still 
significantly negative at 1% level both in terms of legal protection of shareholders and in terms of 
the legal enforcement as well as the corruption level. This confirms our previous conclusion that 
there is a direct negative linkage between the shareholder legal protection and the cost of equity. 
Meanwhile, the parameter of the accounting standard variable is quite significant and negatively 
correlated to the cost of debt and the cost of equity at 1% significance level.  
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Table3. 6 Cost of Debt with Firm-Level Variables and Country-level Variables 
Independent     
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
       
Credit  -0.0671 -0.2047 -0.0985 -0.1751 -0.3148 -0.2014 
 (-0.987) (-0.474) (-1.021) (-0.384) (-0.573) (-0.475) 
Rule  -0.0310   -0.0299   
 (-2.583)**   (-2.049)**   
Efficiency   -0.0131***   -0.0100*  
  (-2.992)   (-1.716)  
Corruption    -0.0351   0.0341 
   (-1.574)   (0.998) 
Account  -0.0030*** -0.0044*** -0.0030*** -0.0027*** -0.0036*** -0.0027*** 
 (-3.494) (-6.765) (-3.494) (-3.148) (-4.377) (-3.148) 
Dte  -0.0187*** -0.0187*** -0.0187*** -0.0190*** -0.0190*** -0.0190*** 
 (-11.143) (-11.143) (-11.143) (-10.792) (-10.792) (-10.792) 
Lev  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.080) (1.080) (1.080) (1.143) (1.143) (1.143) 
Las  -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** 
 (-5.384) (-5.384) (-5.384) (-4.973) (-4.973) (-4.973) 
Inflation     0.0051 0.0051 0.0051 
    (0.856) (0.856) (0.856) 
Govbd     0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 
    (1.639) (1.639) (1.639) 
Observations 36687 36687 36687 35691 35691 35691 
Adjusted R
2
 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.422 0.422 0.422 
F-statistics 104.5 104.5 104.5 78.80 78.80 78.80 
This table presents results of random-effect regressions with country effects of the cost of debt (DT) on 
independent variables: legal protection on creditors (Credit), rule of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system 
(Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and accounting standard (Account), firm characteristic variables: the 
debt to equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las. The constant terms are not presented. Year 
dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted(White, 1980) to correct the heteroskedasticity. 
t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-
tailed t-test. Test on overall significance, F- test statistics are at the bottom for overall significance of all 
coefficients. 
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Table3. 7 Cost of Equity with Firm-level Variables and Country-level Variables 
Independent    
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
       
Share  -0.0366*** -0.0201** -0.0128 -0.0377*** -0.0209** -0.0136** 
 (-3.291) (-2.293) (-1.326) (-3.322) (-2.414) (-2.457) 
Rule  -0.0819***   -0.0864***   
 (-4.321)   (-4.448)   
Efficiency   -0.0493***   -0.0545***  
  (-3.091)   (-3.569)  
Corruption    -0.0093   -0.0129 
   (-0.566)   (-0.808) 
Account  -0.0128*** -0.0071*** -0.0008 -0.0123*** -0.0066*** 0.0001 
 (-4.637) (-2.827) (-0.300) (-4.351) (-2.721) (0.004) 
Dte  0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 
 (3.891) (3.891) (3.891) (3.559) (3.559) (3.559) 
Lev  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.113) (-0.113) (-0.113) (-0.154) (-0.154) (-0.154) 
Las  -0.0191*** -0.0191*** -0.0191*** -0.0183*** -0.0183*** -0.0183*** 
 (-3.790) (-3.790) (-3.790) (-3.426) (-3.426) (-3.426) 
Inflation     0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 
    (1.068) (1.068) (1.068) 
Govbd     0.0106** 0.0106** 0.0106** 
    (2.079) (2.079) (2.079) 
Observations 35876 35876 35876 35761 35761 35761 
Adjusted R
2
 0.490 0.490 0.496 0.501 0.501 0.502 
F-statistics 23.69 23.69 23.69 19.06 19.06 19.06 
This table presents results of random-effect estimation with country effect of the cost of equity (EQT) on 
independent variables: legal protection on shareholders (Share), rule of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system 
(Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and accounting standard (Account); firm characteristic variables: the 
debt to equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las. The constant terms are not presented. Year 
dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted to correct the heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are 
presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-tailed t-test. F- 
test statistics are at the bottom for overall significance of all coefficients.  
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 3.5.5 Results with Financial Development 
 
Another important variable to control for is the differences among financial systems across 
countries. The development level of the financial system is highly correlated with the access to 
external financing by the firm. In other words, the funds available to firms and the cost of funds 
depend on the development of financial markets and financial intermediaries (e.g. Bond and Meghir, 
1994; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). On the other hand, according to the law and finance 
view, the legal system is a key factor that influences the level of financial development regardless of 
the financial structure. Therefore, to investigate the influence from the legal protection on the cost 
of capital, we need to further control for financial development in each countries as well as the 
interaction between legal protection and financial development.  
In our research, we want to focus on the influence from financial development. Therefore, 
we include variables that indicate financial development: stock and bank, the indicators to measure 
the size of the stock market and the banking sector respectively, where stock is the total 
capitalization of stock market to GDP ratio while bank is the private credit to GDP by the banking 
sector. Furthermore, we involve FDST and FDFI, the indices for stock market development and 
financial intermediaries’ development, the compound index which is a proxy for the liquidity of the 
financial sector rather than pure size effects. All indicators of financial development are from the 
database of the World Bank by Levine and Beck (2000), and detailed explanations are presented in 
the table for variable description as above.  
Since legal protection considerably affects the cost of capital via its influence on financial 
development, the interactive terms between legal protection and financial development variables 
(share*stock, credit*bank, etc) will indicate those particular effects. Therefore, these interactive 
terms are included in the estimation model as well.  
Table 3.8 presents results of the model on the cost of debt including the indices for market 
size and banking sector size, stock and bank, as well as the interactions between legal indicators and 
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bank. Here we only interact the legal factors with bank not with stock, because we believe that debt 
largely depends on the debt market where the banking sector plays a domination role rather than the 
stock market in most countries across the world. After controlling for the financial size, the results 
suggest the negative relationship between legal protection and the cost of debt but this time, the 
results turn to be statistically significant at 5% level. The results imply that the influences from the 
legal factors on the cost of debt come from their impact on the banking sector, since the interactive 
terms are always statistically significant while coefficients of the legal factor terms are typically not 
significant. Those results modify the conclusions that we generate previously and suggest that the 
legal protection of creditors (Credit) is important and vital in affecting the cost of debt but through 
the effect on the banking sector rather than via a direct impact. This is proved by the significantly 
negative coefficients of the interactive term between Credit and bank.  Furthermore, the interactive 
terms between bank and efficiency, rule and corruption are also significant, which confirms our 
conclusion that legal protection reduces the cost of debt as it deepens the credit market. The 
accounting standard still remains significant at both 1% and 10% level.  
Secondly, we involve another type of variables indicating financial development, FDFI and 
FDST which measure liquidity of the financial sector. The results are similar to previous model 
which controls for the size effect. Table 3.8 shows the empirical results. However, after adding in 
the interactive term between FDFI and legal protection indicators, the estimators turn to be less 
significant than previous models while coefficients still hold negative. Comparatively, legal 
protection influences the cost of debt because it affects the depth and width of banking credit rather 
than the other impacts it has on the banking sector.  
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Table3. 8 Cost of Debt with Financial Development 
Independent FD Size  Independent  FD liquidity  
Variables (1) (2) (3) Variables (4) (5) (6) 
        
Credit  -0.0615 -0.0658 -0.0710 Credit   -0.0602 -0.0628 -0.0784 
 (-0.949) (-0.878) (-0.997)  (-1.281) (-1.624) (-0.996) 
Bank*Credit -1.1451** -1.6470* -1.1090* FDFI*Credit -1.0825** -1.0825** -1.0798 
 (-2.510) (-1.998) (-1.793)  (-2.055) (-2.055) (-2.154) 
Rule -0.0598   Rule  -0.0235   
 (-0.948)    (-1.932)   
Bank*Rule  -0.6150***   FDFI*Rule -0.9871   
 (-2.701)    (-1.924)   
Efficiency   -0.0925**  Efficiency   -0.0281*  
  (2.511)    (1.978)  
Bank*Efficiency  -0.6150***  FDFI*Efficiency   -1.5014**  
  (-2.701)    (-2.047)  
Corruption    -0.1847 Corruption    -0.2458 
   (-1.228)    (-1.4125) 
Bank*Corruption   -0.6150*** FDFI*Corruption   -1.0825** 
   (-2.701)    (-2.055) 
Account -0.0129*** -0.0034*** -0.0129*** Account  -0.0031 -0.0045 -0.0293** 
 (-3.287) (-4.583) (-3.287)  (-0.997) (-1.121) (-2.278) 
Bank  -0.4174*** -0.4174*** -0.4174*** FDFI  -0.4857** -0.4857** -0.4857** 
 (-2.603) (-2.603) (-2.603)   (-2.037) (-2.037) (-2.037) 
Stock  0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 FDST -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.390) (0.390) (0.390)  (-0.309) (-0.309) (-0.309) 
Dte  -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0161*** Dte  -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0189*** 
 (-11.754) (-11.754) (-11.754)  (-10.258) (-10.258) (-10.258) 
Lev  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 Lev  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.603) (1.603) (1.603)  (0.997) (0.997) (0.997) 
Las -0.0091*** -0.0091*** -0.0091*** Las -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0129*** 
 (-4.661) (-4.661) (-4.661)  (-4.991) (-4.991) (-4.991) 
Inflation  0.0067 0.0067 0.0067 Inflation  0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 
 (1.397) (1.397) (1.397)  (0.540) (0.540) (0.540) 
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Govbd     0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 Govbd 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 (1.167) (1.167) (1.167)  (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
        
Observations 35186 35186 35186  36012 36012 36012 
Adjusted R
2
 0.577 0.577 0.577  0.413 0.413 0.413 
F-statistics  87.38 87.38 87.38  52.73 52.73 52.73 
This table presents results of random-effect models with country effects of the cost of equity (EQT) on independent variables: legal protection on shareholders (Share), rule 
of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system (Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and accounting standard (Account); firm characteristic variables: the debt to equity 
ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las; country-specific variables, inflation level, inflation; and government bond rate, Govbd; indicators for banking and stock 
size, bank and stock  as well Las the interactive terms between bank and legal protection variables: Bank*Credit, Bank*Rule, Bank*Efficiency, Bank*Corruption. Indicators 
for financial intermediaries and market development in terms of liquidity rather than size, FDFI and FDST ; as well as the interactive terms between financial intermediaries 
and legal protection variables: FDFI*Credit, FDFI*Rule, FDFI*Efficiency, FDFI*Corruption. These interactive terms imply the effect from legal protections on the cost of 
debt that transfer from the influence on banking sector. The constant terms are not presented. Year dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted to 
correct the heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-tailed t-test., F- test statistics 
are at the bottom for overall significance of all coefficients. 
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Furthermore, we control for the influence from the financial openness, Fopen. The index of 
financial openness is constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008) which is a compound index to reflect the 
country’s capital account transactions as well as the exchange rate regime. This variable helps us 
control the impact from the foreign capital as opposed to domestic funds in the financial system.  
Table 3.9 illustrates the results.  The coefficient of Fopen is not significant but the coefficient of 
bank turns to be positive. There, we have some possible reasons to explain. A negative coefficient 
may suggest injection of funds from foreign financial transactions to domestic credit markets, which 
leads to lower cost of debt. For a positive coefficient, we need to consider that when financial sector 
is more opened, weaker domestic banks will disappear as they cannot compete with foreign 
financial institutions; as a result, the remaining domestic banks would increase their rate of credit in 
order to survive. At the same time, foreign financial institutions are mostly giant financial groups 
which usually have a set of critical credit requirements for the borrowers; therefore, weaker 
companies will be riskier and be asked for higher rate of debt as the risk premium. From those two 
aspects, the cost of debt turn to be higher when the financial sector is more opened.  
107 
 
Table3. 9 Cost of capital with Financial Openness 
Independent Cost of debt Independent  Cost of equity 
Variables (7) (8) (9) Variables  (7) (8) (9) 
            
Credit  -0.0679 -0.1024 -0.0745 Share  -0.1469*** -0.1342*** -0.1486*** 
 (-1.021) (-1.435) (-1.201)  (-3.111) (-2.773) (-3.259) 
Bank*Credit -0.4740*** -0.4740*** -0.3789* Stock*Share 0.2997*** 0.2997*** 0.2997*** 
 (-2.899) (-2.899) (-2.017)  (3.078) (3.078) (3.078) 
Rule  0.1243   Rule  -0.0450*   
 (1.638)    (-1.659)   
Bank*Rule -0.5675**   Stock*Rule 0.0267   
 (-2.426)    (0.195)   
Efficiency   -0.0795**  Efficiency   -0.0213  
  (2.004)    (-1.233)  
Bank*Efficiency  -0.5675**  Stock*Efficiency  -0.0218  
  (-2.426)    (-1.293)  
Corruption   -0.0329 Corruption    -0.0454* 
   (-0.775)    (-1.714) 
Bank*Corruption   -0.5675** Stock*Corruption   -0.2176* 
   (-2.426)    (1.744) 
Account  -0.0116*** -0.0034*** -0.0116*** Account  0.0123*** 0.0080*** 0.0124*** 
 (2.782) (4.624) (2.782)  (3.966) (3.190) (4.179) 
Bank  0.3965** 0.3965** 0.3965** Stock  -0.3670*** -0.3670*** -0.3670*** 
 (2.447) (2.447) (2.447)  (-4.407) (-4.407) (-4.407) 
Stock  0.0054 0.0054 0.0054 Bank  0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 
 (0.363) (0.363) (0.363)  (0.798) (0.798) (0.798) 
Fopen  0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 Fopen  -0.0348 -0.0348 -0.0348 
 (0.890) (0.890) (0.890)  (-0.951) (-0.951) (-0.951) 
Dte  -0.0159*** -0.0159*** -0.0159*** Dte  0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 
 (-11.549) (-11.549) (-11.549)  (3.188) (3.188) (3.188) 
Lev  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 Lev  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (1.624) (1.624) (1.624)  (-0.142) (-0.142) (-0.142) 
Las -0.0091*** -0.0091*** -0.0091*** Las -0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0173*** 
 (-4.651) (-4.651) (-4.651)  (-2.637) (-2.637) (-2.637) 
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Inflation  -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0060 Inflation  0.0102 0.0102 0.0102 
 (-1.242) (-1.242) (-1.242)  (0.780) (0.780) (0.780) 
Govbd 0.0054 0.0054 0.0054 Govbd 0.0261 0.0261 0.0261 
 (1.467) (1.467) (1.467)  (1.620) (1.620) (1.620) 
        
Observations 35992 35992 35992  35704 35704 35704 
Adjusted R
2
 0.577 0.577 0.577  0.538 0.537 0.537 
F-statistics  80.14 80.14 80.14  11.81 11.81 11.81 
This table presents results of random effect regressions with country effect of the cost of debt (DT) and the cost of equity (EQT) on independent variables: legal protection 
on creditors (Credit), shareholder protection, Share; rule of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system (Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and accounting standard 
(Account); firm characteristic variables: the debt to equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las; country-specific variables, inflation level, inflation; and 
government bond rate, Govbd; indicators for banking and stock size, bank and stock; the interactive terms between bank(stock) and legal protection variables respectively: 
Bank(Share)*Credit, Bank(Share)*Rule, Bank(Share)*Efficiency, Bank(Share)*Corruption; and the indicator for financial openness, Fopen. The interactive terms imply the 
effect from legal protections on the cost of debt that transfer from the influence on banking sector; the financial openness indicator monitors the capital influence from the 
cross broader capital transactions. The constant terms are not presented. Year dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted to correct the 
heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-tailed t-test., F- test statistics are at the 
bottom for tests on overall significance of all coefficients.  
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In terms of the cost of equity, we again add in variables stock and bank controlling for the 
size of the financial sector. Similar to the models of the cost of debt, we construct interactive terms 
between the size of stock markets and legal protection indicators. Table 3.10 below presents the 
results, which indicate that legal protection is still influential to the cost of equity at 1% significant 
level, as is the accounting standard in a country. In the models presented in Table 3.9, the total 
capitalization of the stock market itself is negatively correlated to the cost of equity; the coefficients 
of Stock are all significantly negative at 1% level. However, the interactive terms between legal 
protection and stock are not significant. We find out that only the shareholder protection (Share) 
rather than the level of its enforcement is significantly negatively correlated to the cost of equity 
and this seems to work via its influence on the total capitalization of the stock market size: 
Stock*Share is significantly negative. We investigate financial development using another type of 
indicators, FDST and FDFI, the indicators of liquidity of the financial system. Table 3.10 also 
presents those empirical results. The coefficients of interactive terms between financial 
development indicators and legal enforcement indicators, efficiency, rule and corruption turn to be 
significant. Those two tables indicate that the level of legal enforcement is important in determining 
the volatility of the stock market, through which legal protection affects the cost of equity, while 
alternatively the legal system is also important in determining the capitalization of the stock market 
in a country, through which it affects the cost of equity. Through both mechanisms as above, better 
shareholders’ legal protection will increase the availability and the volatility of the funds in the 
stock market; hence reduce the cost of equity.  
Similarly, the models also add in Fopen to control for the impact of the financial openness. 
The results are shown in Table 3.9 above. The empirical analyses illustrate a negative impact of the 
financial openness on the cost of equity. This is the result from a positive influence from the 
financial openness on the stock market. In other words, when the financial sector is more opened, 
cross-border capital transactions will be more active, which will inject more funds to the domestic 
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stock market; and as a result, firms will find funds more easily at lower costs.  
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Table3. 10 Cost of Equity with Financial Development 
Independent  FD Size Independent  FD Liquidity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) Variables (4) (5) (6) 
        
Share  -0.1517*** -0.1354*** -0.1539*** Share  -0.0269 -0.0158 -0.0261 
 (-3.230) (-2.799) (-3.399)  (-1.385) (-0.856) (-1.501) 
Rule  -0.0613***   Rule  -0.0512**   
 (-2.908)    (-2.290)   
Stock*Share -0.2965*** -0.2965*** -0.2965*** FDST*Share -0.0828*** -0.1284 -0.1827* 
 (3.048) (3.048) (3.048)  (-4.460) (-1.245) (-1.810) 
Stock*Rule -0.2217   FDST*Rule -0.0991***   
 (-0.573)    (-3.229)   
Efficiency   -0.0309**  Efficiency   -0.0305**  
  (-2.197)    (-2.055)  
Stock*Efficiency  0.0289  FDST*Efficiency  -0.0991***  
  (0.782)    (-3.229)  
Corruption    -0.0618*** Corruption   -0.0511** 
   (-3.067)    (-2.315) 
Stock*Corruption   -0.0027 FDST*Corruption   -0.0991*** 
   (-0.086)    (-3.229) 
Account  -0.0131*** -0.0077*** -0.0133*** Account  -0.0116*** -0.0079*** -0.0115*** 
 (4.425) (3.084) (4.707)  (4.184) (3.306) (4.090) 
Stock  -0.3640*** -0.3640*** -0.3640*** FDST 0.0163 0.0163 0.0163 
 (-4.375) (-4.375) (-4.375)  (0.909) (0.909) (0.909) 
Bank  0.0464 0.0464 0.0464 FDFI 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 
 (1.104) (1.104) (1.104)  (0.708) (0.708) (0.708) 
Dte  0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** Dte  0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 
 (3.325) (3.325) (3.325)  (3.473) (3.473) (3.473) 
Lev -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 Lev  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.183) (-0.183) (-0.183)  (-0.217) (-0.217) (-0.217) 
Las  -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0172*** Las -0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0173*** 
 (-2.621) (-2.621) (-2.621)  (-2.694) (-2.694) (-2.694) 
inflation 0.0124 0.0124 0.0124 Inflation  0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 
 (0.966) (0.966) (0.966)  (0.518) (0.518) (0.518) 
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Govbd 0.0292* 0.0292* 0.0292* Govbd 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049 
 (1.855) (1.855) (1.855)  (0.503) (0.503) (0.503) 
Observations 35704 35704 35704  35835 35835 35835 
Adjusted R
2
 0.537 0.537 0.537  0.584 0.584 0.584 
F-statistics  12.65 12.65 12.65  14.39 14.39 14.39 
This table presents results of random effect regressions with country effects of the cost of equity (EQT) on independent variables: legal protection on shareholders (Share), 
rule of law (Rule), efficiency of the legal system (Efficiency), corruption level (Corruption) and accounting standard (Account); firm characteristic variables: the debt to 
equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las; country-specific variables, inflation level, inflation; and government bond rate, Govbd; indicators for banking and 
stock size, bank and stock  as well as the interactive terms between stock and legal protection variables: Stock*Share, Stock*Rule, Stock*Efficiency, Stock*Corruption. 
indicators for financial intermediaries and market development in terms of liquidity rather than size, FDFI and FDST ; as well as the interactive terms between financial 
intermediaries and legal protection variables: FDST*Share, FDST*Rule, FDST*Efficiency, FDST*Corruption. These interactive terms imply the effect from legal 
protections on the cost of equity that transfer from the influence on stock market. The constant terms are not presented. Year dummies are involved in the model. The errors 
are White-adjusted to correct the heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level in a two-tailed t-
test. Test on overall significance of all coefficients are given by the F- test statistics at the bottom.  
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3.5.6 Further Results with Financial Development 
In previous section, we argue that the impact from legal protection on the cost of capital is 
transferred from the influence on the financial sector. In order to trace this mechanism, I am going 
to use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the panel dataset with the financial 
development variables instrumented by legal protections. Since GMM method established by 
Arellano-Bond, (1991)
24
 is more efficient in dealing with panel data, argued by Levine (2004). The 
application of this method can be a confirmation of our previous conclusions. Besides, with legal 
protection variables as instruments of the financial development variables, this technique can avoid 
the simultaneity problem raised by the potential endogeneity from the financial development 
variables, hence clarify the causality issue argued by opponents who investigate finance-growth 
nexus. By applying this methodology, the model can illustrate the mechanism more clearly, which 
suggests that the exogenous effect from legal protection on financial development can transfer to 
the level of the cost of capital. This idea has been examined by prior literature such as Levine et al. 
(2000, 2002) which tackles the impact from legal protection on economic growth via the legal effect 
on financial development. (For detailed literature review, see Chapter 2)   
Table 3.11 shows results of the model from equation (3.1) with financial intermediaries 
instrumented by legal protection. I investigate the impact of legal protection on the banking size and 
the financial intermediaries separately. To be consistent with previous studies, I also involve the 
impact of the degree of financial openness in a country.  The results suggest that with more 
developed banking system and other financial intermediaries, the cost of debt will be lower. The 
following up Table 3.13 illustrates the determinants of financial development-legal protection of 
creditors: both the legal structure and the enforcement. It provides the evidence that in a country, 
where 1) the legal system grants priorities to secured creditors; 2) legal institutions are more 
efficient in dealing with law cases and 3) corruption is less; the banking system and other 
                                                        
24
 See Chapter 2 & 4 for detailed discussion about GMM technique.  
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intermediaries will be more developed. Again, these results also confirm previous results found out 
by LLSV (1998) and Levine et al. (2000), etc. 
Table 3.12 shows results of the model based on equation (3.2) with stock market 
development instrumented by legal protection. I follow the same procedures as above. Indicators of 
the stock market size and of financial market development are instrumented by the legal protection 
proxies separately. Similarly, results show that the cost of equity will be lower if the country’s 
financial market is deeper and wider, which thus can provide more funds to financing seekers. Table 
3.14 then suggests that legal protection is linked with stock market development. In other words, if 
the legal system can secure the minority shareholders more; the legal system is more efficient and 
the corruption is less, the financial market in the country will be more developed.  
Therefore, following the GMM technique, we confirm that the legal protection lowers the 
cost of debt and the cost of equity in a country through its effect on financial development.  
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Table3. 11 The Cost of Debt and Financial Development (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank  -0.185***  -0.011***  
 (-4.465)  (-5.178)  
Stock  0.062***  0.054***  
 (3.386)  (71.770)  
FDFI  -0.013*  -0.005*** 
  (-1.825)  (-15.008) 
FDST  0.004**  0.003*** 
  (2.313)  (13.662) 
Las  -0.005* -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (-1.691) (-0.084) (-2.753) (-4.693) 
Lev  0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.751) (-0.005) (12.182) (37.476) 
Dte   -0.002*** -0.002* -0.003** 0.000** 
 (-3.039) (-1.740) (-1.991) (2.160) 
Inflation  -0.002 -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.019*** 
 (-0.737) (-5.181) (-60.167) (-132.519) 
Account  -0.030*** -0.004** -0.007*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.972) (-2.429) (-17.416) (9.102) 
Govbd  -0.003 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 
 (-1.625) (3.509) (40.088) (74.658) 
Fopen   -0.019*** -0.003*** 
   (-26.858) (-11.610) 
Constant -1.871*** -0.179 0.488*** -0.038** 
 (-2.813) (-1.485) (15.936) (-2.067) 
     
Sargan(d.f.) 53.38(420) 27.60(416) 291.7(476) 243.8(490) 
p-value (0.624) (0.353) (0.127) (0.287) 
Hansen(d.f.) 18.77(420) 18.83(416) 77.41(476) 93.00(490) 
p-value (0.174) (0.278) 0.433 0.393 
F-test 6.472 10.48 66379 284800 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR-test -1.493 -0.802 -1.513 -0.713 
p-value (0.136) (0.423) (0.130) (0.476) 
Dependent Variable: Cost of Debt (DT). Independent variables list on the left hand of the table above. Equation (1) 
– (4) are estimated using Arellano-Bover (1995) two-step robust GMM estimations with the system 
transformation.  (See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion about system GMM technique) in equation (1) & (3), 
instruments are 3
rd
 lagged DT, 3
rd
 lagged Bank, Stock; level terms of the rest independent variables: in equation (2) 
& (4), instruments are 3
rd
 lagged DT, 3
rd
 lagged FDFI, FDST and level terms of the rest independent variables. 
Financial openness, Fopen, is treated as predetermined; hence use its 1
st
 lag as instrument. t-statistics are 
presented in the parentheses, which are corrected for heteroskedasticity following Windmeijer’s(2005) 
methodology. The instruments validity is passed by the Sargan test and Hansen test.  The results in the AR-test 
suggest that the errors in the fist-difference regressions have no second-order autocorrelations. Probabilities of 
each test are in the parentheses below.  
d.f., the degree of freedom; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
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Table3. 12 The Cost of Equity and Financial Development (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock   -1.896*  -0.588***  
 (-1.909)  (-2.608)  
Bank  -0.401**  -0.338**  
 (-2.285)  (-2.348)  
FDFI  -0.643*  -0.012** 
  (-1.886)  (-5.880) 
FDST  0.129  -0.031* 
  (0.625)  (-1.733) 
Las  0.009 -0.052* 0.005 -0.011** 
 (0.704) (-1.765) (0.361) (-2.260) 
Lev  0.001* -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.693) (-0.580) (0.604) (0.400) 
Dte 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.876) (0.916) (0.925) (1.102) 
Inflation  0.290* 0.114 0.131*** 0.007 
 (1.792) (1.520) (2.623) (0.955) 
Account  -0.069** -0.055** -0.033*** -0.004** 
 (-2.417) (-2.429) (-3.652) (-2.588) 
Govbd  0.305* 0.173* 0.101** 0.026*** 
 (1.848) (1.656) (2.492) (4.836) 
Fopen   -0.060 -0.109*** 
   (0.939) (-3.258) 
Constant -1.502*** -2.153** -1.155*** -0.594*** 
 (-2.704) (-2.446) (-2.803) (-5.031) 
     
Sargan(d.f.) 7.406(416) 14.71(420) 5.463(416) 143.6(390) 
p-value (0.365) (0.793) (0.393) (0.286) 
Hansen(d.f.) 13.85(416) 14.78(420) 27.92(416) 103.4(390) 
p-value (0.610) (0.789) (0.324) (0.158) 
F-test 7.593 1.560 1.856 5.953 
p-value (0.026) (0.036) (0.0578) (0) 
AR-test -0.439 -0.0565 -0.0119 -0.117 
p-value (0.661) (0.955) (0.990) (0.907) 
Dependent Variable: Cost of Equity (EQT). Independent variables list on the left hand of the table above. 
Equation (1) – (4) are estimated using Arellano-Bover (1995) two-step robust GMM estimations with the system 
transformation. (See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion about system GMM techniques) in equation (1) & (3), 
instruments are 3
rd
 lagged EQT, 3
rd
 lagged Bank, Stock; level terms of the rest independent variables: in equation 
(2) & (4), instruments are 3
rd
 lagged EQT, FDFI, FDST and level terms of the rest independent variables. 
Financial openness, Fopen, is treated as predetermined; hence use its 1
st
 lag as instrument. t-statistics are 
presented in the parentheses, which are corrected for heteroskedasticity following Windmeijer’s(2005) 
methodology. The instruments validity is passed by the Sargan test and Hansen test.  The results in the AR-test 
suggest that the errors in the fist-difference regressions have no second-order autocorrelations. Probabilities of 
each test are in the parentheses below.  
d.f., the degree of freedom; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Determinant of Financial Development 
Table3. 13 Financial Development (Intermediaries) and Legal Protection 
 BANK      FDFI      
INDEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS BETWEEN BETWEEN BETWEEN OLS OLS OLS BETWEEN BETWEEN BETWEEN 
             
Credit  0.434*** 0.421*** 0.079*** 0.390*** 0.374*** -0.014 0.530*** 0.446*** 0.017 0.517*** 0.408*** 0.147** 
 (44.158) (41.314) (4.635) (13.405) (11.469) (-0.250) (36.941) (28.995) (0.704) (13.018) (8.558) (1.975) 
Rule  0.459***   0.424***   0.618***   0.607***   
 (50.722)   (16.735)   (47.954)   (17.581)   
Efficiency   0.350***   0.327***   0.416***   0.395***  
  (46.898)   (13.996)   (37.562)   (11.570)  
Corrupt    0.127***   0.023   0.006   0.218*** 
   (-7.572)   (0.429)   (0.247)   (2.932) 
Account  0.067*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.021* 0.080*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.079*** 0.050*** -0.004 
 (34.312) (30.340) (12.764) (10.392) (8.259) (1.836) (28.592) (19.293) (7.531) (10.432) (5.742) (-0.252) 
Constant 1.853*** 2.415*** -1.171*** 1.513*** 1.949*** -0.701* 2.047*** 2.270*** -1.147*** 2.076*** 2.076*** 0.091 
 (22.207) (25.774) (-8.639) (6.444) (6.900) (-1.665) (17.090) (16.329) (-6.055) (6.483) (5.023) (0.156) 
             
R-squared 0.378 0.352 0.142 0.521 0.458 0.221 0.364 0.296 0.151 0.544 0.407 0.244 
F-test 1333 1189 364.0 161.9 125.9 42.24 1310 960.7 406.7 177.9 102.1 47.98 
Dependent variables: BANK=the size of the banking system in a country; FDFI=financial intermediaries development in a country 
Independent variables are legal protection variables and variable indicates the accounting standard.  
Equation(1)-(6) show results from OLS estimation and equation (7)-(12) show results from between estimation.  
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Table3. 14 Financial Development (Financial Markets) and Legal Protection 
 STOCK      FDST      
INDEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS BETWEEN BETWEEN BETWEEN OLS OLS OLS BETWEEN BETWEEN BETWEEN 
             
Share 0.047*** 0.046*** -0.018*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.293*** 0.304*** 0.098*** 0.233*** 0.259*** 0.050** 
 (10.819) (11.278) (-3.863) (3.315) (3.870) (4.775) (22.213) (24.714) (6.873) (10.376) (13.294) (2.168) 
Rule  0.114***   0.096***   0.334***   0.271***   
 (15.131)   (7.383)   (14.540)   (7.016)   
Efficiency   0.106***   0.094***   0.358***   0.327***  
  (18.797)   (9.759)   (20.965)   (11.852)  
Corrupt    0.090***   0.096***   0.303***   0.297*** 
   (9.964)   (6.261)   (11.189)   (6.539) 
Account  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.041*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.043*** 0.002 -0.005 0.087*** 0.018*** 0.007 0.096*** 
 (9.700) (10.923) (26.885) (7.520) (8.193) (16.728) (0.429) (-1.409) (19.103) (2.784) (1.341) (12.691) 
Constant -1.342*** -1.220*** -1.141*** -1.327*** -1.222*** -1.139*** -2.499*** -2.166*** -1.728*** -2.769*** -2.493*** -2.223*** 
 (-25.032) (-23.385) (-21.335) (-14.760) (-14.440) (-12.698) (-14.801) (-13.342) (-10.351) (-10.320) (-10.325) (-8.378) 
             
R-squared 0.224 0.240 0.208 0.566 0.598 0.552 0.156 0.182 0.145 0.495 0.573 0.488 
F-test 577.1 628.6 523.4 194.0 221.9 183.5 415.5 502.8 382.5 146.1 200.3 142.2 
Dependent variables: STOCK=size of stock market in a country; FDST=financial market development in a country.  
Independent variables are legal protection variables and variable indicates the accounting standard.  
Equation(1)-(6) show results from OLS estimation and equation (7)-(12) show results from between estimation.  
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3.5.7 Results with Legal Origins  
 
Many studies argue that the reason why legal factors explain the differences in financial 
development across the world is due to the difference of legal origins. In the pioneer studies by 
LLSV (1997, 1998), Levine (1999) as well as later studies such as Levin et, al.(2000) the focus is 
on the importance of the distinctions among different legal origins. The legal system in the world 
can be divided into four categories, English Common law, French Civil Law, German Civil law and 
the Scandinavian law. The country’s legal system is either determined by the history, such as the 
UK, French, and Germany; or from the colonization, such as Australia, Brazil and South Korea. 
Since the Scandinavian law system only applies to four Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, the majority of countries in reality belong to three legal origins, English, 
French and German.   Their findings mainly hold that countries that have English-Common law 
origin will have the strongest legal protection for shareholders and a good protection for creditors, 
while the French-Civil law origin countries have the weakest protections for both shareholders and 
creditors. Besides, the German-Civil law origin has the strongest creditor protection, especially for 
secured creditors.  
Besides investigating the legal protection effect on the cost of capital, we also examine 
whether there is an impact of the legal origin on the cost of capital. We apply three dummies 
representing three legal origins, English, French and German. The coefficients of these legal origin 
dummies are all significantly negative, see Table 3.15. Countries with English-Common law origin 
have the largest coefficient in absolute value, while coefficients of the German dummy are the 
second largest.  We then test whether the difference between the above two groups of coefficients 
are systematic, thus test the null hypothesis of (English=German), and Stata provides the Chi
2
 
statistics which are Chi
2
(1)=0.28(0.5995) and Chi
2
(1)=0.27(0.6003) for two random effect models. 
It suggests that the impact of English-common law is not statistically different from the impact from 
the German civil law. Nevertheless, countries with French-civil law origins have the highest cost of 
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equity capital. The coefficients in both models are the smallest in absolute value. Again we test 
whether the difference between coefficients of French dummy and coefficients of English or 
German dummy is 0. The results
25
 reject the null hypothesis, which illustrates that firms in French 
civil law countries statistically have higher cost of equity than firms in the English or German law 
countries. Because the legal protection for shareholders is weaker in French civil law countries than 
English common law or German civil law countries, firms have more difficulties in accessing 
external finance; therefore, have to pay higher cost of equity.  
The coefficients also suggest an idea that legal origins can also determine the difference in 
the cost of debt capital: countries with German-Civil law origin have the strongest creditor 
protection and the largest coefficient in the absolute value; while French-Civil law origin countries 
have the weakest creditor protection, and it has the lowest coefficients. However, the results are not 
statistically significant; therefore, there is no evidence of such effect on cost of debt.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
25
 Ho:French=English, Chi
2
(1)=6.29(0.012)** and Chi
2
(1)=3.12(0.077)*; Ho:French=German, Chi
2
(1)=2.71(0.099)* and 
Chi
2
(1)=4.02(0.045)**. 
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Table3. 15 Cost of Capital with Legal Origins 
Independent  Cost of Debt                                               Cost of Equity 
Variables   
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
English -0.0261 -0.0210 -0.7423*** -0.8235*** 
 (-1.951) (-1.921) (-4.837) (-5.590) 
French -0.0256 -0.0207 -0.6431*** -0.6895*** 
 (-0.485) (-0.329) (-4.804) (-5.385) 
German -0.0304 -0.0325 -0.6889*** -0.7377*** 
 (-0.538) (-0.500) (-4.765) (-5.338) 
Account  -0.0026*** -0.0030*** -0.0117*** -0.0101*** 
 (-3.079) (-3.023) (-5.645) (-5.530) 
Dte  -0.0179*** -0.0203*** 0.0134*** 0.0147*** 
 (-12.084) (-10.594) (2.944) (3.421) 
Lev  0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (1.790) (1.150) (-0.000) (-0.054) 
Las  -0.0095*** -0.0131*** -0.0152*** -0.0180*** 
 (-3.619) (-4.280) (-3.401) (-4.333) 
Inflation  0.0050 0.0060 0.0242** 0.0094 
 (1.131) (0.916) (2.098) (0.932) 
Govbd 0.0028 0.0048 -0.0108 0.0048 
 (0.997) (1.429) (-1.311) (0.752) 
Bank  -0.0079  -0.0135  
 (-0.399)  (-0.387)  
Stock  -0.0005  -0.1241***  
 (-0.033)  (-4.131)  
FDFI  -0.0034  0.0191 
  (-0.316)  (0.923) 
FDST  -0.0019  -0.0232*** 
  (-0.671)  (-2.611) 
Observations 35696 35853 35696 35853 
Adjusted R
2
 0.577 0.541 0.577 0.541 
Chi2 8497.6 8412.0 8497.6 8412.0 
The first part of this table presents the results of OLS regression and the random-effect regression of the cost of 
debt on legal origin dummy: English, French and German; and accounting standard, Account; firm characteristic 
variables: the debt to equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las; country-specific variables, inflation 
level, inflation; and government bond rate, Govbd; indicators for financial intermediaries and market development 
in terms of size, Bank and Stock,  indicators for financial intermediaries and market development in terms of 
liquidity, FDFI and FDST; the financial openness indicator, Fopen, controls for the influence from cross boarder 
capital transactions.   
The second part of this part presents the results of OLS regression and the random-effect regression of the cost of 
equity on legal origin dummy: English, French and German; and accounting standard, Account; firm characteristic 
variables: the debt to equity ratio, Dte;  leverage, Lev; log of total assets, Las; country-specific variables, inflation 
level, inflation; and government bond rate, Govbd; indicators for financial intermediaries and market development 
in terms of size, Bank and Stock,  indicators for financial intermediaries and market development in terms of 
liquidity, FDFI and FDST; the financial openness indicator, Fopen, controls for the influence from cross boarder 
capital transactions.   
The constant terms are not presented. Year dummies are involved in the model. The errors are White-adjusted to 
correct the heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *,**,and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level in a two-tailed t-test. Test on overall significance, Chi-Squared statistics for Wald test of overall 
significance of the regressions with random effects are available at the bottom. 
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Tables 3.16-3.17 Summary Tables 
 
 
Table3. 16 Cost of Debt Capital (Summary Table) 
*indicates that the negative sign is significant in the model at least at 10% significant level.  
 
 
A basic model  
B basic model with firm specific variables 
C basic model with firm and country specific variables  
D with country effect  
E with random effect 
F with financial size indicators 
G with financial liquidity indicators 
H with financial size indicators and country effect 
I with financial liquidity indicators and country effect 
J with financial size indicators and random effect 
K with financial liquidity indicators and random effect 
L with financial openness indicators  
M with financial openness indicators and country effect  
N   with financial openness indicators and random effect 
 
Variables Expected 
Sign  
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  
Credit -        *     *       
Rule -    *          *   * 
Efficiency  -    *  *   * * *   * * * 
Corruption  -      * *   * * *   - 
Account  -    *  *   * * * * * * * 
Credit*bank(FDFI) -      * * * * * * * * * 
Rule *bank(FDFI) -      *   *  *   * * * 
Efficiency *bank(FDFI) -      *   * * * * * * * 
Corruption*bank(FDFI) -      *   * * *   * * * 
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Table3. 17 Cost of Equity Capital (Summary Table) 
*indicates that the negative sign is significant in the model at least at 10% significant level.  
 
A basic model  
B basic model with firm specific variables 
C basic model with firm and country specific variables  
D with country effect  
E with random effect 
F with financial size indicators 
G with financial liquidity indicators 
H with financial size indicators and country effect 
I with financial liquidity indicators and country effect 
J with financial size indicators and random effect 
K with financial liquidity indicators and random effect 
L with financial openness indicators  
M with financial openness indicators and country effect  
N   with financial openness indicators and random effect 
 
 
 
Variables Expected  
Sign  
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  
Share  - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Rule - * * * * * *  * *    * *  
Efficiency  - * * * * *   * *       
Corruption  - * * * * * *  * * * * * * * 
Account  - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Share*stock(FDST) -      * *   * * * * * * 
Rule*stock(FDST) -          *       
Efficiency *stock(FDST) -      * *   *   *     
Corruption*stock(FDST) -      * *   * * * *   * 
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3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we analyze the impact of legal protection for investors on the cost of debt 
and equity capital in 2432 firms across 40 sample countries between 1985 and2006.  While prior 
studies argue that investor rights are highly correlated with the cost of capital, empirical work has 
rarely focused on the law and finance mechanism perspective. Holding the law and finance view 
from the pioneer work by LLSV (1997, 1998), we try to investigate the influence from the legal 
protection on the cost of capital while controlling the impact from information disclosure separately. 
We find legal protection is negatively correlated with the cost of debt and the cost of equity capital. 
In other words, stronger legal protection and law enforcement will lead to lower cost of capital. This 
conclusion is robust when we further analyze the effect from domestic financial sector and foreign 
financial transactions, financial openness, and when we control both firm-specific and country-level 
variables. Our conclusions are consistent with most of the empirical studies that analyze the 
relationship between shareholder protection and the cost of equity (see Fransics et al., 2005) as well 
as the interaction between creditor protection and the cost of debt capital (see Mansi et al., 2006). 
Our results suggest that the legal protection will strengthen corporate governance with lower cost of 
agency problems. The mechanism takes effect when legal protection influences the size of the 
banking sector and volatility of the stock market. The impact on the cost of equity capital is more 
statistically significant compared with the results of the cost of debt capital.  
In this chapter, we study the impact of the legal protection on the cost of debt and the cost of 
equity separately in two similar models. The studies provide a rather systematic analysis about the 
legal factor, since we not only look at the legal protection derived from statutes, (Share and Credit), 
but also investigate the impact of the legal enforcement level. The empirical results suggest that the 
legal protection for the shareholder is mostly significant for the cost of equity of a firm in the 
sample country. Alternatively, the impact of the legal protection of creditors is relatively ambiguous 
as the results are not statistically significant. These results are robust in later models that control for 
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firm-specific variables as well as the country-level variables which provide some other explanation 
powers in the model. However, we find that the impact of creditor protection is strong when we try 
to control for the effect from financial development. The interactive terms of legal protection and 
financial development in the empirical models turn to be significant, especially the cross term 
between the size of banking credit and the legal enforcement index. This provides evidence that 
creditor legal protection on the cost of debt capital is still effective through the impact on the 
banking sector. We have compared the impact from the size effect of the financial sector as well as 
liquidity of the financial sector. The results suggest that the legal factor is more effective through 
the impact on the size rather than other aspects. In other words, a better creditor protection will 
enlarge the credit market, the depth of the banking credit; therefore, the cost of debt will reduce as a 
result of more credit availability. This transmission mechanism seems to be important to explain the 
way that creditor legal protection affects the cost of debt.  
From the cost of equity perspective, we find out that an improvement in shareholder right 
protection and the enforcement will reduce the cost of equity. This provides evidence that there is a 
direct link between shareholder legal protection and the cost of equity. It implies that a stronger 
shareholder legal protection will ease the agency problem by improving the minority shareholders 
right and restricting the majority shareholders as well as the managers to benefit themselves, as 
suggested also by LLSV, (1997, 2000). Therefore, the firms in a better protected country will have 
higher valuation and thus will pay lower cost of equity.  When we trace the impact from the 
financial sector, we find out that there is also a similar mechanism that explains how legal 
protection on shareholders influences the cost of equity. It is the shareholder legal protection that 
increases the liquidity of the funds in the stock market; hence reduces the cost of equity as a 
consequence of more funds availability. In this mechanism, again the level of legal enforcement 
(Efficiency and Rule) is more important rather than the protection according to the legal statutes 
(Share).   
Considering the sensitivity check of the estimation model we choose, we further instrument 
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financial development variables particularly by legal protection variables based on GMM technique. 
This is also a methodology to avoid simultaneity problem raised by potential endogeneity of 
financial development variables. The estimation results suggest that, influenced by the legal system, 
the financial sector is negatively associated with the cost of capital. 
In the last session, we analyze differences in the cost of capital across countries in terms of 
the legal origin perspective. We find that firms in countries with English-common law origins and 
German-civil law origins have lower cost of equity; while firms in countries with French-civil law 
countries appear to have higher cost of equity. Although coefficients of the English dummies are 
greater in absolute values than other two dummies’, the difference between English and German is 
not statistically significant. But hypothesis tests strongly prove that French dummies are 
systematically different from the other two dummies. Moreover, whether the legal origin can 
explain differences in the cost of debt is ambiguous since the results are not significant. Therefore, 
the results partially support the prior studies on the legal origin view that the French-civil law 
countries have the least protection in both shareholders and creditors (e.g. LLSV, 1998, Levine, 
1999; Levine et al. 2000).  
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4 
FINANCIAL QUALITY AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
For many years there have been arguments about the role that the financial sector plays in 
economic growth. The debates about the causality issues in the finance-growth nexus have been the 
focus but a majority of researchers argues that finance causes growth. Examples of the literature are 
Bagehot (1873), Schumpter (1912), and Mckinnon, (1973); etc. from theoretical perspective and 
Levine (1997, 2002); Allen and Gale (2000); Stulz and Williamson (2003), etc empirically. This has 
been discussed in Chapter 1. 
Theoretically the role of financial sector plays in economic growth can be categorized into 
five mechanisms: 1) providing information to improve capital allocation efficiency; 2) monitoring 
investment and corporate governance after providing finance; 3) managing the risk; 4) mobilizing 
and pooling deposits; 5) reducing the cost of exchange of goods and service. (See a survey by 
Levine, 2004). The above stated financial services are provided by the formal financial institutions. 
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Comparatively, there are services supplied by the informal financial markets, which cover all other 
legal financial activities that are not officially regulated. They usually refer to lending and 
borrowing activities in varieties of forms among individuals and intermediaries, such as friends, 
relatives and neighbours; informal lenders; the rotating credit and saving associations and so on so 
forth. The informal financial sector meets people’s financial needs in terms of its basic 
characteristics, for instance the ease of entry and exit, flexible interest choices, informal terms in 
transactions and small scale operations; therefore, in less developed countries where the formal 
financial sector has not been well developed, the informal financial sector plays a particular major 
role in the economy. (see Chandavarkar, 1987; Sharma& Zeller, 2000, etc.) However, in this chapter, 
we would focus on the study on the formal financial sector.   
The early study of the finance-growth nexus stressed the distinction between a market-based 
and a bank-based financial system in explaining the difference in country’s economic level (i.e. 
Goldsmith, 1969; Boot and Thakor 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; etc.). However, there 
arises another financial function view which holds that banks and markets provide complementary 
services. This view considers the functions provided by financial system that influence a country’s 
economic growth and regardless whether the financial system in a country is bank-based or market-
based (see Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997). Later on, La Porta et al. (LLSV, 1998, 2000) 
argue that the legal system is the fundamental source in explaining the difference in financial 
development; hence further studies incorporating this analyse the impact on economic growth 
(LLSV, 1999; Levine, 1999, 2000).  
Empirically, there are variety of econometric techniques employed to analyze the linkage 
between financial development and economic growth. Empirical works have employed panel data 
(i.e. Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000; etc.) and time-series data (i.e. 
Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Xu, 2000; etc.) on country-level studies (i.e. Levine, 1998, 1999; etc.) 
as well as micro-level studies, for example Rajan & Zingales, (1998) and Wurgler (2000) for firm-
level study; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1998); Clessens & Laeven, (2002) for industry-level, 
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All studies have demonstrated that the impact of financial sector on  economic growth is 
significantly positive.  
Regardless of the econometric technique employed in previous literature, the essential factor 
is to measure financial development across countries. Existing proxies for either financial market 
development or financial intermediations are generally based on measuring the quantitative aspect 
of the financial sector. In other words, they measure either the size or the volume of the financial 
system. A summarized explanation is held in the paper by Beck and Levine (1997) and Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2000). For example, the ratio between the total values of listed shares 
to GDP indicates market capitalization, and the ratio between total values traded in stock market to 
GDP measures the market liquidity; while the ratio of total claims of deposit money banks to GDP 
is an indicator of the banking size. Complementing previous existing indicators of financial 
development which mainly focus on the stock size of the financial system, this chapter provides 
four new indicators to capture the quality of the financial system, including both financial 
intermediaries and financial markets: bid-ask spread (BA)-measuring the ability of the stock market 
to provide liquidity, interest-rate spread (Interest)-indicating the efficiency of intermediaries, non-
banking institutions development (NBI)-indicating the success of non-banking intermediaries in 
providing market services efficiently; and bank default ratio(BANKDEFAULT)-measuring the risk 
management of the banking system of a country.  
The empirical results suggest that, measured by the new indicators, financial development in 
terms of quality as well as quantity has a significantly important impact on economic growth, 
although this impact is not statistically as large as previous analyses (for instance, Levine, et al, 
2000; Beck et al, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002). The results shown in this chapter also find out that 
legal origins and legal protections have exerted a significant role in financial development, which 
confirms the law and finance view, arguing that the legal institutions determine the financial 
development difference across countries. Accounting standard is also found to be an important 
factor that affects financial development. Robustness analysis indicates that the indicators are 
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compatible to those widely employed quantitative financial indicators and are efficient indices to 
measure financial difference in explaining economic growth.  
In this chapter, section 4.2 provides further literature review about previous analyses on 
finance-growth nexus; section 4.3 discusses the model as well as methodology; section 4.4 
describes the new indices that I construct as well as a full explanation about other data and variables 
used in this chapter; section 4.5 provides the empirical results and section 4.6 concludes.  
4.2 Literature Review 
 4.2.1 The Financial Development 
 
 
Financial system has a vital important contribution to economic growth because it provides 
several functions involved in economic activities. According to the summary by Levine (2004) and 
Merton and Bodie (1995), the functions provided financial system can be categorised into the 
following sectors even though financial contracts, markets and intermediaries are different across 
countries and history:  
i. To facilitate the trading; i.e. provide ways of clearing and settling payments during and 
after transactions. (Merton and Bodie, 1995) 
ii. To provide information about possible investment and allocate capital, to help transfer 
economic resource. Considering the large costs that individual investors face when they 
collect information on evaluating firms, markets as well as other economic conditions, 
financial system can reduce the costs in collecting and producing information and 
therefore improve resource allocation.  
iii. To provide information to monitor investment and to exert corporate governance. This 
issue has normally been pointed as the standard agency problem by many scholars, such 
as (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; etc.) Financial system which 
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can reduce information asymmetry can ease external financial constraints and facilitate 
better allocation. (Chapter 2&3, Levine, 2004)  
iv. To provide ways of managing risks. Many risks arise because of information 
asymmetries and its implied high costs. Financial system can provide services and tools 
with information to diversify and manage those risks and ease transactions resulting in 
better resource allocation and economic growth.  
v. To mobilize and pool savings. Financial intermediaries and markets can agglomerate 
capital from disparate savers and allocate the capital to possible investment. During the 
process, it can collect information and overcome the transaction costs.  
As above, each of the function will influence savings, financial investment decisions as well as 
resource allocation and thus affect economic growth.  
4.2.2 Bank-Based vs. Market-Based Systems 
 
Since the financial system influences economic growth via the above functions, the 
assessment of the effectiveness of financial development in different countries depends on how 
financial intermediaries and financial markets meet these functions in an efficient manner. Early 
analyses consider the structure of the financial system in explaining financial development and 
economic growth. In other words, financial economists argue whether bank-based or market-based 
financial system allocates resource more efficiently and thus boosts economic growth. (See Levine, 
2004; Demirguc-Kunt&Levine, 1999, etc) 
Proponents of bank-based system argue that banks can overcome shortcomings from which 
the market-based system may suffer. For example, a well-developed financial market can reveal the 
information promptly but cannot effectively monitor managers because of the asymmetric 
information, a result of the corporate governance problem where the outsiders are less informed 
than insiders.(see Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer  and Vishny, 1996) However, the banks usually have a 
132 
 
close tie to firms, thus can do a good study of the firms and collect sufficient information about the 
manager.(see Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1999) On the other hand, 
market-based system proponents argue that market can provide more financial tools for risk 
diversification as well as for external financing, thus flexibly and efficiently allocating the capital 
and boost economic growth. (See Levine, 2004) 
4.2.3 Law and Finance View 
 
The financial function view rejects the debate on distinguishing bank-based with market-
based system, but evaluates the overall functions that the financial system provides. The law and 
finance view is one of the views stressing that there are more fundamental sources, rather than 
financial structure, which will influence financial development. The law and finance view
26
 holds 
that finance is the constitution of a set of contracts described and regulated by a series of laws and 
regulations, therefore the quantity and quality level of the financial sector will determined by the 
country’s laws and enforcement mechanism (LLSV, 1998, 2000). A well-functioning legal system 
will facilitate operation of both financial intermediaries and financial markets, thus efficiently 
allocate resources and stimulate economic growth. The commonly applied indices for legal 
protection are constructed by LLSV (1998) in terms of shareholder protection, creditor protection as 
well as legal enforcement. The legal indicator for shareholder protection is constructed by 
considering commercial laws and company laws, which assess the level of protection on minority 
shareholders in a country: the higher the index is, the more protection the minority shareholders will 
have. Index for creditor protection takes into account of bankruptcy laws and reorganization laws, 
which assesses how creditors, mainly secured creditors, will be protected in process of bankruptcy 
and reorganization. The higher the creditor protection index is, the more protection the creditor will 
gain. The index for legal enforcement of LLSV consists two parts: efficiency of the legal system 
and the country risk. The higher the index is, the more efficient the legal system is or the less risky 
                                                        
26
Please see previous Chapter 2 and 3 for detailed explanations about Law and Finance view.  
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the country is.  Their results
27
 indicate that these three indices are statistically strongly correlated 
with financial development in a country, therefore, are sufficient instrument variables to use in 
analysing finance-growth nexus.  
4.2.4 Review of Empirical Results  
4.2.4.1 A General Empirical Model 
Considering the empirical studies from the aggregate level, a general type of econometric 
model is as following: 
itiititit ZFY                                                                                       (2.4.1) 
This is a panel estimation model, where itY is the dependent variable indicating per capita GDP 
growth or real capital stock or total factor productivity growth in ith country at time t ; itZ  is the 
variables controlling for additional information that affect economic growth, such as inflation level, 
the level of  government expenditure, the black market exchange rate premium and so on. itF  is the 
set of variables indicating financial development level in ith country at time t. Indictors of financial 
development employed by exiting literature are summarized by King and Levine, (1993), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (1995) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2000). Those indicators 
can be categorized as 1) indicators of financial intermediaries; 2) indicators of financial markets; 3) 
indicators of financial development.  
4.2.4.2 Financial Development Indicators 
 
Financial Intermediaries Indicators 
Following King and Levine (1993, henceforth KL) method, the most frequently used 
indictors for financial intermediaries development are DEPTH, BANK and PRIVY.  
DEPTH is the index to measure the size of financial intermediaries which equals to liquid 
                                                        
27
 Please also refer to previous literature reviews in Chapter 2 about empirical results in law and finance study.  
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liabilities of financial system: (currency + demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
nonbank financial intermediaries)/ GDP.  
BANK is the indicator to measure the degree of commercial banks allocating credit in the 
banking system, which equals to bank credit/ (bank credit + central bank domestic assets). The 
higher BANK is, the more credit that commercial banks provide compared with the central bank.  
PRIVY measures the credit to private sector, given by credit to private enterprisers / GDP. It 
measures the importance of the banking sector to the whole economy in terms of the credit it 
provides.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) analyse nonbanking financial intermediaries 
development by innovating the indictors PNB and INPE, which measure the size of nonbanking 
financial corporations such as mutual funds, brokerage houses, etc. as well as insurance and pension 
companies respectively. The two indictors are measured by the assets of PNB or INPE divided by 
GDP. These two indictors complement the measurement that only accounts for banking system in a 
country. But those indicators are rarely used in empirical country studies since they did not report 
any significance on those indicators.  
The four indicators are based on the size of the banking and nonbanking sectors. For 
efficiency measurement, the overhead cost is a commonly used one. It equals to ratio of the 
accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs to its total assets and averaged across all banks in a 
country. This indicator is rarely used either due to the inconsistency of the overhead costs over the 
banking system from our point of view.  
Financial Market Indicators 
The SIZE of the market capitalization is set equal to the stock market capitalization as a 
share of GDP, where the stock market capitalization is the total value of listed shares. This indicator 
measures the size of the stock market in a country.  
Another ratio is given by the stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP which 
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measures the trading volume in the stock market which reflects the liquidity that it provides to the 
country’s economy. It uses the share values that traded in the market instead of measuring the static 
share values in the market, compared with SIZE. 
 The third indicator is the turnover ratio which equals to the value of total shares traded 
divided by the market capitalization, the total values of listed shares. This indicator is the other 
measurement of the market liquidity in a country. This method implies the trading size related to the 
size of the stock market.  
Those indicators concentrate more on the size of the market the country has and the liquidity 
that the stock market provides to the economy. Although liquidity is one of most important 
functions the market provides, stock markets may supply other more services than that. For example 
it provides the mechanism for hedging and risk diversifications. However, it is very difficult to 
measure especially from the cross-country perspective.  
Financial Development Indicators 
Since financial function view disregards the distinction between bank-based and market-
based system, there are indicators measuring overall level of financial system in its size, activity 
and efficiency. Not specially, those indicators are transformation in a combination of indicators for 
both financial intermediaries and financial markets as described as above.  
The Empirical Results Based on FD Indicators 
Empirical results based on above indicators for financial development show a statistically 
strong relationship between financial development and economic growth.  
Early in 1993, KL study 77 counties over 1960-1989 and investigate whether financial 
development influence the capital accumulation, productivity growth using intermediaries 
indicators DEPTH, BANK and PRIVY.  However, KL do not employ the panel estimation but 
average the indicators for financial intermediaries as well as for economic growth over the sample 
period 1960-1989 and run a cross-country regression. The results are economically strong as they 
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find out that the per capita growth rate would have been increased by almost 1 percent a year if 
DEPTH increases by 0.4. In other words the financial system should develop from a lower level of 
0.2 to a higher level of 0.6, which is the same as in the fastest growing countries.  
Later on in 1998, Levine and Zervos (henceforth LZ) add in stock markets indicators to 
analyze the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 42 sample 
countries across 1973-1993. They use stock market capitalization indicator and the turnover ratio to 
measure stock market as well as BANK to control for effect of the bank system. Their results find 
out strong evidence to show the initial level of stock market development and bank credit are 
positively correlated with the economic indicators, per capita growth, capital accumulation and 
productivity growth, but the size of the market is not robustly correlated with those economic 
indicators. Moreover, the coefficients are relatively large as they imply that an increase of the 
standard deviation in both stock market and banking development will lead to almost 30 percent 
increase in per capita growth after 18 years. Additionally, literature extends LZ analysis based on a 
dynamic panel technique (e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2003). They employ 
similar indicators of LZ for stock market development (turnover ratio) and for banking system 
(BANK, commercial bank credit). Their results both suggest that the exogenous components of 
banking and stock market development have positive influence on economic growth.  
What we need to emphasize in this paper is that it applies the dynamic panel technique to 
control for the endogeneity of financial development. This has solved the simultaneity bias from the 
financial system on economy growth. The use of legal variables as instruments suggests the 
fundamental source of financial development and thus becomes commonly use as instruments in 
dealing with the finance-growth nexus as we discuss below.  
The legal origin dummy is one typical instrument commonly used in empirical analyses. 
There are four dummies: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law and 
Scandinavian Law, which represent four groups of countries according to the country’s legal 
heritage, because the legal tradition inherited from the past time will always have an influence on 
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modern laws and regulations that regulate the financial sector. The other type of variables are the 
indices constructed by LLSV (1998) and later modified by Pistor, et al., (2003) particularly 
concerning legal protection on shareholders (especially minority shareholders) and creditors 
(mainly secured creditors) as well as the degree of legal enforcement.  
Levine (1997, 1999) employs legal origin dummies and variables indicating creditor 
protection in explaining the influence of financial sector to economic growth. The papers use 
indicators, LLY (financial liquidity liability to GDP ratio, similar to DEPTH mentioned above), 
BANK, CREDIT, to measure banking size and liquidity in a panel Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. The results reveal that countries with better creditor protection will have better 
developed banking sector and this influence is positively and robustly correlated with economic 
growth. Levine, Loayza and Beck’s (henceforth LLB, 2000) paper also analyzes how financial 
intermediaries affect real per capita GDP growth in 71 countries over 1960-1995 based on both 
cross-sectional and the dynamic panel estimation with instruments variables measuring creditor 
protection as well as accounting standard. The indicators showing intermediaries development are 
similar to Levine’s (1998, 1999) paper which based on the quantitative figure of the banking system. 
Similarly, the results suggest that legal factor yields a positive influence on real per capita GDP 
growth through the effect on the financial system.  
 
4.3 Empirical Model and the Methodology 
4.3.1 The First Empirical Model  
In this Chapter, the first basic regression for the relationship between growth and financial 
development takes the form as:          
itiititit SETNINFORMATIOFDG   )(                                        (4.1) 
itG is the indicator of economic growth, for instance real per capita GDP growth, FDit is the 
financial development indicator(s), (INFORMATION SET)it includes all other explanatory variables 
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that may influence economic growth, such as the trade balance, the government expenditure, the 
initial income level as well as inflation level.  
Because of the endogeneity arisen by FD variables, we aim to estimate this regression using 
2-stage least squares method with instruments and GMM estimation for robustness. We can apply 
legal variables as instruments in this technique.  
4.3.2 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)/IV Estimation 
Let us consider an equation to be estimated as, in matrix formation, 
Y X                                                                                                              (4.1.1) 
with typical ith row    i i iY X                                                                                     (4.1.2) 
Where the matrix of X  is ,n K n is the number of observations. The error term   follows 
an independent and identical distribution with zero-mean and a variance-covariance 2I , denoted 
by  , a n n matrix. The explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term. Those can be 
illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
2~ 0,
, 0
IID I
Cov X
E
 



  
                                                                                                      (4.1.3) 
However, the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS) is not consistent if some of the 
independent variables are not exogenous,  , 0K iE X   . Without any further information, we 
cannot now consistently estimate the parameters in the equation above.  
The use of Instrumental Variables (IV) provides a general solution to the problem mentioned 
as above, among which the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators is the most efficient IV 
estimator28and is mostly widely applied in empirical econometrics field.  
To select the instrumental variable(s), we need to observe the instrumental variable(s) 
1 2, , , Lz z z    , those instrumental variables must be exogenous and be uncorrelated with the error 
                                                        
28
 Wooldridge, 2002. 
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term  ,    , 0, 1,2, ,jCov z j L   ;    then the 2SLS method choose the matrix of exogenous 
variables denoted as  1 2 1 1 21, , , , , , , ,K LZ X X X z z z , a n H matrix where H L K  ; then 
the linear relationship between the instrumented variable and the instrumental variables is    
     
0 1 1 1 1 1 1K K K L L KX X X z z      
                                                  (4.1.4) 
Where  is the parameter(s) of the instrumental variables; the error term K is not correlated 
with each of the variables on the right-hand-side of equation (4.1.4) and has a zero-mean by 
definition.  
Therefore, the instrumented variable is estimated as 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
K K K L LX X X z z                                                                    (4.1.5) 
Thus denote the vector  1 2 1ˆ ˆ1, , , , ,K KX X X X X  and gives the IV estimator  
 
1
1 ' 1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
N N
i i i i
i i
N x x N x y X X X Y

  
 
   
      
   
                                                       (4.1.6)  
  The matrix Xˆ can be expressed as  
1ˆ
zX Z Z Z Z X P X

   , denoting the project matrix
 
1
zP Z Z Z Z

  , which is idempotent and symmetric, therefore, the IV estimator can be also 
written as 
 
1ˆ
z zX P X X PY

                                                                                                 (4.1.7) 
Besides, the order condition of the above equation (4.1) is satisfied, i.e. the IV estimator ˆ
can be found, if H K . In other words, there must be at least as many instruments jz as there are 
endogenous variables. If H K , the equation is said to be ―exactly identified‖; if H K  , the 
equation is ―overidentified‖.  
The basic IV estimation assumes that the error matrix is homoskedastic, ICov 2)(   . 
However, the most commonly problem met in empirical work is heteroskedasticity, i.e. 
   2 , 1,2, ,iCov I i n                                                                                         (4.1.8) 
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or           
2
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At this time, although the IV estimation is still consistent, the estimation of the standard 
errors are inconsistent, which leads to diagnostic tests for endogeneity and overidentifying invalid. 
A common solution is to construct the heteroskedasticity-consistent or ―robust‖ standard errors; 
meanwhile another popular method today is to use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
method, introduced by Hansen in his famous 1982 paper, which relaxes the assumption of the 
standard errors but only demands a set of moment conditions which the model should satisfy.  
With the same model in 4.1, the set of instruments Z , a n H matrix, are exogenous, and 
again uncorrelated with the error term,   0E Z   . Thus, those H instruments give H moments 
conditions,   
   ˆ ˆˆi i i i i ig Z Z Y X                                                                                        (4.1.9) 
and those conditions are all orthogonal, which are satisfied with the true value of the 
parameter  .  
    0i i iE Z Y X E g                                                                                  (4.1.10) 
The efficient GMM estimator ˆ minimizes the GMM criterion function 
     ˆ ˆ ˆJ N g M g  

                                                                                  (4.1.11) 
In which,    
1
ˆ ˆ
N
i
i
g g 

 ,  N is the sample size, and M is a weighting  matrix. This 
weighting matrix is critical for GMM estimation, from which the efficiency is gained compared 
with traditional IV/2SLS estimators. 
Thus the GMM estimator is  
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 
1ˆ
GMM X ZMZ X X ZMZ Y

                                                                                (4.1.12) 
Another advantage of using GMM is that now we can examine the instruments validity via 
testing the overidentifying restrictions, the J-statistic of Hansen (1982). The J-statistic is distributed 
as 
2 with the degree of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions H K , i.e. the 
number of instruments deducted by the number of regressors. The non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis in the J-statistic implies that the instruments are valid, or satisfying the orthogonal 
condition. As a special case of J-statistic, Sargan’s statistic is another way to test the overidentifying 
restrictions under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. It is also following the 
2  -
distribution with degrees of freedom, H K .  
4.3.3 The Second Empirical Model 
Considering the impact from past economic performances, the regression for economic 
growth can take the form as follows: 
 it  yit   -1 yi t-1 β
 
  it                    it  i  t  it                  (4.2.1) 
where itG is the real economic growth per capita, and ity is the contemporary real GDP per 
capita and its first lag, 1, tiy , shows the effect from last period of economic performance. Therefore, 
to rearrange equation (4.2.1), the second empirical model takes the form as: 
            y
it
  y
i t-1
 β
 
  it  
                  it  i  t  it                                      (4.2.2) 
On the right-hand-side, itFD   is the set of explanatory variables which involves the financial 
development estimators and                  it is the set of other explanatory variables;   i
controls the country-specific effect, t  is the time-specific effect and     is the unobserved error 
term. i and t represent different country and different time respectively.  
4.3.4 Dynamic Panel Estimation and GMM 
The employment of dynamic panel estimation allows us to use weakly exogenous 
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explanatory variables, i.e. variables assumed to be uncorrelated with future error terms, which can 
take into account of the dynamic adjustment in the economic growth and control feedbacks from 
current and past shocks. A widely used class of Generalized Method of Moments(GMM) estimators 
are introduced by Holtz-Eakins et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995) to estimate this type of dynamic panel model.  
In other to eliminate the country-specific effect, we can take first-difference in eq. (4.2.2), 
then we get 
     , , 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1 , , 1i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty y y y Z Z                                                          (4.2.3) 
where Zit represents the explanatory variables. The instruments are applied to solve the 
possible endogeneity problems and the other problem that the new error term  , , 1i t i t    in (4.2.3) 
may correlated with the dependent variable , , 1i t i ty y  . Then using the following moment of 
conditions (4.2.4) & (4.2.5), the GMM generates the ―difference‖ estimator.  
  , , , 1 0 2& 3, , ;i t s i t i tE y s t T                                                                 (4.2.4) 
  , , , 1 0, 2& 3, ,i t s i t i tE Z s t T                                                                    (4.2.5) 
This GMM method assumes that the initial condition ity   is uncorrelated with the 
subsequent errors sit  (s =1,2,..., T) and also the error term it   is not serially correlated, which 
makes  ,i t sy   
orthogonal to    ,i t    (denote , , , 1i t i t i t       ) and conditions (4.2.4) are valid. 
Secondly, the explanatory variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous so that the disturbances 
it   will not affect the lagged values, ,i t sZ   , which makes ,i t sZ   valid instruments used in 
condition (4.2.5).  
However, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
when explanatory variables are not changed dramatically over time, lagged levels of the variables as  
instruments will be poor; furthermore Monte Carlo experiments show that when T is small the 
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instruments will not be robust which generate biased coefficients29. Arellano and Bover (1995), 
Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the first-difference GMM estimator to a ―system‖ GMM estimator.  
With the additional assumption that the differenced variables, i.e. it ity ,Z  are orthogonal to the 
country-specific effect, i , it is valid to add in the lagged differences of  ity  as additional 
instruments, which shows a dramatic efficiency gained over the first-difference GMM. The 
additional instruments are shown as below: 
0)))((( 1,,   itististi yyE     
  for s=1                                                                (4.2.6) 
   1 0i ,t s i ,t s i itE Z Z          for s=1                                                                (4.2.7) 
Similarly as above, there are two important tests after this GMM estimation. The first is the 
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to ensure the instrument validity, which follows the  
2   
distribution with degree of freedom equal to the number of instruments deducted by the number of 
regressors.  The other test is to ensure that the error term it  is not serially correlated.  
4.4 Data 
The chapter uses aggregate level annual data to investigate the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth in 40 countries over the 1998-2007. In the chapter, 
four new indices are constructed in order to monitor the financial development in terms of 
intermediaries and markets, so as to complement the traditional indicators in measuring financial 
development. A summary of all variables are listed above in Table 4.1 and sample countries are 
listed in Table 4.2.  
  
                                                        
29
 Levine, 2000 
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Table 4. 1 Variable Description 
Variable Description  
G 
y 
Real GDP per capita growth. 1 itititit yyyG ; 
Real GDP per capita, base year 2000. 
Income level is the initial level of the real GDP per capita 
Source: World Development Report, 2008.  
 
Financial Development Indicators in Qualitative Aspect  
BA Bid-ask spread. The difference between ask-price and bid-price, divided by the 
average price of the day. Annual smoothed. From 1998-2007. Source:  DataStream  
Interest Interest spread. the difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Annual data. 
Source: IMF International  Financial Statistics(IFS). 
NBI Ratio of non-banking financial institutions assets divided by commercial banks’ 
assets. Annual data.  ource: the central bank’s webpage in each country 
BANKDEFAULT Bank default ratio in a country. Index from 4-17. Source: Thomson Bankscope.  
 
Financial Development Indicators in Quantitative Aspect 
FDST Stock market development. Index-1 from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (1996). It is 
the aggregate of market capitalization to GDP; total value traded to GDP; turnover 
(total value traded to market capitalization) 
30
 
FDFI Financial intermediaries’ development. Similar to FIndex-1 from Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, (1996). It is the aggregate of ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP; ratio of 
domestic credit to private sector to GDP. 
31
 
 
Legal Protection Indices 
Share Index assessing shareholders’ right protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Credit Index assessing creditors’ right protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Countryrisk Assessment of the country risk by taking average of indices for corruption; risk of 
expropriation; repudiation of contracts by governments. Source: International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
LGEF Index assessing legal enforcement and government performance. Source: La Porta 
et al. (1998) 
 
Other variables  
OPEN A country’s openness to trade. Exportation and importation of goods and 
service, % of GDP. Source :World Development Indicators (2008) 
GOVN General government consumption expenditure, % of GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators (April 2008) 
ACCOUNT Index to indicate the accounting standard of a country. Source: International 
accounting and auditing trends, Centre for International Financial Analysis and 
Research  and LLSV(1998) 
Inflation  Annual percentage change of the consumer Price. Source: Would Bank, World 
Development Indicator, 2008  
Legal origin 
dummy 
Dummies indicating the legal origins of a country: English common law, French 
Civil law and German common law; Source: LLSV(1998) 
Religion dummy Dummies indicating the religion that the country’s majority population choose: 
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist. Source: Djankov, et al.(2005) 
                                                        
30
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 , accessed on 23/06/2008. 
31
 Data collected from the World Bank webpage. A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. By 
Beck , Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine, http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0, accessed on 23/06/2008.  
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Income dummy High income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income as classified by the 
World Bank. Source: world Bank Database 
 
Legal indices: 
Variable  Definition Source 
One share-one vote 1: each ordinary share 
guarantees one vote in the 
shareholder meeting; 0: 
otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Posted proxy is allowed  1: shareholder to mail proxy 
allowed; 0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Shares not frozen before 
shareholder meeting 
1: shareholders can sell their 
shares before a general 
shareholder meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation 
1: allow accumulated shares to 
represent a number of 
shareholders in election of the 
board of directors;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Oppressed minorities 
mechanism 
1: if minority shareholders can 
challenge manager’s decisions 
with granted judicial venue or 
to abandon the company by 
selling their shares when they 
disagree with the management’s 
decision;  
0: otherwise (minority 
shareholders are those whose 
capital share is 10% or less) 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Pre-emptive rights 1: if shareholders have priority 
to subscribe new shares and this 
right can only be discarded by 
shareholders’ vote;  
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Percentage of share capital to 
call an extraordinary 
shareholders' meeting 
1: shareholders have to hold 
greater or equal to 10% of share 
capital in order to call for an 
extraordinary shareholder’s 
meeting; 
0: otherwise 
Company law or commercial 
code; LLSV (1998) 
Share Shareholder right protection; 
sum of points 1-7, range from 
0-7 
 
   
Restriction on reorganization 
process 
1: reorganization process 
requires consent of creditors; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
No automatic stay on secured 1: an automatic stay on the Bankruptcy and reorganization 
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assets  assets of the firm is not required 
in the reorganization procedure; 
(collateral can be repossessed 
after the reorganization petition 
is approved.) 
0: otherwise 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Secured creditors rank top 1: secured creditors have 
priority in the distribution of the 
disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Management has to leave 1: court or the creditors appoint 
the managerial body during the 
reorganization process; 
0: otherwise 
Bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws; LLSV(1998) 
Credit Creditor right protection; sum 
of points 9-11, range from 0-4 
 
Efficiency of judicial system Assessment of the legal 
system’s efficiency and 
integrity in terms of its effects 
on business, particular on 
foreign firms, constructed by 
the country risk rating agency 
Business International Corp. 
ranges from 0-10; average 
between 1980-1983 
Business International Corp. 
and LLSV(1998)  
Rule of law Assessment of law and order: 
i.e. the strength of laws and the 
population observance in the 
country, produced by the 
country risk rating agency, 
International Country Risk 
(ICR); scores from 0-10; 
average monthly data between 
1982-1995 
Low score indicates weaker 
observance of the population. 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
Corruption Assessment of corruption 
within political system. Ranges 
from 0-10; average monthly 
index between 1982-1995 
Low score indicates high 
corruption in government  
According to Wei
32
 (2000), 
there is interactive between 
―Corruption‖ and ―Openness‖.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Risk of expropriation measurement of risk of 
―outright confiscation‖ or 
―forced nationalization‖, 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
                                                        
32
 Wei, S-J., (2000) ―Natural openness and good government‖, NBER Working Paper, No. 7765 
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ranging from 0-10; 
Average monthly index 
between1982-1995 
Lower score shows higher risk  
Repudiation of contracts by 
government 
Assessment of risk of ―a 
modification in a contract 
taking in the form of a 
repudiation, postponement and 
scaling down‖ due to the 
governmental changes. 
ranging from 0-10; 
Average monthly index 
between1982-1995 
Lower score shows higher risk 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
LGEF Law enforcement. sum of 12-
16; range from 0-50.  
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Table 4. 2 Sample Country 
 Country name Legal origin Religion  Income level
33
 
1 Australia English  Protestant  High Income  
2 Austria German  Catholic High Income 
3 Belgium French  Catholic High Income 
4 Brazil French  Catholic Lower-middle  
5 Canada English  Catholic  High Income 
6 China German  Other  Lower-middle  
7 Denmark Scandinavian  Protestant  High Income 
8 Finland Scandinavian  Protestant  High Income 
9 France French  Catholic  High Income 
10 Germany German  Protestant  High Income 
11 Hong Kong English  Other  High Income 
12 Hungary German  Catholic  Upper-middle 
13 India English  Other  Lower-middle 
14 Indonesia French   Muslim  Lower-middle 
15 Ireland English  Catholic High Income 
16 Italy French  Catholic  High Income 
17 Japan German  Buddhist  High Income 
18 Jordan French  Muslim  Upper-middle 
19 Kenya English  Protestant  Low income  
20 Korea German  Buddhist  High Income 
21 Luxembourg German Catholic High Income 
22 Malaysia English   Muslim  Upper-middle 
23 Mexico French  Catholic  Upper-middle 
24 Morocco French  Muslim  Lower-middle 
25 Netherlands French  Catholic  High Income 
26 New Zealand English  Protestant  High Income 
27 Norway Scandinavian  Protestant  Upper-middle 
28 Philippines French  Catholic  Lower-middle 
29 Poland German  Catholic  Upper-middle 
30 Portugal French  Catholic  High Income 
31 Russia French  Other  Upper-middle 
32 Singapore English  Buddhist  High Income 
33 South Africa English  Protestant  Upper-middle 
34 Spain French  Catholic High Income 
35 Sweden Scandinavian  Protestant  High Income 
36 Switzerland German  Catholic  High Income 
37 Taiwan German  Buddhist  High Income 
38 Thailand English  Buddhist  Lower-middle 
39 United Kingdom English  Protestant  High Income 
40 United States English  Protestant  High Income 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33
 Countries are categorized into four groups according to the classification of World Bank 2008 method in terms of the 
GDP per capita:  low income, $975 or less; lower middle income, $976 - $3,855; upper middle income, $3,856 - 
$11,905; and high income, $11,906 or more 
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4.4.1 Definition of Financial Development Indicators 
4.4.1.1 Bid-Ask Spread (BA) 
This indicator is constructed to capture the spread between the bid prices and ask prices in the 
stock market. For each selected stock, we take the difference between the ask price and the bid price 
divided by the average price (the average of highest price and lowest price in a day). The index for a 
country is then the average ratios for 100 stocks, with the top 30 stocks according to the stock’s 
total capitalization, the middle 40 stocks as well as the lowest 30 stocks. The original price data is 
from DataStream.  
1
100
1
1
1
100
nt nt
nt
nt
t nt
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ask price bid price
ratio
average price
BA ratio



 
                                                                       (4.4.1) 
The above formula indicates how the bid-ask spread ratio series are constructed for a country, 
where n is the number of stock selected and t is the time. We obtain the BA series for each sample 
country so that we can arrange the international comparison.  
Generally, the bid-ask spread of a single asset is the difference between the price required from 
the seller and the price offered from the buyer. If the difference is narrow, then the deal between the 
buyer and seller is easier to clear. As a result, the asset is more liquidised in this market. In other 
words, the market offers more liquidity to investors and borrowers. Therefore, the BA index offers 
an average level about the spread level in the financial market of a country. It provides the 
information about the liquidity of the financial market. However, the bid-ask spread is always exists, 
because it is also meant to cover the costs of the market makers in terms of contracts processing as 
well as the risks associated with the market volatility (Plerou, et al, 2005) therefore, holding the 
contracts processing costs fixed, the smaller a bid-ask spread is, the less the risks are reflected, 
which implies that the market is more efficient.  
This index is an index to measure the efficiency of the stock market; meanwhile the BA ratio 
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tries to capture the activity and volatility of the stock market in a country. Since the stock market is 
not only the method of providing liquidity, but also a way of hedging, the BA index measures the 
chances for speculation in a country in some sense.  
4.4.1.2 Interest Rate Spread (Interest) 
The interest rate spread index, Interest, is the difference between the lending rate and the 
deposit rate based on the country level data. The raw data is from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). The interest rates obtained are based on an averaged level of the interest rates in a 
country according to IFS data description. 
it it itint erest lending rate deposit rate                                                          (4.4.2) 
Where i denotes different sample countries and t is the time.  
The conventional view is that financial liberalization leads to economic growth. (see for 
example, Chapter 1; Levine, 1997; King and Levine, 1993) Therefore, the interest rate spread is 
associated with financial repression which we would expect to be negatively related to economic 
growth. Alternatively, when the level of interest rate spread is low, there will be more loanable 
funds attracted by the higher real deposit rate whilst more borrowing demands stimulated by the 
lower lending rate, which leads to the economic expansion. Since financial intermediaries play a 
key role in transferring funds between deposits and loans, regardless of the role played by the 
informal financial market, most credit and deposit activities will be realized via the financial 
intermediaries system, therefore, the level of interest rate spread could be considered as an indicator 
of the efficiency of financial intermediaries in channelling funds in the favour of facilitating capital 
formation and trade as well as filtering useful information. We expect this measurement as a 
complement to previous indicators, DEPTH, which mainly measures the size of banking system but 
is less concerned with the efficiency of the system.  
4.4.1.3 Non-Banking Institutions Development (NBI) 
The non-banking institution indicator measures the development of other financial 
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corporations, which excludes central bank and other commercial banks. It comprises the data of 
finance companies, mutual funds, brokerage houses, insurance companies and pension companies, 
and other financial companies that engage in financial intermediation and provide relative financial 
services. NBI equals the ratio of nonbanking institutions assets divided by the banks’ assets (non-
central banks).  The original data is from individual country reports or database of Central Banks, 
Ministries of Finance, and regulatory agencies.  
it
it
it
nonbanking assets
NBI
banking assets
                                                                               (4.4.3) 
Where i is the country and t is the time. 
NBI measures the size of other financial intermediaries than banks, which reflects the degree 
of how other financial intermediaries anticipate in the country’s economy related to banking sector. 
A higher NBI indicates more activities from other financial intermediaries compared with banks in a 
country. This proxy provides an assessment on the depth and width of the financial intermediaries, a 
judge of the further development in non-banking development rather than traditional commercial 
banks development. It is also a completeness of some indicators, such as PNB/GDP, INPE/GDP 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000) that take into account of other financial intermediaries 
related to GDP.  
4.4.1.4 Bank Default Rate (BANKDEFAULT) 
BANKDEFAULT measures the default ratio of the commercial banks in a country. It is the 
average ratio of individual bank’s default ratio in a country. The default ratio is constructed 
according to the CAMEL
34
 rating system and a summary index from subcategories as: earnings, 
bank liquidity, asset quality and the capital adequacy. I have investigated the data from all 
commercial banks in each sample countries from Bankscope.   
Index 1 for the earning is measured by ranking the ratio2, the ratio of net income and total 
                                                        
34
 The CAMEL system is a method to assess the health of credit unions by the National Credit Union Administration  in 
terms of Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liability management.  
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assets for each individual commercial bank. If ratio2 is less than -1%, the index is 0; between -1%-
0%, index is 1; between 0%-1%, index is 2; between 1%-2%, it equals to 3; between 2%-3%, it is 4; 
and greater than 3%, it is 5.  
Index 2, for liquidity, is measured by the ranking of ratio3, the ratio of liquid assets and total 
assets.  If ratio3 is smaller than 10%, the liquidity index equals to 0; between 10%-20%, index 
equals to 1; between 20%-30%, index is 2; between 30%-40%, index is 3; between 40%-50%, index 
is 4 and greater than 50%, index is 5. 
Index 3, asset quality indicator is marked according to the rank of ratio4, the ratio of 
problematic loans divided by total assets. If ratio4 is greater than 50%, then index 3 equals to 0; if it 
is between 10%-50%, index 3 equals to 1; if it is between 5%-10%, the index is 2; if it is between 
3%-5%, the index is 3; if it is between 1%-3%, index 3 is 4 and if smaller than 1%, index 3 is 5.  
Index 4, asset adequacy, is the ranking for ratio5, equity divided by total assets. If the ratio is 
smaller than 5%, the index is 0; between 5%-10%, the index is 1; between 10%-15%, the index is 2; 
between 15%-20%, the index is 3; between 20%-30%, the index is 4 and if greater than 30%, the 
index is 5.  
The total default ratio for each individual bank equals to the sum of Index 1 to Index 4, as 
shown below. Index of a country is averaged over all the individual commercial banks’ ratios. The 
higher the BANKDEFAULT index is, the less likely the banks in the country are to default, 
therefore, the more stable the banking system is in the country. The original data is from Bankscope.  
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Table 4. 3 Criteria for Measuring BANKDEFAULT 
Ratio2(%) <-1 (-1, 0) (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) >3 
Index1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio3(%) <10 (10,20) (20,30) (30,40) (40,50) >50 
Index 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio4(%) >50 (10,50) (5,10) (3,5) (1,3) <1 
Index 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio5(%) <5 (5,10) (10,15) (15,20) (20,30) >30 
Index 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 
In country i, each bank’s(bank j) ratio is jtbankdefault Index i                                       (4.4.4)  
Therefore, country i’s BANKDEFAULT ratio is
1
1 n
it jt
j
BANKDEFAULT bankdefault
n 
                  (4.4.5) 
 
4.4.1.5 Other Financial Development Indicators 
The chapter also involves two compound indicators for financial development. They are 
commonly used by previous literature in controlling financial development of each country in the 
quantitative prospect. The use of those two indicators is to check whether our measurements can 
complete previous measurement or not. Data is obtained from the World Bank database, which is 
also indicated in Table 4.1. 
1) FDFI, financial intermediaries’ development indicator. It is the aggregate ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP; ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP. According to (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 1996), FDFI is constructed by two steps. First step is to get the average-removed 
value for each of those indicators. For each country i, the mean-removed value for each index Zi is 
as follows: 
 ( )
( ( ))
i
i
Z mean Z
Z
abs mean Z

                                                               (4.4.6) 
where ( )mean Z  is the mean value of each index across all countries; ( ( ))abs mean Z is the 
absolute value of the mean value.  
The second step is to take simply aggregate of the above three mean-removed indicators. 
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2) FDST, financial market development indicator. It is the aggregate of market 
capitalization to GDP; total value traded to GDP; turnover (total value traded to market 
capitalization). According to (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996), FDFI is constructed by two steps 
similar to above.  
4.4.2 Legal and Cultural Indicators 
4.4.2.1 Legal Origin 
Legal indicators are the most commonly used variables in explaining financial-growth nexus, 
as mentioned in the literature review section of this chapter. According to the law and finance view, 
the law and its enforcement determine financial development of a country, thus influence economic 
growth. Therefore, in this chapter, we also employ the legal instruments to investigate whether legal 
factors also influence those aspects of the financial sector and the results can be comparative to 
previous empirical results.  
The legal origin dummy indicates the cross-country difference in law and regulation 
traditions, since the law and finance view holds that a country’s law system is generated from 
heritage or colonization (i.e. Beck, et al, 2002). The sample countries in the chapter can be divided 
into four legal groups: English Common law, French Civil law, German Civil law and Scandinavian 
Civil law. Each country’s legal origin is indicated in Table 4.2,  
4.4.2.2 Legal Protection 
Based on legal protection indices constructed by LLSV (1998, 1999) and Pistor et al.(2003), 
two types of indices are employed to indicate legal protection in the chapter: SHARE and CREDIT.  
SHARE is the indicator for shareholder (minority shareholders) protection. It measures how 
the commercial law and company law in the book protect shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders in the firm, against the insiders (i.e. managerial sector and majority shareholders). The 
higher the index, the better protection minority shareholders will gain from the law.  
CREDIT measures the creditor protection. The index is based on the country’s bankruptcy 
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law and reorganization law and measures how the law in the book secures creditors’ right in terms 
of bankruptcy or reorganization procedure. A higher index means a better protection.  
4.4.2.3 Law Enforcement, Country Risk and Accounting Standard 
The legal protection indices only reflect how investors are protected from the legal statutes, 
but the enforcement of laws still needs to be measured since there might be distinct between the law 
and its enforcement. The law enforcement index comprises two parts: efficiency of judicial system; 
and rule of law.  The first one measures the efficiency of the judicial system in anticipating business 
cases, higher score indicating a more efficient judicial system; while the later checks the law and 
order tradition of a country, a high rule of law index indicating a better order of tradition in a 
country.  
The next group of instruments for country risk consists of three parts: corruption, risk of 
expropriation and repudiation of contracts by government. Corruption index measures the degree of 
the country’s corruption level of the government. A high index means a low level of corruption. The 
index for risk of expropriation measures the risk of a business being forced nationalization or 
outright of confiscation, a high score indicating a low risk of expropriation. The repudiation of 
contracts by the government index assesses the risk of a contract being modified or postponed, a 
high index showing a low risk of such modification. The variable COUNTRYRISK, used in the 
model is the average of those three indices to show the overall level of the country risk in managing 
a business, a high score predicting a low risk. Besides, variable Corruption is employed in the 
model instead of employing COUNTRYRISK, because there are some countries, such as China, 
Russia, and Luxembourg, missing the values for risk of expropriation or index for repudiation of 
contracts by government.  In order to make the panel more balanced, we use this variable 
Corruption as well.  
ACCOUNT is the accounting standard from International accounting and auditing trends, 
Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research and LLSV (1998), which measures the 
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accounting standard in a country. Accounting standard indicator is also an widely used instrument 
for law and finance empirical analysis (i.e. LLSV, 1998, 1999; Levine, 1997, 2002, Pistor, et al. 
2000, etc) although accounting standard is not involved in the law system, the quality of 
information reveal is a matter of the information costs for both investors and finance seekers, thus 
will influence the capital allocation and economic growth.  
4.4.2.4 Cultural Indicator 
Culture is also an important factor for scholars in explaining economic growth (i.e. Lal, 
1999; Greif, 1994). Furthermore, Stulz and Williamson, (2003) argue that besides of legal factor, 
culture is a vital factor for financial development. Particularly, in some countries such as China 
(Allen, et al. 2004), culture belief is even more important than legal factor in explaining the 
financial development. In recent empirical study, language and religion are the two indicators that 
are widely accepted as the instruments for empirical work on finance-growth nexus (i.e. Levine, 
2000; Beck, et al., 2002; Djankov, et al., 2005; etc.)  
For completeness and comparativeness, the chapter also involves culture indicator as an 
instrument. There are five categories of culture dummies: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, 
and Other, where each dummy indicates the religion belief of the majority population in a country 
and particularly, Other means the majority religion belief in the country is not in any of first four 
groups.   
4.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables 
Influences from the other macroeconomic variables still need to be considered in order to 
comparativeness with previous empirical work. Those exogenous variables involved in the chapter 
are Inflation, GOVN and OPEN. Inflation measures the inflation level of the country, which is the 
CPI growth rate from the World Bank database. GOVN is the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP, which measures the government’s involvement in the economy. OPEN is the ratio of internal 
and external trade to GDP, which assesses the openness of the country’s economy to the rest of the 
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world and controls for the influence of the world economy to the domestic economy.  
We are aware that our empirical model has omitted some standard variables such as 
investment and population growth. Because the impact from the financial system to economic 
growth is mainly from the financial functions in terms of capital allocations, risk diversifications, 
and information sharing and so on which we have discussed in previous section in this chapter, this 
influence is thus relatively independent from the effects from other physical factors such as 
investments and labours. Prior literature also proves that the strong impact from financial 
development on economic growth is not likely to be driven by omitted variables. (see for example 
Levine, et al., 2000; Beck, et al. 2000, Levine & Renelt, 1992) Therefore, we will not expect that 
the omission of such traditional variables will lead to dramatic errors in the finance-growth nexus 
study. We are more concerned with the influence from financial development and its determinants 
and will put more effort on investigating the impact from different aspects of the financial sector 
rather than other factors.  
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Table 4. 4 Statistic Description 1 
 GRGDP BA Interest NBI BANKDEFAULT Open Govern Inflation FDFI FDST 
Mean 2.91 3.91 4.02 25.83 11.29 3.89 16.49 3.70 1.84 2.51 
Maximum 11.21 27.89 14.37 80.63 17 29.84 28.10 85.74 5.63 10.32 
Minimum -10.14 0 0 0.47 4 -12.35 3.11 -3.96 0.28 0.13 
Std. Dev. 2.54 5 2.18 19.75 2.28 7.80 5.27 6.36 .96 1.78 
Obs. 400 317 343 356 368 371 371 398 366 400 
           
Correlation           
GRGDP 1.00          
BA 
-0.01 
(0.086)* 
1.00         
Interest 
-0.29 
(0.000)*** 
0.29 
(0.000)*** 
1.00        
NBI 
0.28 
(0.000)*** 
-0.06 
(0.332) 
-0.19 
(0.001)*** 
1.00       
BANKDEFAULT 
0.13 
(0.010)*** 
-0.09 
(0.118) 
-0.21 
(0.001)*** 
-0.17 
(0.005)*** 
1.00      
Open 
0.28 
(0.000)*** 
0.03 
(0.604) 
-0.11 
(0.051)** 
-0.20 
(0.001)*** 
0.07 
(0.199) 
1.00     
Govern 
-0.31 
(0.000)*** 
0.07 
(0.204) 
0.12 
(0.026)** 
0.16 
(0.009)*** 
0.03 
(0.542) 
-0.17 
(0.001)*** 
1.00    
Inflation 
-0.40 
(0.000)*** 
0.13 
(0.017)** 
0.23 
(0.000)*** 
-0.12 
(0.039)** 
-0.17 
(0.001)*** 
0.01 
(0.850) 
-0.14 
(0.009)*** 
1.00   
FDFI 
0.50 
(0.000)*** 
-0.11 
(0.041)** 
-0.27 
(0.000)*** 
0.41 
(0.000)*** 
-0.15 
(0.005)*** 
0.16 
(0.003)*** 
-0.19 
(0.000)*** 
-0.29 
(0.000)*** 
1.00  
FDST 
0.60 
(0.000)*** 
-0.06 
(0.338) 
-0.34 
(0.000)*** 
0.26 
(0.000)*** 
0.01 
(0.98) 
0.33 
(0.000)*** 
-0.06 
(0.266) 
-0.39 
(0.000)*** 
0.53 
(0.000)*** 
1.00 
p-values are represented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4. 5 Statistic Description 2 
 BA Interest NBI BANKDEFAULT Share  Creditor  Countryrisk  
Rule of 
law 
Corruption  
Efficiency 
of judicial 
system 
LGEF Account  
Mean 3.91 4.02 25.83 11.29 3.24 2.65 8.18 7.93 7,64 8.02 7.91 67.01 
Maximum 27.89 14.37 80.63 17 5.5 4 9.99 10 10 10 10 83 
Minimum 0 0 0.47 4 0 0 2 2.73 2 2.5 3.24 36 
Std. Dev. 5 2.18 19.75 2.28 1.48 1.24 1.84 2.20 2.34 2.25 2.18 8.956 
Obs. 317 343 356 368 360 360 360 366 400 360 320 360 
             
Correlation             
BA 1.00            
Interest 
0.29 
(0.000)*** 
1.00        
   
NBI 
-0.06 
(0.332) 
-0.19 
(0.001)*** 
1.00       
   
BANKDEFAULT 
-0.09 
(0.118) 
-0.21 
(0.001)*** 
-0.17 
(0.005)*** 
1.00      
   
Share  
-0.03 
(0.060)* 
-0.11 
(0.051)** 
-0.20 
(0.001)*** 
0.07 
(0.199) 
1.00     
   
Credit  
-0.07* 
(0.104) 
-0.12 
(0.026)** 
0.16 
(0.009)*** 
0.03 
(0.542) 
-0.17 
(0.001)*** 
1.00    
   
Countryrisk  
-0.13 
(0.017)** 
-0.23 
(0.000)*** 
0.12 
(0.039)** 
0.17 
(0.001)*** 
0.01 
(0.850) 
0.14 
(0.009)*** 
1.00   
   
Rule of law 
-0.11 
(0.041)** 
-0.27 
(0.000)*** 
0.41 
(0.000)*** 
-0.15 
(0.005)*** 
0.16 
(0.003)*** 
0.19 
(0.000)*** 
0.29 
(0.000)*** 
1.00  
   
Corruption  
-0.06 
(0.338) 
-0.34 
(0.000)*** 
0.26 
(0.000)*** 
0.01 
(0.98) 
0.33 
(0.000)*** 
-0.06 
(0.266) 
0.39 
(0.000)*** 
0.53 
(0.000)*** 
1.00 
   
Efficiency of 
judicial system 
-0.01 
(0.914) 
-0.23 
(0.000)*** 
0.35 
(0.000)*** 
0.131 
(0.022)** 
0.28 
(0.000)*** 
-0.04 
(0.462) 
0.85 
(0.000)*** 
0.82 
(0.000)*** 
0.87 
(0.000)*** 
 
1.00 
  
LGEF -0.0939 -0.082 0.29 -0.135 0.129 0.240 0.946 0.946 0.966 0.947 1.00  
 (0.306) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.661) (0.037)** (0.663) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***   
Account  
-0.01 
(0.975) 
-0.31 
(0.000)*** 
0.19 
(0.004)*** 
0.10 
(0.093)* 
0.42 
(0.000)*** 
0.07 
(0.274) 
0.33 
(0.000)*** 
0.23 
(0.000)*** 
0.41 
(0.000)*** 
0.56 
(0.000)*** 
0.363*** 
(0.000) 
1.00 
p-values are represented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Description of the Four Indicators  
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Financial Development Indicators cross Income Groups, average 1998-2007 
Fig 4.1 shows our four financial indicators across different income groups. Vertical line 
shows the indices values. The value is averaged over countries and over time in each income group. 
The income level for each country is shown in Table 4.2 above. Fig.4.1 shows that non-banking 
institution development, NBI tends to increase dramatically as we move from the lower-middle 
income country to high income country group; meanwhile there is an obvious decreasing in interest 
rate spread from the lower-middle income group to high income group. The differences among the 
income group in terms of the other indicators, BA and BANKDEFAULT, are not significant from 
the graph above. Since there is trend shown as above that financial development indicators are 
correlated with the income level, it would be better to control for the wealth of the country, in order 
to show the independent relationship between financial development and economic growth, as 
suggested by previous literature such as Levine, et al. (2000).  
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Figure 4. 2 Bid-Ask Spread in Different Income Level Group over 1998-2007 
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Figure 4. 3 Interest Rate Spread in Different Income Groups over 1998-2007 
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Figure 4. 4 Non-Banking Institutions Development in Different Income Group over 1998-
2007
35
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35
 Data is only available from 2001 to 2007 for the upper middle income countries.  
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Figure 4. 5 BANKDEFAULT Rate in Different Income Group over 1998-2007 
(Note: higher BANKDEFAULT rate indicates better bank risk management) 
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Fig 4.2 – Fig 4.5 illustrate four different financial development indicators average across 
countries in different income groups across time. 
 In terms of the bid-ask spread, the lower-middle income countries keep a high level of bid-
ask spread over the sample period while the high income countries keep the lowest level and the 
upper-middle income countries have the middle level. However, the high income country group has 
an upward trend rather than a downward trend in upper-middle and lower-middle income group. 
Though the difference between high income group and the lower-middle income group is quite 
large at the beginning, between about 2% for high income group and about 6% for lower-middle 
income group, the difference becomes very small at the end of the sample period.  
Fig. 4.3 shows the interest rate spread. Neither the high income group nor lower-middle 
income group has too much change across time, though the high income group stands in a very low 
level while the lower-middle income group stand in a much higher level. Alternatively, the upper-
middle income shows a significant downward trend and tends to reach the same level as the high 
income group countries at about 3.5%.  
The indicator of non-banking institutions development (NBI) is shown in Fig.4.4. The high 
income group countries obviously have the highest amount of non-banking institutions related to 
their banking system, while the upper-middle income group countries stand in the middle and the 
lower-middle countries in the lowest. The first income groups does not show any significant 
changes across time, while only the lower-middle income group countries have a great development 
in the non-banking system over the sample period, which is from 8% to 16%.  
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the BANKDEFAULT ratio over countries across time and across different 
income groups. The BANKDEFAULT value is an average ratio for all commercial banks in a 
country and the higher the BANKDEFAULT is; the less likely the country’s banking system is to 
default. Similarly, the high income group countries’ banking system have the least likely to go 
default followed by the upper-middle income countries and with the most likely of bank default in 
the lower-middle income countries.  
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4.5.2 Financial Development and Economic Growth  
In the following, we intend to examine how financial system affects economic growth based 
on the indicators we construct. The empirical models have been explained in previous section.  
Table 4.6 presents results in the static growth model, equation (4.1) and Table 4.7 provides 
results of model 4.2.2, the dynamic panel regression. Financial development indicators have been 
transformed to the natural logarithm forms in order to imply the elasticity relationship with the 
economic growth and also to get rid of some potential heteroskedasticity. The results suggest that 
the exogenous component of the financial development, as indicated by the four indicators in terms 
of the qualitative aspect, has a significant though not statistically large impact on economic growth. 
The impact from the intermediaries on economic growth, two coefficients for Interest and 
BANKDEFAULT, are comparatively larger than the other two variables. Table 4.6 present results 
using 2-Stage Least Squares method (2SLS) on the fixed effect
36
 allowing endogeneity
37
 for the FD 
indicators which are instrumented by the legal factors. Additionally, the table reports results using 
White’s (White, 1980) method to correct heteroskedasticity. All four equations shown in the table 
have information set of variables, such as inflation, government expenditure and trade openness as 
the exogenous variables while income level dummies controlling the wealth difference across 
countries. Equation (1) & (3) presents results with the legal origin dummies and cultural dummies 
as instruments; while equation (2) & (4) show results with legal protection variables as instruments.  
Table 4.7 shows results from 6 regressions of the dynamic panel estimation using both the 
difference and system GMM estimators, described as above. The two tables generate similar results 
although the dynamic panel estimations show greater significance of the estimators. The initial GDP 
per capita is employed to control the wealth difference across countries and the year dummies are 
involved so as to control the time-specific influence. Equation (1) & (4) report the simple results 
                                                        
36
 A Hausman test for the difference between fixed effect and random effect is held; result is presented underneath 
table4.6. 
37
 The tests for endogeneity is held and presented below underneath table 4.6.  
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without any information variables while the rest 4 equations involve the information variables. 
Equation (2) and equation (5) show coefficients from regressions with legal protection variables as 
instruments; while equation (3) and equation (6) show results from regressions with legal origin 
dummies and cultural dummies as instruments.  
NBI and BANKDEFAULT are significantly and positively correlated with economic growth, 
while BA and Interest is negatively correlated with economic growth. However, the influence is not 
statistically as large as those traditional indicators
38
. Coefficients show that economic growth will 
increase (decrease) less than 1% when financial sector is increasing (decreasing) 1% as proxy by 
the four indicators. However previous studies show this impact greater and around 2% (for instance, 
Levine, et al, 2000)  
The negative coefficient of the bid-ask spread shows that a narrow difference between the 
bid and ask price implies a faster economic growth. The impact from this indicator is the second 
largest below to the impact from BANKDEFAULT, but only shown by 2SLS/GMM estimation 
results in table 4.6. When the bid-ask spread is smaller, it implies that market provides more 
liquidity, which facilitates resource allocation and stimulate economic growth.  
Interest rate spread is negatively associated with economic growth, as implied by the 
negative coefficient of Interest.  A cut of interest rate spread is due to either the increasing in deposit 
rate or the reduction on lending rates, which will attract households’ savings to depository while 
stimulate business borrowing because the rate of loanable funds is lower. This illustrates that the 
financial liberalization will increase the efficiency of financial intermediaries in transferring funds 
between creditors (loan suppliers) and borrowers (loan demanders), which leads to faster economic 
growth. Previous empirical studies also suggest that less developed countries have wider interest 
rate spread (see Barajas, et al, 2000; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000;  Chirwa and Mlachila, 2004, 
etc). This is mainly due to a less efficient financial system that they usually have. In a country 
where financial system is fragile, intermediaries requires higher interest margin to compensate the 
                                                        
38
 Such as Credit, LLY, Size of the stock market, etc. as described above in the literature review section.  
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high monitoring costs against high risks.  Proxy by this indicator, each unit decreasing in the spread 
will lead to around a half unit percentage economic growth, but this result is only suggested by the 
dynamic panel estimation results in table 4.7. Yet in table 4.6 it is less than half percentage, it is still 
larger than other coefficients of BA and NBI from the results of 2SLS/GMM estimations.  
The development of non-banking institutions measures the development of financial 
intermediaries excluding the banking system, thus indicates the width and depth of the financial 
system versus the traditional measurement in banking development. The positive coefficient 
confirms that a country with more developed non-banking institutions has a better developed 
financial system which provides more liquidity and boosts the economic growth. However this 
impact is statistically small and usually less than 0.1% as indicated by both 2SLS and GMM 
dynamic panel estimations.  
A high value in BANKDEFAULT means a low probability of banking default ratio in average 
of a sample country. A lower probability of banking default in a country implies a more secured 
banking system which is functioning better in allocating capital and resources in the country thus 
speeds up the economic growth. Furthermore, a safer banking system will also attract more 
investors and thus provide more liquidity to the whole economy. The impact from this indicator is 
around 0.1% to 0.2% and is comparatively larger than other indicators as suggested by coefficients 
in all estimations methods of this chapter.    
The regression results suggest a large impact from financial development on economic 
growth. For instance, Mexico has a value of bid-ask spread for 3.83 but the mean value of the upper 
middle income countries is 3.2. Therefore, if the bid-ask spread will be shortened to the mean value 
by the exogenous improvement in Mexico; the real GDP per capita will be pushed by an additional 
0.02 of a percentage per year
39
.  
                                                        
39
 If BA decreases from 3.83 to 3.2, then the change in GDP growth will be (ln(3.2)-ln(3.82))*(-0.13)=0.02, where 
the coefficient for BA is -0.13.  
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Table 4. 6 IV Estimations 
 Expected 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BA − - 0.1274** 
(0.024) 
-0.1254* 
(0.061) 
-0.0721** 
(0.031) 
-0.0158* 
(0.086) 
Interest  − -0.0468* 
(0.077) 
-0.0938 
(0.119) 
-0.0133* 
(0.086) 
-0.0186* 
(0.076) 
NBI + 0 .0428** 
(0.034) 
0.0117* 
(0.096) 
0.0347** 
(0.042) 
0.0292*** 
(0.008) 
BANKDEFAULT  + 0.1885** 
(0.027) 
0.1245* 
(0.069) 
0.1002* 
(0.063) 
0.2356* 
(0.091) 
Open  + 0.1200*** 
(0.000) 
0.299** 
(0.048) 
0.1140*** 
(0.000) 
0.0455 
(0.161) 
Govern  ? -0.1049** 
(0.035) 
-0.134 
(0.363) 
-0.0751 
(0.152) 
-0.0828 
(0.116) 
Inflation  − -0.0257 
(0.785) 
0.150 
(0.601) 
-0.0623 
(0.587) 
-0.3575** 
(0.046) 
Constant  ? 1.0629*** 
(0.002) 
4.871* 
(0.081) 
1.624* 
(0.081) 
6.3796* 
(0.079) 
Wald-test  36.96*** 
(0.001) 
36.86*** 
(0.000) 
66.33*** 
(0.000) 
52.89*** 
(0.000) 
J-statistics 
(p-value) 
 0.479 0.673 0.625 0.168 
p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
The above table shows results for regression Growth=constant+betai*FD+gammaj*information set variables. FD 
is the set of indicators for financial development: bid-ask spread; interest rate spread; non banking institutions; 
and BANKDEFAULT. Information set variables are openness to trade, government expenditures to GDP ratio, 
and inflation rate 
Equation (3) & (4) are using White’s robust estimation for heteroskedasticity correction.   
Hausman test for difference between fixed effect and random effect is  
 Chi2 (7) = 26.62, (Prob.>Chi2=0.002***); a rejection of the null hypothesis suggests an adoption of the fixed 
effect model. 
Tests on endogeneity of BA, Interest, NBI and BANKDEFAULT are 
Durbin (score) chi2(4)          =  17.8522  (p = 0.0013***) 
 Wu-Hausman F(4,352)        =   4.5791  (p = 0.0016***)( H0: variables are exogenous) 
Instruments for  regression (1)&(3) are legal origin dummies, cultural dummies and income dummies 
Instruments for regressions (2)&(4) are share, credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system, corruption, inflation, open, 
govern, income dummies. 
The p-values of Hansen-test for overidendification test for all instruments are presented at the bottom. Null 
hypothesis of the test: the instruments are valid.  
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Table 4. 7 Dynamic Panel Estimations (GMM) 
 Difference System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BA -0.0743* 
(0.066) 
-0.0630** 
(.0230) 
-0.0191* 
(0.052) 
-0.0561** 
(0.017) 
-0.0582* 
(0.069) 
-0.0310* 
(0.089) 
Interest  -0.4812* 
(0.065) 
-0.5124* 
(0.067) 
-0.1227 
(0.224) 
-0.1597* 
(0.093) 
-0.1903* 
(0.097) 
-0.0434* 
(0.095) 
NBI 0.0283** 
(0.029) 
0.0174* 
(0.085) 
0.0595*** 
(0.006) 
0.0299** 
(0.021) 
0.0137* 
(0.086) 
0.0215** 
(0.031) 
BANKDEFAULT  0.1380*** 
(0.008) 
0.1374* 
(0.104) 
0.0136* 
(0.084) 
0.1009*** 
(0.004) 
0.1109** 
(0.024) 
0.0936* 
(0.071) 
Open   0.1677*** 
(0.003) 
0.0339 
(0.477) 
 0.1875*** 
(0.000) 
0.0700** 
(0.036) 
Govern   -0.1618** 
(0.025) 
-0.3057** 
(0.022) 
 -0.0414* 
(0.053) 
-0.1379*** 
(0.003) 
Inflation   -0.0895** 
(0.021) 
-0.0584 
(0.397) 
 -0.1862** 
(0.032) 
-0.1047* 
(0.079) 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.3527*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3562** 
(0.033) 
-0.9523** 
(0.015) 
-0.4927** 
(0.027) 
-0.3591** 
(0.018) 
-0.0755 
(0.752) 
yr1999 -0.2537*** 
(0.002) 
-0.4258 
(0.385) 
2.0681* 
(0.057) 
-0.1081 
(0.826) 
-0.2383 
(0.639) 
-0.2528 
(0.644) 
yr2000 1.0358** 
(0.031) 
0.9551 
(0.193) 
2.4936*** 
(0.010) 
1.3029** 
(0.013) 
1.1534* 
(0.107) 
0.6053 
(0.182) 
yr2001 -2.7604*** 
(0.000) 
-2.6515*** 
(0.000) 
-0.5286 
(0.571) 
-2.8712*** 
(0.000) 
-2.9643*** 
(0.000) 
-3.0896*** 
(0.000) 
yr2002 -2.1784*** 
(0.000) 
-1.5766*** 
(0.000) 
0.2365 
(0.788) 
-1.0496** 
(0.022) 
-1.5045*** 
(0.002) 
-1.7574*** 
(0.000) 
yr2003 -2.4476*** 
(0.000) 
-1.7357*** 
(0.001) 
0.0803 
(0.922) 
-1.3681*** 
(0.005) 
-1.4695** 
(0.014) 
-1.7459*** 
(0.000) 
yr2004 -.9131* 
(0.094) 
0.0873 
(0.878) 
1.3632** 
(0.047) 
0.3553 
(0.459) 
0.2288 
(0.700) 
0.0234 
(0.957) 
yr2005 -2.2444*** 
(0.000) 
-0.9344** 
(0.040) 
0.1496 
(0.808) 
-0.8000* 
(0.104) 
-0.9221* 
(0.062) 
-1.1819*** 
(0.002) 
yr2006 -1.8647*** 
(0.006) 
0.0744 
(0.888) 
0.7807 
(0.135) 
0.2215 
(0.639) 
0.1663 
(0.770) 
-0.0295 
(0.940) 
Constant  4.5412*** 
(0.000) 
7.1648** 
(0.048) 
6.6069** 
(0.026) 
7.1942*** 
(0.001) 
5.4978*** 
(0.000) 
5.9246*** 
(0.002) 
Wald Test 194.11 
(0.000)*** 
149.23 
(0.000)*** 
139.5 
(0.000)*** 
206.64 
(0.000)*** 
260.13 
(0.000)*** 
236.12 
(0.000)*** 
Sargan Test 0.261 0.160 0.302 0.295 0.444 0.831 
AR Test 0.845
40
 0.707
41
 0.478 0.577 0.710 0.267 
p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
The p-values of Sargan-test for overidendification test for all instruments are presented at the bottom. Null 
hypothesis of the test: the instruments are valid.  
The p-values of serial correlation are presented at the bottom. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that the 
first-difference regression has no second-order correlation.  
Equation (1) & (4) shows results for regression lnGDP= constant+alpha*lnGDP(-1)+betai*FD; equation(2), (3), 
(5) & (6) show regression lnGDP= constant+alpha*lnGDP(-1)+betai*FD+gammaj*information set variables. FD 
is the set of indicators for financial development: bid-ask spread; interest rate spread; non banking institutions; 
and BANKDEFAULT. Information set variables are initial GDP per capita, openness to trade, government 
expenditures to GDP ratio, and inflation rate 
                                                        
40
 &
40
  the serial correlation tests also show that there is no first-order correlation.  
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instruments for regression(1) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, and BANKDEFAULT;  level 
terms of share, credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system,  corruption and year dummies yr1999-yr2006, first-
differenced term of initial GDP per capita. 
Instruments for regression (2) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, and BANKDEFAULT;  level 
terms of share, credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system, corruption and year dummies yr1999-yr2006, first-
differenced term of inflation, open, govern, initial GDP per capita. 
Instruments for regression (3) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, Interest, NBI, BANKDEFAULT; level term 
of legal dummies, cultural dummies and year dummies yr1999-yr2006, first-differenced term of inflation, open, 
govern, initial GDP per capita. 
Instruments for regression (4) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, and BANKDEFAULT; level 
term of  share; credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system,  corruption and year dummies yr1999-yr2006; first-
differenced initial GDP per capita; lagged first-differenced BA, interest, NBI, BANKDEFAULT and lagged first 
differenced economic growth 
Instruments for regression (5) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, and BANKDEFAULT; level 
term of  share; credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system,  corruption and year dummies yr1999-yr2006; first-
differenced inflation, open, govern, initial GDP per capita; lagged first-differenced BA, interest, NBI, 
BANKDEFAULT and lagged first differenced economic growth 
Instruments for regression (6) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, and BANKDEFAULT; level 
term of legal origin dummies, cultural dummies and year dummies yr1999-yr2006; first-differenced inflation, 
open, govern, initial GDP per capita; lagged first-differenced BA, interest, NBI, BANKDEFAULT and lagged 
first differenced economic growth 
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4.5.3Determinants of the Financial Development  
4.5.3.1 Legal Environment and Financial Development 
The main idea of the Law and Finance view holds that financial development is determined 
by the law system and its enforcement in a country. Therefore, a good and efficient legal 
environment will improve the functioning of the financial system, which is better at ameliorating 
information and transaction costs, etc. thus allocates resources more efficiently and boosts growth. 
Share and Credit indicate the legal protection for shareholders and creditors respectively. Law 
enforcement indicators include rule of law, corruption, efficiency of judicial system and Countryrisk, 
as described as above. The legal origins interpret the difference in the law system across countries, 
as suggested by literature such as LLSV (1998). Our study also analyzes the legal origins’ influence 
on financial development.   
Table 4.8 to Table 4.11 show empirical results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation, with the information set variables with/without cultural factors. It suggests that 
shareholder protection is negatively correlated with bid-ask spread (BA) and positively associated 
with non-banking institutions’ development (NBI). It is reasonable as better investor protection will 
encourage investors participating in financial market and thus stimulates market liquidity. At mean 
time, an improvement in legal protections encourages the development of non-banking institutions.  
Meanwhile, creditor protection is negatively correlated with interest rate spread (interest), 
while positively related with BANKDEFAULT. According to the method of constructing the creditor 
protection index which aims to measure the protection on secured creditors (the major creditors, 
such as banks), the positive coefficients suggest that banks are protected from default by the laws. 
In turn, banks do not need to require high level of profit margin to protect themselves against non-
performing loans, doubtable debt or other risks. Interestingly, the creditors’ protection is negatively 
correlated with NBI development, which suggests that traditional banks are stronger and bigger than 
non-banking institutions when legal statutes ensure banking system more.  
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In terms of law enforcement, a more efficient legal system is correlated with lower bid-ask 
spread, lower interest-rate spread, higher NBI and higher BANKDEFAULT, suggested by evidence 
that the coefficients of LGEF, Rule of law, and Efficiency of judicial system are significantly 
negative for the first two indicators and positive for the latter two indicators. These results confirms 
that legal enforcement ensure the efficiency of the financial system additional to the effects from 
legal statutes.  
Countryrisk, the degree of corruption, the risk of being expropriated by government and the 
risk of contracts repudiation are negatively correlated with BA, interest-rate spread, and positively 
correlated with BANKDEFAULT, and non-banking development. (Note: higher index in Countryrisk 
means less risk in the country) Therefore, the high risk of the country correlated with a high level of 
fluctuation in the financial system and a high bank default ratio.  
Table 4.12 shows the results between legal origins and financial development indicators.  
The country’s legal heritage is a key determinant of the modern legal system in a country. 
According to LLSV(1998, 1999a,b), English common law origin countries have the strongest legal 
protection for shareholders and French Civil law origin countries have the least; while German Civil 
law origins have the highest pro-creditor law system and French law origins have the weakest again. 
French Civil law origin countries have the least efficient law enforcement while German Civil law 
are stronger and English Common law countries are in the middle. The result in the study suggests 
that German Civil law origin countries have the lowest probability of bank defaults, since the 
German Civil law origin have the strongest creditor protection which give a strongest protection on 
the banking system so that yields a lower probability of bank default. In opposite, the English 
common law origins have the highest proportion of non-banking system, since it has the highest 
shareholder protection which supports financial investments in financial markets. Interestingly, the 
French origins countries have the biggest coefficients of bid-ask spread and interest rate spread, 
which suggest that French origin countries have the most inefficient market and banking system 
since they have the weakest legal protection on creditors.  
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4.5.3.2 Accounting Environment  
The quality of accounting system is commonly considered as a key factor related with the 
financial system since the quality is closely related with the information closure, thus the market 
efficiency. The result illustrates that a better accounting standard narrows the spread between bid-
ask stock prices and spread between the borrowing and lending interest rates, although the former 
coefficient is weaker and the later is much more significant at 1%. This implies that a better 
accounting environment will ease the information asymmetric thus reduce the abnormal profit that 
would be speculated in the financial system. Meanwhile, a good qualified accounting system will 
ensure more developed non-banking institutions as well as less probability of banking defaults 
because of transparency.  
4.5.3.3 Other Control Variables  
Regressions in Table 4.8-4.11 also consider the impacts from macro economy, such as 
inflation level, government expenditure and openness to trade. However, as we discussed before, 
the financial sector is independent from other sectors, thus we would not expect very significant 
relationship with those variables, which also has been confirmed by our empirical results shown as 
below, but for sensitivity analyses and complement, we would include those variables. 
A summary table for the relationship between legal, and the financial development 
indicators is presented below in Table 4.13.   
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Table 4. 8 Bid-Ask Spread with Legal Protection and Law Enforcement 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
            
Share  -0.333*** -0.378*** -0.327*** -0.332*** -0.337** -0.269*** -0.285*** -0.218 -0.207 -0.291**  
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.009) (0.424) (0.446) (0.021)  
Rule  0.020     -0.191***      
 (0.859)     (0.009)      
Efficiency   0.082     0.015     
  (0.491)     (0.818)     
Corruption    0.021     -0.209***    
   (0.859)     (0.002)    
Countryrisk     0.028     -0.256***   
    (0.859)     (0.002)   
LGEF      0.025     0.017  
     (0.859)     (0.818)  
Account  -0.072*** -0.080*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.003 -0.067 -0.004 -0.022 -0.067  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.836) (0.115) (0.968) (0.815) (0.102)  
Open  0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Govern  0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543  
 (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483) (0.483)  
Inflation  0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Constant 3.080* 2.983 3.113 3.037* 3.081* 0.811 2.563 1.362 3.236 2.487  
 (0.094) (0.117) (0.112) (0.074) (0.094) (0.629) (0.537) (0.766) (0.478) (0.524)  
            
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 340 340 340 340 340  
R-Squared 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704  
F-test 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11 12.11  
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
This table presents regression on bid-ask spread(BA) using OLS estimation: BA=alpha+beta*legal protection+gamma*information variables. 
Information variables include trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level, income dummy and religion dummy. Equation (1)-(5) control 
the income difference across countries; equation(6)-(10) control effects from differences in income level and religions. p-values are presented in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 9 Interest Rate Spread with LP and LGEF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
            
Creditor  -0.269*** -0.285*** -0.218 -0.207 -0.291** -0.119** -0.326*** -0.255*** -0.276*** 0.048  
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.424) (0.446) (0.021) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.529)  
Rule  -0.191***     -0.020      
 (0.009)     (0.525)      
Efficiency   -1.388***     -0.056     
  (0.000)     (0.170)     
Corruption    -0.728***     -0.191***    
   (0.008)     (0.005)    
Countryrisk     -1.692***     -0.255***   
    (0.001)     (0.005)   
LGEF      -1.734***     0.008  
     (0.000)     (0.815)  
Account  -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.026* -0.049*** -0.064*** -0.018** -0.016** -0.017** -0.020*** -0.016**  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.003) (0.000) (0.016) (0.040) (0.023) (0.009) (0.040)  
Open  -0.052 -0.063 0.011 0.000 -0.085 -0.198*** -0.178*** -0.184*** -0.187*** -0.193***  
 (0.335) (0.235) (0.840) (0.994) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Govern  0.041 0.096 0.071 0.046 0.031 0.042** 0.035* 0.051** 0.028 0.043**  
 (0.544) (0.114) (0.366) (0.542) (0.623) (0.025) (0.054) (0.021) (0.177) (0.021)  
Inflation  0.643*** 0.622*** 0.577*** 0.594*** 0.667*** 0.149*** 0.134** 0.132** 0.113** 0.152***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.034) (0.004)  
Constant  -2.312 3.428 -3.111 11.294*** -0.298 3.631* -0.032 2.371 2.694 2.925  
 (0.434) (0.203) (0.303) (0.007) (0.913) (0.064) (0.989) (0.248) (0.178) (0.181)  
            
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322  
R-Squared 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758  
F-test 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69 16.69  
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
This table presents regression on interest rate spread (interest) using OLS estimation: Interest=alpha+beta*legal protection+gamma*information 
variables. Information variables include trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level, income dummy and religion dummy. Equation (1)-(5) 
control for income difference across countries; equation(6)-(10) control for effects from differences in both income level and religions. p-values are 
presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 10 Non-Banking Institution with LP and LGEF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Share(Credit) 0.119** 0.093 0.094* 0.124** 0.097* -0.126** -0.139** -0.077 -0.110* -0.133** 
 (0.048) (0.114) (0.095) (0.035) (0.096) (0.049) (0.027) (0.230) (0.078) (0.039) 
Rule 0.084     0.021     
 (0.123)     (0.699)     
Efficiency   -0.001     -0.022    
  (0.989)     (0.698)    
Corruption    0.155***     0.128**   
   (0.004)     (0.027)   
Countryrisk     0.240**     0.145  
    (0.018)     (0.157)  
LGEF      0.051     0.001 
     (0.399)     (0.992) 
Account  0.042*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Open  0.052 0.079 0.012 0.019 0.060 0.131* 0.152** 0.063 0.097 0.140* 
 (0.417) (0.235) (0.853) (0.770) (0.360) (0.064) (0.038) (0.396) (0.186) (0.057) 
Govern  -0.097 -0.014 -0.286* -0.196 -0.080 -0.157 -0.105 -0.337** -0.249* -0.136 
 (0.495) (0.929) (0.071) (0.194) (0.602) (0.260) (0.477) (0.030) (0.097) (0.359) 
Inflation  -0.041 -0.049 -0.023 -0.024 -0.044 -0.014 -0.021 0.006 0.005 -0.019 
 (0.625) (0.563) (0.777) (0.772) (0.602) (0.863) (0.799) (0.941) (0.952) (0.814) 
Constant 4.236*** 4.235*** 4.541*** 3.446*** 4.293*** 4.709*** 4.769*** 4.646*** 4.073*** 4.786*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
R-Squared 0.302 0.288 0.337 0.320 0.292 0.302 0.302 0.329 0.313 0.301 
F-test 6.491 6.067 7.611 7.072 6.193 6.490 6.490 7.357 6.827 6.463 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents regression on non-banking institutions to commercial bank ratio (NBI) using OLS estimation: NBI=alpha+beta*legal 
protection+gamma*information variables. Information variables include trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level, and income dummy. 
Equation (1)-(5) control for the effect from legal protection on shareholders with both income and religion dummies; equation (6)-(10) control for 
effects from legal protection on creditors with both income and religion dummies. p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 11 Bank Default Ratio with LP and LGEF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Creditor  0.872*** 0.949*** 0.218 1.119*** 0.945*** 0.894*** 0.241 1.053*** 1.117*** 0.404 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.464) (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) 
Rule  0.613***     0.556***     
 (0.000)     (0.000)     
Efficiency   -0.058     0.030    
  (0.621)     (0.769)    
Corruption    0.445**     0.259**   
   (0.026)     (0.040)   
Countryrisk     0.925***     0.344**  
    (0.000)     (0.040)  
LGEF      0.114     -0.191 
     (0.680)     (0.153) 
Account  0.038** 0.039 0.020 0.054*** 0.025 0.051*** 0.119*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.097*** 
 (0.021) (0.201) (0.410) (0.001) (0.142) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Open  -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* -0.057* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Govern  -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 
 (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) 
Inflation  0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Constant 11.277*** 13.339*** 10.488*** 10.010*** 11.693*** 12.586*** 22.917*** 21.562*** 20.459*** 21.692*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
R-Squared 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 
F-test 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents regression on bank default ratio (BANKDEFAULT) using OLS estimation: BANKDEFAULT=alpha+beta*legal 
protection+gamma*information variables. Information variables include trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level, income dummy and 
religion dummy. Equation (1)-(5) control for income difference across countries; equation(6)-(10) control for effects from differences in income level 
and religions. p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 12 FD with Legal Origins 
 Bid-Ask  Interest Rate  NBI  BANKDEFAULT  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
English  4.503*** 6.253*** 1.679*** 3.139*** 4.784*** 7.420*** 1.824*** 3.232*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
French  4.655** 7.688*** 2.301*** 5.593*** 4.740*** 5.543*** 3.123*** 2.306*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
German  3.930*** 4.075*** 1.430*** 2.046*** 4.104 4.1744 4.784*** 4.471*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.214) (0.000) (0.000) 
Account  -0.102*** -0.047* 0.008 0.017** 0.181*** 0.245*** 0.137*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.063) (0.313) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Catholic   -1.451  -0.754**  -4.639***  0.732 
  (0.250)  (0.044)  (0.000)  (0.187) 
Muslim   -0.613  -0.914**  -6.272*  2.216*** 
  (0.611)  (0.018)  (0.064)  (0.000) 
Protestant   5.928***  1.843***  -5.307  6.581*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.207)  (0.000) 
Other   -0.955  0.379  9.915***  -2.877*** 
  (0.415)  (0.312)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
         
Observations 344 344 363 363 300 300 378 378 
R-Squared 0.847 0.847 0.855 0.855 0.872 0.872 0.889 0.889 
F-test 42.70 42.70 183.6 183.6 258.2 258.2 798.5 798.5 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents regression on each of the four financial development indicators using OLS estimation: FD=alpha+beta*legal protection+gamma*information variables. 
Information variables include trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level, income dummy and religion dummy. Equations (1), (3), (5) and (7) control for the 
income differences across countries. Equations (2), (4), (6) and (8) control for differences in terms of both income and religion. p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 13 Summary Table of Results 
 Bid-Ask Interest Rate NBI BANKDEFAULT 
Legal Protection      
Share  −  +  
Credit   − − + 
Rule of Law − − + + 
Efficiency of 
Judicial System 
− − + + 
Corruption  − − + + 
Countryrisk  − − + + 
LGEF − − +
b
 + 
Legal Origin     
English
a
  2
nd
 2
nd
  1
st
  2
nd
  
French  1
st
 1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
German  3
rd
  3
rd
  3
rd
  1
st
     
a 
For legal origin dummies, the sequence is presented in the table.  
b 
LGEF is not a significant regressor in the model for NBI. 
−:negative relationship; +:positive relationship  
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4.5.4 Compatibility with FD Indicators from Qualitative Prospective 
The motivation of constructing the new indicators is to measure financial development from 
its quality aspect so as to complement the traditional measurements for financial development, 
which concern more about the size of financial system, but ignore other features of the financial 
sector.  Therefore, the following study we need to do is to check the compatibility of the new 
indicators with the traditional financial development indictors. In practice, we want to check 
whether the new indicators as well as the traditional ones are significant at the same time in the 
empirical model.  
We introduce FDFI and FDST, financial development indicators for financial intermediaries 
and stock market respectively, as the additional regressors to previous two empirical models as 
above. Again, we construct the fixed effect 2SLS model with instruments allowing for endogeneity 
of the four FD indicators as well as FDFI and FDST. The main results together with test for 
selection of the fixed effect model and the test for endogeneity are represented in Table 4.14. We 
also construct the dynamic panel estimation with both difference and system GMM estimators. 
Table 4.15 present the main results. Equation (1) & (3) in each of the table presents the results 
without other information variables such as the inflation level, government expenditures and trade 
openness level and instrumented by legal variables. Equation (2) & (4) in each of the table presents 
results with these information set of variables. All financial development variables are instrumented 
by legal variables.  
In general, the new financial development indicators are complementary to the traditional 
financial development indicators, although a few of the coefficients are insignificant in the 
difference GMM estimation. This implies that the impact from financial system on economic 
growth is not only from the size effect but from its efficiency. This feature reflects how actively and 
efficiently financial system allocates resource in the whole economy. Therefore, when we financial 
economists consider the role that financial system plays in economic growth, we should not only 
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take into account of the proportion of financial development relative to the whole GDP, but also 
should concern the efficiency of financial system. Our new indicators has controlled for it. 
Moreover, using legal protection variables as instruments successfully indicates that legal system 
also has a significant correlation with the efficiency of financial system, and influences economic 
growth.  
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Table 4. 14 IV Estimations (with Conventional FD Indicators) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BA -0.0876 
(0.306) 
-0.0725** 
(0.038) 
-0.0637  
(0.331) 
-0.0532** 
(0.022) 
Interest  -0.1379** 
(0.025) 
-0.2141*** 
(0.002) 
-0.1185** 
(0.043) 
-0.2071*** 
(0.002) 
NBI 0.0033 
(0.868) 
0.0461*** 
(0.003) 
0. 0029 
(0.834) 
0.0422*** 
(0.005) 
BANKDEFAULT  0.3145* 
(0.094) 
0.3834** 
(0.009) 
0.3451** 
(0.025) 
0.3892*** 
(0.007) 
FDFI -0.5823 
(0.133) 
1.7612*** 
(0.000) 
0.7448*** 
(0.009) 
1.6515*** 
(0.000) 
FDST 0.7656*** 
(0.000) 
0.8296*** 
(0.000) 
0.8177*** 
(0.000) 
0.8312*** 
(0.000) 
Open   0.0187* 
(0.063) 
 0.0044 
(0.745) 
Govern   -0.1739*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.1726*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation   -0.5823*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.5956*** 
(0.000) 
Constant  3.0553*** 
(0.000) 
7.294*** 
(0.000) 
3.2398*** 
(0.003) 
7.3382*** 
(0.000) 
Wald test 35.49*** 
(0.000) 
82.61*** 
(0.000) 
57.41*** 
(0.000) 
93.99*** 
(0.000) 
J-statistics 
(p-value) 
0.614 0.368 0.542 0.368 
Above table presents regression on growth with financial development: 
Growth=alpha+beta*FD+gamma*information variables 
FD includes bid-ask spread(BA), interest rate spread(Interest), non-banking institution to commercial ratio( NBI) 
and bank default ratio( BANKDEFAULT), as well as  the conventional indicators for financial 
intermediaries(FDFI) and financial markets (FDST). These FD variables are instrumented in the regressions. 
Information variables involve trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level and income level dummy, 
which treated as exogenous.  
Equation (1) and (2) use 2SLS estimations; equation (3) and (4) have corrected heteroskedasticity using White-
robust estimations. Additional instruments are share, credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system, corruption, income 
level dummies. 
 
The Hausman test for difference between fixed effect and random effect are 
Chi2 (9) =23.79 (Prob.>Chi2=0.0046***), test with the information set variables 
Chi2 (6) =23.15 (Prob.>Chi2=0.0007***), test without the information set variables 
A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests an adoption of the fixed effect model. 
Tests on endogeneity of BA, Interest, NBI and BANKDEFAULT are 
Durbin (score) chi2(4)          =  10.9049  (p = 0.0277**) 
 Wu-Hausman F(4,350)        =  2.63665  (p = 0.0363**) 
Tests on endogeneity of FDST and FDFI are 
Durbin (score) chi2(2)          =  4.88173  (p = 0.0871*) 
 Wu-Hausman F(2,352)        =  2.30273  (p = 0.1035*) 
Tests on endogeneity of BA, Interest, NBI, BANKDEFAULT, FDFI and FDST are 
Durbin (score) chi2(4)          =  10.9049  (p = 0.0277**) 
 Wu-Hausman F(4,350)        =  2.63665  (p = 0.0363**)(H0: variables are exogenous) 
The p-values of Hansen-test for overidendification test for all instruments are presented at the bottom. Null 
hypothesis of the test: the instruments are valid.  
p-values of coefficients are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Table 4. 15 GMM Dynamic Estimations with FDFI and FDST 
 Difference   System   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BA - 0.0021 
(0.996) 
-0.0066** 
(0.037) 
-0.0186  
(0.368) 
-0.0294* 
(0.070) 
Interest  -0 .0321* 
(0.092) 
-0.0162*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0666** 
(0.043) 
-0.0821*** 
(0.001) 
NBI 0 .0193 
(0.302) 
0.0141 
(0.549) 
0.0149** 
(0.015) 
0.0108* 
(0.100)  
BANKDEFAULT  0 .0397 
(0.526) 
0.0941 
(0.177) 
0.0845* 
(0.059) 
0.0977** 
(0.038) 
FDFI 0.8074 
(0.149) 
0.2419 
(0.732) 
0.0182 
(0.945) 
0.6995** 
(0.022) 
FDST 0.5880*** 
(0.000) 
0.7993*** 
(0.000) 
0.5483*** 
(0.000) 
0.5621*** 
(0.000) 
Open   0.0756 
(0.119) 
 0.0408* 
(0.078) 
Govern   -0.2952** 
(0.023) 
 -0.1317*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation   -0.2063** 
(0.039) 
 -0.2482*** 
(0.001) 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.3866*** 
(0.001) 
-0.4941** 
(0.020) 
-1.0279*** 
(0.000) 
-0.8141*** 
(0.006) 
yr1999 0.3497 
(0.544) 
0.3259 
(0.665) 
0.3623* 
(0.078) 
0.0396 
(0.948) 
yr2000 1.5771*** 
(0.007) 
1.7786*** 
(0.004) 
0.9588* 
(0.082) 
1.2561*** 
(0.003) 
yr2001 -1.8829*** 
(0.002) 
-1.4119** 
(0.022) 
-2.8177*** 
(0.000) 
-2.2237*** 
(0.000) 
yr2002 -0.8039 
(0.129) 
-0.3136 
(0.638) 
-0.9684* 
(0.056) 
-0.8130* 
(0.072) 
yr2003 -0.3649 
(0.531) 
-0.3707 
(0.556) 
-1.1372** 
(0.036) 
-0.6336 
(0.167) 
yr2004 -0.9421* 
(0.086) 
1.1517 
(0.055)* 
0.4966 
(0.348) 
-.8924** 
(0.038) 
yr2005 0.8450 
(0.113) 
0.0753 
(0.895) 
-1.0103* 
(0.065) 
-0.3708 
(0.362) 
yr2006 -0.2126 
(0.742) 
0.8633 
(0.126) 
-0.1291 
(0.804) 
-0.6978* 
(0.087) 
Constant  2.1517* 
(0.089)  
6.3129** 
(0.030) 
2.1015*** 
(0.001) 
4.8928*** 
(0.000) 
Wald test 166.36*** 
(0.000) 
167.08*** 
(0.000) 
262.77*** 
(0.000) 
318.2*** 
(0.000) 
Sargan test 
(d.f.) 
0.183 
(113) 
0.599 
(160) 
0.187 
(132) 
0.268 
(169) 
Serial Correlation 
 Test 
0.892 0.341 0.462 0.597 
Above table presents regressions on the dynamic panel estimation model for log real GDP per capita; 
lnGDP=alpha+beta*lnGDP (-1) +gamma1*FD+gamma2*information variables  
FD includes bid-ask spread(BA), interest rate spread(Interest), non-banking institution to commercial ratio( NBI) 
and bank default ratio( BANKDEFAULT), as well as  the conventional indicators for financial 
intermediaries(FDFI) and financial markets (FDST). These FD variables are instrumented in the regressions. 
Information variables involve trade openness, government expenditures, inflation level and income level dummy, 
which treated as exogenous.  
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instruments for difference estimator in equation (1) and (2) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, 
BANKDEFAULT, FDFI and FDST;  level terms of share, credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system, and 
Countryrisk, first-differenced term of inflation, open, govern, initial GDP per capita and year dummies. 
Instruments for system estimator in equation (3) and (4) are t-2 lagged economic growth, BA, interest, NBI, 
BANKDEFAULT, FDFI and FDST; level term of  share; credit, rule, efficiency of judicial system, and 
Countryrisk; first-differenced inflation, open, govern, initial GDP per capita and year dummies; lagged first-
differenced BA, interest, NBI, BANKDEFAULT and lagged first differenced log GDP per capita.  
p-values of coefficients are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, year 
dummies are yr1999-yr2006 
The p-values of Sargan-test for overidendification test for all instruments are presented; the degrees of freedom 
for the Sargan test are presented in the parentheses. Null hypothesis of the test: the instruments are valid.  
The p-values of serial correlation are presented at the bottom. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that the 
first-difference regression has no second-order correlation. 
186 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examines the effect from financial development on economic growth with four 
innovated indicators. The indicators of the financial development are different from the traditional 
indicators which concern more about the quantitative aspect of the financial system. Alternatively, 
the financial development indicators in the chapter consider the quality of the financial system in 
terms of both financial market and financial intermediaries and aim to measure the efficiency of the 
financial sector in a country. BA is a measurement of the average bid-ask spread in the stock market 
of a country, which can indicate the liquidity of the market. Interest indicates the spread between 
the borrowing interest rate and lending interest rate of a country, which can indicate the efficiency 
of the financial intermediaries. NBI is an indicator of the non-banking institutions development, 
which measures the development of the non-banking financial institutions. BANKDEFAULT is the 
fourth indicator of the financial development in the chapter, which measures the average bank 
default likelihood ratio in a country constructed from the CAMEL ranking system.  
The study uses two econometric techniques: 2SLS/IV for the static panel estimation and 
GMM for the dynamic panel estimation. Other explanatory variables that may influence economic 
growth are controlled in the information set, such as the level of trade, government expenditure and 
income level. Besides, both estimation techniques involve the use of instruments that can solve the 
simultaneity problem in the regression. The two estimations generate similar results that our 
indicators are significantly correlated with the economic growth; and the impacts from each unit 
change of the financial sector are only lead to less than 1% change in economic growth. A negative 
coefficient for interest-rate spread indicates that the banking system is more liberalized and more 
efficient which can provide more liquidity to the economy. A larger non-banking sector 
development can also provide more liquidity to economy to compensate commercial banks in need 
of finance sources. Negative coefficient for bid-ask spread suggests that more liquidity from the 
market can help economic growth; in the meanwhile, positive coefficient of BANKDEFAULT 
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implies that a banking system with less likelihood of default can function better and more stably so 
as to boost economic growth.    
Furthermore, in tracing the exogenous determinants of financial development, we 
investigate the impact from legal protection as well as religions. Our results suggest that when 
investors are better protected, the efficiency of financial market and banking sector is better. When 
shareholders are well protected, the bid-ask spread is narrow since more investors participate in the 
market which provides more liquidity to the economy. So does in the banking sector. When 
creditors are protected well, banking sector suggests more efficiency in terms of interest rate spread 
as well as a better risk management indicated by BANKDEFAULT ratio. Moreover, the creditor 
protection is more favouring banking sector since banks usually are the secured creditor of an 
enterprise, which in turn weakens the development of non-banking institutions. However, the 
development of shareholder protection provides more opportunities for their development. From the 
legal origin dummy estimators, we conclude that English origin countries have more non-banking 
institutions development since it has the strongest investor protection. German origin countries tend 
to have higher bank default likelihood. This is because of that German origin countries have the 
strongest creditor protection which favours the banking system most in the country and leads to the 
lowest probability of banking default. The accounting standard is also considered. The study shows 
that a well informed financial system narrows down the spread between bid-price and ask-price in 
the stock market and the spread in interest rates; meanwhile a better information transparency 
supports the establishment of better developed banking and non-banking financial institutions. 
A robustness test for the compatibility of the new indicators with conventional indicators is 
carried out in the last session of this chapter. The results suggest that both types of indices could 
indicate the influences from financial sector on economic growth from different perspectives. The 
efficiency of the financial system cannot be neglected since it is of the same importance as the size 
of financial system. Our measurements provide a clue to control for such feature and complement 
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the study in finance-growth nexus.  
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5  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  
 
This concluding chapter contains two parts. Firstly, we provide a summary of the empirical 
results presented in Chapter two to four and the policy implications. In the second section we will 
discuss recommendations for further researches. 
  
5.1 Summary of Results and Policy Implications  
 
This thesis consists of three empirical studies on different aspects of legal origin/protection 
and economic activities and adds to the growing literature on the Finance-Growth nexus. The 
research presented in this thesis has illustrated the mechanisms through which legal protection 
affects economic growth both using micro firm-level and macro country-level based on a multi-
national panel analysis. The first two studies in Chapter two and three explain how legal protection 
influences company investment behaviour. Chapter four illustrates how legal protection affects 
financial development hence economic growth at the country-level controlling for both quality and 
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quantity.  
In Chapter two we investigate how legal protection influences firms’ capital investment. We 
use a modified neo-classical investment model. The model follows the Euler empirical model 
innovated by Bond and Meghir (1994) that investigates the investment of a company under 
financial constraints. In other words, the model shows how the investment of a firm is influenced by 
both the internal finance as well as external finance. Our modified model in Chapter two analyzes 
how legal protection affects the capital investment decision. If the hypothesis based on previous 
analyses on legal protection and financial development (e.g. LLSV, 1998, 1999; Levine, 2000, 2004) 
is true (i.e. better legal protection will yield better financial development), then the improvement of 
the legal protection on investors will result in a reduction in the financial constraints that a firm 
faces.  The empirical analysis considers this hypothesis. Results in this chapter suggest that firms in 
a country that has better legal protection of investors will less sensitive to internal finance, i.e. the 
coefficient on interactive term between legal protection and cash flows is significantly negative. 
This result suggests that better legal protection for investors will reduce the external finance 
obstacles. The results are robust when we control the macroeconomic characteristics such as 
inflation, accounting system transparency and government expenditure. This chapter also uses a 
threshold regression analysis and the results from this suggest that only when legal protection goes 
above a relatively high level that its impact on the firm’s investment is significant.  
The individual country study illustrates that in a country with weaker legal protection firms 
will benefit more from financial development than those in countries with advanced developed 
financial systems. This effect does not strictly follow the rule of legal origins across the world. In 
terms of debt, the results illustrate that in most countries financial development encourage firms 
taking more debt finance for investments in the next period. Moreover, the impact from the 
financial development is fairly the same among different legal systems but with exceptions of the 
Scandinavian countries where financial development is more influential to firms’ debt finance than 
191 
 
other countries.  
In Chapter two the empirical results illustrate the relationship between the investment 
behaviour and legal protection & financial development. The rationale for the relationship is that 
stronger legal protection is effective because it reduces the cost of capital for companies seeking 
external finance. In Chapter three, we aim to analyze whether better legal protection of investors is 
positively associated with the reduction in the cost of capital. Econometric tests have examined the 
costs in both types of capital-debt and equity across the world. In this Chapter, we will 
systematically explain whether legal protection is associated with the cost of capital and identify 
what is the impact. 
To consistent with previous work in Chapter two, we still work on the firm-level data. We 
investigate legal protection of creditors and shareholders as well as the level of legal enforcement, 
and identify their influences on the cost of debt and the cost of equity. The results suggest that a 
stronger legal protection of investors will lead to lower cost of capital. Empirical results in this 
chapter confirm previous researches arguing that effective legal institutions are positively associated 
with the functioning of financial markets hence will attract more investors and lower the cost of 
external finance. However, this mechanism only exists when legal protection of shareholders is 
strengthened. We have only found a direct linkage between shareholder legal protections and the 
cost of equity, but little evidence suggests similar mechanism works when we trace the impact of 
legal protection for creditors on the cost of debt. According to our analysis, legal protection of 
shareholders can substitute for risk premium and hence lower the cost of equity.  
On the other hand, legal protection of creditors is still influential for the cost of debt. 
Previous studies have largely proved that better legal protection will enlarge credit markets or 
banking sectors (e.g. Levine, 1999, 2000, and 2002). Our findings provide a confirmation of the 
existence of such linkage. We find that the interacted effect between legal protection of creditors 
and banking size is strongly significant negative for the cost of debt. In other words, the 
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improvement of the legal protection for creditors is important in reducing the cost of debt because 
in a country with stronger creditor legal protection, the banking sector will usually be larger since 
risk premium is relatively low. 
Similarly, our analyses suggest that the interaction effect between financial markets and 
legal protection of shareholders is also significantly negatively associated with the cost of equity. 
This can be explained through arguing that stronger legal protection for shareholders encourages 
investors to hold equity with a consequent reduction in the risk premium. A secondary effect will be 
that increased activity in financial markets will mean that they are more developed in terms of both 
depth and liquidity. Note that legal protection of shareholders is significant when interacted with 
financial markets’ liquidity in determining the cost of equity. Stronger legal protection for 
shareholders will lead to a lower level of cost of equity because it stimulates financial assets trading; 
therefore reducing barriers to external financing and the cost of equity will be reduced.  
Moreover, the study in Chapter three is only partially consistent with the legal origin view. 
The study find that the cost of equity in French civil law countries is the highest, but there is no 
systematic difference between the firm’s cost of equity in the English common law countries and in 
the German civil law countries.  
To summarize the first two chapters, we found evidence suggesting that stronger legal 
protection of investors will impact on company’s capital investment, through reducing both 
financial constraints and the cost of capital. However, as some scholars may argue, establishment of 
the legal system in a country will take centuries and, once established, is slow to adjust; therefore, 
the indicators for legal protection in our studies, especially indicators of legal protections are time-
invariant and only differ across countries. From this point of view, the study explains the cross-
country difference in the effects from legal protection on firm investment, but may lack a 
demonstration of a dynamic influence. In reality, it is the legal enforcement indicators that illustrate 
these changes although the effects are not dramatic. In our study, the effect from the legal 
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enforcement is indicated to be more important and effective than legal protection as established in 
the legal statutes. The results of chapter three support this conclusion. 
In Chapter four we turn to investigate law and finance interaction from a macro-economic 
perspective. Chapter four provides empirical studies between financial development and economic 
growth, and how legal protection takes effect in this finance-growth nexus. To provide additionality 
to the existing literature, empirical studies in this chapter provide four new indices in terms of 
financial market and banking sector performance in order to control for the liquidity and volatility 
of the system, rather than size and volume that have been the traditional indicators of financial 
system effectiveness. Following the law and finance view, legal factors are again considered as a 
determinant of financial development across countries, and hence a sound instrumental variable in 
the empirical regressions to avoid the simultaneity problems. The variables representing the 
finance-growth nexus are found to be very significant in the study, while the legal factors strongly 
affect the level of financial development. We compare our indicators with the conventional 
indicators for financial development (i.e. traditional measurements for banking size, and stock 
market capitalisation) and we find that the results are compatible. In contrast to prior work which 
states that legal protection is positively determining the size and depth of the financial sector, our 
study finds a different perspective. In general, better legal protection for both shareholders and 
creditors will lead to financial development and boost economic growth. For example, better 
shareholder protection is correlated with smaller bid-ask spread in the financial market which would 
provide more liquidity to economic growth. In terms of legal enforcement, the empirical results 
illustrate that stronger legal enforcement will lead to a lower rate of bank failure and also higher 
development in the non-banking institutions. This seems reasonable because stronger legal 
enforcement will ensure investor rights of both banking and non-banking institutions. However, 
effects from creditor protection and shareholder protection are different to the development of non-
banking institutions. Shareholder protection is positively related to NBI while creditor protection is 
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negatively correlated. It implies that shareholder protection facilitates non-banking sector 
development while creditor protection restricts it since creditor protection is more favour of banking 
development. The development of non-banking institutions is proved to be beneficial to economic 
growth. However, the non-banking sector is relatively weaker and far from maturity especially in 
most developing countries of the world, and thus would be seen to be a growth priority. Then, 
policy makers need to recognize the consequence of different laws and regulations.  
5.2 Further Research  
 The thesis has found legal factors may influence economic growth through lowering the 
cost of capital and reducing firms’ financial constraints when making capital investment. Besides 
the thesis also contributes evidence that supports law-finance-growth nexus view. However, there is 
still further research we need to do in the future.  
Firstly, as mentioned above, most of the legal indicators we employ are time-invariant; 
therefore, the empirical results are weak in explaining the dynamic influences from the legal system 
to real world economic decisions. It is a considerable task to construct a new legal index to monitor 
the changes in legal reform and the consequences for the financial sector and whole economy. Such 
an analysis is best considered using developing countries as examples since their legal and financial 
systems are evolving. However recent policy responses to the global financial crisis also provide a 
potential laboratory to examine this issue. 
Secondly the countries selected in the sample are mainly developed countries, but few are 
developing countries, especially the rising economic powers like China, which is considered by 
most of finance economists as the major exception to the conventional finance-growth nexus and 
law and finance nexus. China has a relatively small and undeveloped financial system. Therefore it 
has always been a puzzle why China confounds the standard analysis that finance is important for 
growth. Do we miss any factor that is unique to the Chinese economy? In China, resources and 
assets are actually mainly traded without a formal financial system but within the unofficial 
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financial market, i.e. borrowing between friends and relatives (see Allen et al., 2004). This type of 
unofficial financial service actually is very prominent in China and thus it is worthy of analysing 
this type of finance development in the context of developing countries. 
Last and related to the previous observation, we believe that other social factors rather than 
legal factors are also determinants of financial development. Although existing literature has 
mentioned factors such as culture, politics and their impacts on finance and economy, their studies 
are still remaining at a qualitative analysis level. In other words, those social factors are not 
properly indexed and therefore cannot be applied widely in the econometric analysis. If we could 
construct any indicators to measure those social factors, it will contribute to the empirical studies on 
the finance and growth. 
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